Army sec: I’d give us ‘B+’ on acquisition reform

Army sec: I’d give us ‘B+’ on acquisition reform

A lot of people scratched their heads when the Army issued a request for proposals for the Ground Combat Vehicle it’s yearning for — and then pulled the RFP right back. But for Army Secretary John McHugh, it was a sign of progress, proof that the service is serious about reforming the sometimes dysfunctional way it develops and buys its major equipment.

In a press conference at Monday’s AUSA trade show, McHugh and Army Chief of Staff Gen. Ray Odierno said they thought the Army had made a great deal of progress in acquisition reform over the past 18 months. McHugh said the service has implemented 60 of the 76 recommendations made by the Army Acquisitions Report, and as we recall, the service is studying what it’s going to do about the others.

On the GCV RFP, McHugh said the original document had about 1,000 requirements — “but then we realized, ‘Here we go again,’” he said. So even though defense vendors pulled their hair out after having begun work on responding to what they thought the Army wanted, McHugh said it was a positive step for the overall direction of the program. The next GCV RFP had about 300 requirements, and the Army was able to move forward with awarding development contracts earlier this year.


Overall, McHugh said, “I’d give us a B-plus — work in progress.” He said he knew the Army’s acquisitions history was not encouraging, and his ears are doubtless still ringing from the AAR’s findings about the billions upon billions of dollars the service has wasted on cancelled programs. (Er, not “wasted,” because, of course, some portion of goodness from those failed programs may have theoretically carried over into things the Army actually was able to buy.)

Still, there are a lot of skeptics about the Army’s aspirations. Senate appropriators want to eliminate funding for the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle, and the GCV’s costs are out of control years before the first one is even built. Finally, the big question was asked: In the face of its internal challenges and the pending budget growth reductions, can the Army build anything new? Or must it rely instead of waves of upgrades to existing equipment, or only fielding new copies of institutions such as the 50 year-old CH-47 Chinook?

No, we can find a balance, Odierno said. “We can’t just say we’re going to give up on modernization. We have to adjust the rheostat between end strength, modernization and readiness.”

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B+ my ass! Why should the US Army ever pay for development, let alone provide their contractors a profit on development? They are planning on buying these GCV’s by the thousands. Any defense contractor could design and develop a prototype for a few million dollars. It certainly wouldn’t cost as much as a new technology helicopter. They could easily make their money back by through a reasonable profit margin on delivered, working vehicles. Imagine that, the US Army could buy the best vehicle for the best price instead of buying a pack of lies told in a bs proposal! Of course, if they did that, the military industrial complex couldn’t drag out the development program for 25 years only to cancel it before even a single unit is produced. They pay the contractor more to drag out the program and jack up the costs, then give themselves a “B+” for reform?

The real question is why things were ever allowed to get this out of hand in the first place. I’m a 11-B sergeant. One of my jobs is ensuring my soldiers have everything they need to accomplish whatever mission we have been tasked with. If my soldiers fail to have something and don’t have a legitimate reason why, I punish them. These senior-level officers OTOH, waste billions of dollars and ultimately NEVER meet missions requirements. Where is the accountability?

“and the GCV’s costs are out of control years before the first one is even built.”

I wonder if they’re including all the money spent on FCS in this statement? It’d be perfectly valid if they did.

30+ years in DoD contracting. Why have things gotten out of hand? EDUCATION!!! Instead of hiring people to work (and get the soldiers their parts) Congress and DoD has put more emphasis on DoD buyers getting Continuous Learning Points (CLP) and Leadership Training. It’s going to get worse…we’ve been able to use the mandatory training to fulfill the 40 hour CLP requirement. Beginning FY12, no more, so now it’ll be mandatory training (sexual harrassment, human trafficking, computer stuff, security, etc) PLUS another 40 hours. The focus has gone away from actually accomplishing the mission and the focus has become employee development. The Govt needs to bring back hiring using tests and hiring veterans. This hiring only from colleges for intern programs using 3.5 GPAs is getting us nothing but prima donnas who done want to accomplish the mission and are mostly concerned about getting their GS-13 in 4 years.
I’m so sorry. 30+ years and most of it, I have been proud to be a civil servant. Not anymore. It’s just dirty now.

I would love to come back and work for the Army. Seems like having around 20 years as a systems engineer and electronics subject matter expert, would make me a desirable employee. But I have yet to see the Army out hiring these kind of skills, even though a decade of my experience is with the Army.
I do see other people with similar skills leaving the Army and going to other groups because they are tired of waiting for this acquisition reform. The Weapon Systems Acquisition Reform act was signed over two and half years ago and still not sign of critical skills becoming worth having.
We are all slowly becoming Powerpoint monkeys and the next generation of engineers will know nothing else but powerpoints and meaningless work. And we all wonder why we get less and less but it costs more and more.

WOW, 30+yrs in DoD contracting!! The question YOU need to ask yourself, is what have I done to continue MY education. NOT what the Gov’t told you needed to do. If you get paid to take training, and somebody above you feels its necessary, than why do you complain? Nobody will argue if you decide to continue your education. Did your education stop, just because the DoD doesn’t tell you to do it. I do agree the CLP’s are useless to me as well. They don’t add a thing to my skillsets. But be careful of asking for testing, (OPEN MOUTH — INSERT FOOT). Just because you may have thought you knew the mission 30+ years ago, don’t mean you know what the mission is today. Hiring veterans / qualified with the right skillset is fine. But first you need to make sure the workforce is competent to meet the needs of missions, not just hire a vet because he/she is one. If you think that Computer Security and “stuff” is useless, than you clearly don’t understand what threatens our homelands and missions today and for tomorrow.

the answer is poor leadership at the top. Shinseki started the FCS GOBI, Schoomaker committed the Army to the program, and Casey refused to change course as the program was going down in flames. Us mere mortals can squabble over the merits of this system or that system and tear one another down. In the end, what does it matter when senior leadership is as stupid and corrupt as it is? And here’s the latest ration to swallow: none of those leaders are to blame, the system’s working just fine, B+ performance.

Grunt is right — DoD is pushing training that main stream has already moved away from because it was a waste of time and money — LSS is BS, 500,000.00 per person and it solves no function in our jobs other than to draw things out and take the focus away from the real intent. Same for toyota and other BS training. They spend more trime debating the format of the report than the report findings, 6 weeks to write a report that could be done in less than a week, Pie charts and graphs are useless and arguments about the color selection is common. Need to get back to the basics and do our true job of watching over the contractors rather than attending non relevent training.

Why should the US pay for development? Because they are totoally unwilling to accept “off the shelf”, thats why. When the US Gov’t goes to procure a vehicle, they provide a set of specs, actually a set of BOOKS of specs that in my 30+ yrs of experience is never ever the same as what they bought before. Then, when you get started drawing, documenting, coding, etc the design and even start building it, they then go in and CHANGE the spec. I’ve seen this happen on every single program that I’ve been on and I have worked on programs for all of the services and Coast Guard. One time, I had an Army radio program where the production run was 200 units and we had them all built at the subassembly level when the Army changed a very key requirement and every single one of them had to have a fairly complex modificaiton made to it.

That happened to be a Cost-Plus contract but based on the cost sharing agreements and the overall position of the job, this was done for no fee (profit) and in actuality, the whole job ended up being zero profit. Maeanwhile., we were taking up lab and produciton space and the team that was working on it were not able to be working on other things. Because we had sales with no net profits, our program served as a drag on the company’s profitability and overall ROS/ROI. Thats why there is customarily a profit paid on development, because otherwise, the companies will take their workforces elsewhere.

Overall, not a good thing for the company or business unit.

What a bunch of BS! The Army buys things all the time that are developed to their specifications without paying any contractors profit on development. Instead the contractor’s development costs are paid back through the profit they make selling actual, honest to God weapons and supplies to the Army. It is a model the Army is very familiar with. It works all the time. It would work here. So quit wasting my tax dollars and do what works instead of doing what has failed on this very type of vehicle for the last 25 years! The you won’t have to make these BS excuses.

Hmmm… interesting. I guess you’d better get the government labs and production facilities spun up to do it because yuo are not going to find companies willing to make MILITARY USE ONLY items for no profit at their own risk.

I’ll tell you what, go ahead and look overseas as well and see how that goes for you. I don’t know of any foreign companies that work for free either.

Good luck with that

Oh, and by the way please tell me what MILITARY USE ONLY items are being developed by contractors for no profit (for free)

Not asking to be tested to keep my job,ConfusedIAM. Somehow before “Acquisition Reform” and the Defense Acquisition Workforce Improvement Act (early 90s) came into being (in a knee-jerk reaction to the tool-boxes), to be a one did not have to have a 4-year degree to work for the Govt. Once DAWIA was passed, then the Govt started paying for more and more schooling. Is it needed to do the job? No. Again, the acquisition focus of the Army has steered away from supplying soldiers now to employee development. As soon as a new hire comes in with their bachelor’s degree, the Army is hot on their tail to get a post-graduate degree…and Uncle Sugar will pay for it.…Is it fair to John Q. Taxpayer to stick them with the bill to pad the educations of federal employees? I’ve worked in buying, pricing and program management offices and I’m here to tell you — the post graduate degree from a civilian institution isn’t worth the money in a military environment. The Army needs to get back to it’s core — we are the military — quit trying to act like a corporation wanna-be.

I don’t know how training works on the government side, but it works just like this on the contractor side: http://dilbert.com/strips/comic/2011–07-18/

From your comments, it seems like both sides do basically the same thing. Just remember, you’re all about process, not results.

I’ll betray my age again.

Does anyone remember the F-20? Built totally out of Northrop’s pocket with the idea of being the “upgrade” to the ubiquitous F-5 as the low end foreign military sales fighter. It was not built with ANY “assistance and oversight” or “overhead” from the USAF development community, and for some reason, it could not generate even the slightest interest in the USAF FMS community. (With the rules they way they are, FMS is a government to government business for major weapon system, so direct sales was not an option!).

Makes a person wonder if there was just a small bit of jealousy or “job security” issues plaguing that reasonably capable, and quite cheap fighter!

Out of the mouths of babes… and 11-B sergeants! LOL! You ask a VERY good question, my friend! Is the mission of the acquisition corps to maintain SPI and CPI, or is it to PROVIDE CAPABILITY for the troops? All of the high philosophy aside, the facts would seem to tell the tale! In an executing business process (no judgement on the value of the process), you reward people who fulfill their mission and punish those that dont. Who gets rewarded these days?

And before a host of folks charge in with “Its more complicated than that!”, Id say, the excuses are complicated, the facts are simple. Is there even a defined PM metric for “system performance” (CPI is cost, and SPI is schedule) in the DoD system.

To a degree, the training is not really a problem. Ive been in and around procurment (from both sides of the fence) since the mid 70s! (OMG, Im OLD!), and the basic principles and problems have not really changed all that much. Its just different names, and some little tweaks here and there. The problem is in employing, and in some cases, ENFORCING some of these good principles, not just in the classroom exercises, but in “real life”. When was the last time that you actually SAW a proactive risk management process (as all of the training courses since the 70s have advocated!) working for a government procurement to not just identify but to mitigate and eliminate risks on a systematic basis? Yeah I know, it costs too much… until that last quarter when the “fixes” for the problems, that used to be risks, all hit.

Lessons unlearned for many years just makes for easy after action reports!

it actually IS the job of the acquisition corps to maintain SPI & CPI. We need to make the proper diagnosis of what is wrong, otherwise we will have more ineffective acquisition reform legislation, blame on the acquisition corps, and more and more dollars spent on DAU training that does not get applied because the industry-friendly concepts are impossibly flawed/constrained from the get go, and LEADERSHIP is too incompetent, corrupt, and undisiciplined to navigate the acquisition process properly and keep requirements from creeping. The “system performance” metric is a YAY/NAY from the test community. For ACAT 1, this means you have to make the DOT&E happy. Communicate, development reqts, and establish achievable performance criteria.

Blow people off, don’t communicate, don’t deliver, and you put your program at much greater risk of impact from “external decision making”.

I agree with you 100%. DAU Acquisition training is great, Acquisition regulations and processes are reasonable and provide a map for how to get from point A to point B. We’ve got lots of training, processes and people who can get this job done. Too many resources are wasted by poor leaders on poor concepts.

I remember the magazine article (Atlantic Monthly?) titled “The Plane that Doesn’t Cost Enough” talking about the F-20 Tigershark. It basically was viewed as a case of the dreaded “not invented here syndrome” and not pursued by the AF.

ROTFL! And what program manager has been “stood in front of the wall” because of a bust in OT&E?

In systems engineering there is a joke about program managing that goes something like: “Do you want it soon, cheap or good? Pick any two!” There are PM metrics for soon (SPI), cheap (CPI), but there is no metric for “good”! There is also a witticism that those things that are not measured and verified don’t happen. That means that, to your seasoned and cynical PM, performance is the “no cost tradeoff” for maintaining a good CPI and SPI and keeping his performance report shiny.

I love that quote. It works for so many things.

Sikorsky is designing the S-97 on their own dime right now. Where the hell have you been?

Don’t put words in my mouth, schill.

The same thing nearly happened to the C-130J. Only a few of the models of the C-130 have been developed on the US government nickle. Lockheed spent $1 billion of their own money on the J. It wasn’t good enough for congress until McCain put it under a standard military contract ending the 50 year run of Lockheed financing their own upgrades.

Oh yeah, acquisition regulations are great just as they are. It’s just those damn people don’t get how great those rules are! Just like comm unism. We need a purge so those who don’t get the greatness of these rules could be weeded out and those who truely comprehend the greatness of these rules can thrive. It’s all clear to me now.

That’s not a joke, it’s a lame cliche used as an excuse by people who don’t know how to develop and execute good acquisition strategy and manage resources effectively. Your “witticism” is actually “You can’t manage what you don’t measure.” As far as verification goes I got a better one for ya — SNCO former QA in my office had a plaque: “In God We Trust, All Others We Inspect”.

I’m having a hard time trying to understand you, on account ofyour sarcasm I believe. I’d like to have a productive conversation with you. If you look back at every failed acquisition program, you can trace the root causes of the failure to a lack of following training & regulations. Training & regulations are not the problem, people are. Sure, there are some gaps that can be filled with training and reformed/simplified regulations. They will not save you if you have people making poor decisions.

One observation I’ve made is that the Army seems to have some kind of tech envy of USAF and USN. The US Govt chases management fad after management fad, hoping to find a silver bullet to correct past failures, rather than addressing the root causes of our problems, because that would be too politically difficult, controversial, and cause conflict. Sometimes the buildup of failure reaches a tipping point, the dam breaks, all h*ll breaks loose, and we need another “independent panel of experts” to inform leaders of the “cold hard truth” that people in their command have known all along and have been trying to inform an unresponsive chain of command.

The problem is simple — too dang many offices providing oversight of one item. Easy lesson in point is 5.56mm ammo, AMC — JMC — JMC/ARDEC — NAVSEA — NAVSEA/USMC all have a program management office for this one round. This round is manufactured to one government spec and all manufactured pretty much by the same contractors along with Lake City Army Ammo Plant. So why do we have all these different PM teams and offices and contracts for this one bullet that the Army is responsible for purchasing for all the service branches? about 100 people to many making decisions for something this simple. And it only adds to issues when one of them accepts a contractor change or accepts the ammo on a waiver without even concidering talking to the other services who wind up having to use it. It’s time to clean house to clean up our act.

Layers of bureacracy may be a problem Boomer, but it’s not the greatest problem and it’s not the root problem. A productive organization that communicates horizontally and vertically can overcome bureacratic inertia. FCS, Spinouts, “Inc-1 EBCT”, LandWarrior, Comanche, Crusader, GCV, JTRS, JC4ISR, WIN-T, Army Expeditionary Contracting (Gansler report) are the festering sores. These are the headlines, the root causes are leadership failures driven by failure to adhere to Core Values resulting in toxic cultures and ineffective organizations.

But all of these programs had the same issue of too many PM’s and thier opinionated changes. I agree with you for the most part but too many chiefs and not enough indians is an issue. for example the JSF — they should had sat down at the onset and decided on one set of capabilities for one platform 100%. Either they were all going to be STOVL with the same avionics, fire control, and weapons or there is nothing joint abot them other than the name. They could had decided at that point that STOVL was an udesirable asset and went to one carrier/land based design for the NAVY & AF and designed a joint STOVL version for the MARINES and country’s that desired them. Would had sped up production and testing saving millions of dollars in the long and short term just by having one responsible office collecting the requirements — laying them out to the contractors — and overseeing the program rather than having each branch and country doing it and mandating changes on thier own.

The B+ comment is symtomatic of how out of touch the acquisition part of the services are with reality. Like acoholics, you must first admit that you have a problem. B+ means everything is A OK.

News on Inside Defense says that the Army led JAGM program has been proposed to be cancelled in the face of the budget hacks. Because this is a joint program,essntially replacing Maverick and Hellfire with a single missile, it would actually improve interoperability and likely save the DoD O&S costs while increasing capability at about the same price as the current weapons. The article also mentioned that JAGM is the only missile in development as also highlighted in the recent DoD industrial base report.

Chalk-up one more for Army acquisition.

right. the problems are political & cultural. More and more bureaucracy and acquisition reforms are levied on technocrats by democratically elected & appointed officials!

I think that I remember you from some of my DAU courses! LOL!

“Poor decisions” is a very vague term. Are you talking about “poor career decisions”, i.e. not playing the pentagon two-step correctly, or are you talking about “poor decisions” for the supported forces in the field? So long as there are those two definitions afloat, some will take one to be more important and some will take the other. Which of those priorities the services support will tell the tale. And I will ask again, what program managers from any of the almost univerasally accepted to have failed programs were “retired for cause” and which were promoted for executing to a CPI and SPI? Is it the pavlovian dog that dumps on the kitchen floor for the sake of a reward that is the problem, or is it the system that rewards the dog?

Let me just take issue with that last sentence. Its sort of like saying that we waste too much money and time looking at pebbles in our search for diamonds and it cost to look at the pebbles. The fact is that the “system” has got to be grabbing on to new ideas, some will be good, and unfortunately most will be bad, just to find those good ones. The problem, at least in my silly little but not always so humble opinion, is that its FAR too hard to toss away the pebble once its character is known, particularly when you have a mafia of the career-minded PMO advocates, congressional pork-meisters, and other assorted politicians in– and out-of-uniform, all touting the weapon system to end war as we know it.… .… aka “the pebble”!

of course I mean poor decisions are those that are made for reasons other than the greatest good, based on some measure of utility. Poor decisions are based upon flawed assumptions & methods, or even intentional disregard to implement a credible decision making process. ignorance, lack of appreciation, and woeful disregard for uncertainty (& the risk that uncertainty creates), and the methods by which uncertainty could be professionaly measured, is a systemicaly corrupt pattern of leadership behavior. I don’t quite get your CPI/SPI fetish (lol jk), but in my opinion EVM is a flawed but possibly useful method in helping to determine if a program has any structure and discipilne to it. I guess the answer to your question is “none”?? don’t quite get your last question either. But if you are getting at that people are not accountable for poor ethical decision making because they are in a systemic swamp, then I have to disagree. I am in a swamp that doesn’t reward ethical behavior, that doesn’t stop me from doing what I know is right to the best of my ability.

And sometimes its just the technocrats twisting around the demoncratically elected officials’ official decrees to insure larger spheres of influence, greater budgetary responsibilities, and success in the beltway bamboozles that are a quest for SES-dom. :-) There is MORE than enough credit to go around to everyone involved! :-)

BTW please don’t think that I have delusions that I am sanctimonius. I understand quite well my own situation as a fallible human being and the true source of righteousness.

Which brings me back to my many times previously stated philosophy of technology development. You make investments because you want the best returns possible given the state of uncertainty, risk, and chaos. I am all for prudent risk taking, technology demonstrators, and a sound process of maturing technology from concept to battlefield. However in MDAPs, the political, system integration, operational testing, life cycle management, and an infinite other programmatic difficulties demands that we set our sights lower. There is no room for failure in MDAPs — people under fire are depending on timely new systems to replace their aging, obsolete, and sometimes unreliable systems. For a fraction of a failed MDAP’s cost, we could do all the research, concept exploration, technology demonstration, and prototyping in the world, where the consequences of failure are much less severe.

Actually, your last little bit above pretty much shows that you DO understand my pavlovian comment. Pavlov’s dogs learned behaviors based on rewards and punishments. They could, in principle, be trained to do diametrically opposed behaviors based on which behavior received the rewards. When “the system” rewards CPI and SPI but quite simply doesnt bother even measuring , much less assessing and rewarding, performance, to what pavlovian stimulus do the program managers respond?

My obsession with CPI and SPI is based on the Systems Engineering principle that cost, schedule AND performance define the necessary “triad” trade space for programmatic decisions. So long as system PERFORMANCE is the unquantified, ephemeral and totally subjective quality, guess what gets “traded off” when push comes to shove?

nice!

But system performance can be quantified through test. You can develop a test script of Yes/No demonstrations of achievement of threshold capabilities and get a metric. Independent test authorities can fail a system, or even better, fail a PM for even developing a credible test program to begin with, resulting in a schedule delay, and DoD, Service, PM’s ARE held accountable to schedule. Your analogizing of trained, professional, experienced, well compensated senior civilians and military officers to dogs also strikes me as a little insulting!

True, but does “the system” insure that those test results show up on the PM’s OER, or SF-50? Therein lies the rub, and it all goes back to accountability. The PM is “accountable” for schedule and cost measures, but simply does not care about (in formal terms) the system performance. :-)

Arf! Arf! Where is my leash! In that reference, I was just refering to one of me.

No insult intended, and citing a Nobel laureate for his works that are routinely cited for explaining human behavior is not usually considered offensive. His concept is “conditioned responses”. Let me point you at: http://​www​.nobelprize​.org/​e​d​u​c​a​t​i​o​n​a​l​/​m​e​d​i​c​i​n​e​/pa…

and perhaps you will see a bit better why that analogy does fit. :-)

OK got it. but still at that level of seniority and professionalism we can expect better from people than being slaves to classical fear conditioning. The “I was just following orders” didn’t work for the Nazis at Nurnberg, it didn’t work for Calley at My Lai, it didn’t work for Lyndie England after Abu Ghraib. We are talking about adult human beings, it is fair for us to expect them to know right from wrong. Integrity core value training is provided to USAF personnel, it is reinforced in DAU and in PME. Training does help prevent ethical lapses, so does professional competence. It’s a shame to not see a meritocracy work, but everyone is a volunteer and can choose their path.

LOL! That “academic environment” that the AF always emphasizes is more than just an assurance of non-attribution! Back in the class of 83D when I went to SOS the instructors trumpeted the differences between a professional AF officer and a “careerist” AF officer, but always, sotto voce, they would point out that if good little Captains wanted to become Majors.… . .you had to take care of your careers. Once out of Montgomery, well meaning AF officers rarely even bothered to provide lip service to the “professionalism” except to blur the distinctions between professional and careerist that they tried to make at SOS.

If it’s really important to the USAF, it will show in promotion board results and OERs, and again I ask (rhetorically and for emphasis) does the “performance” of acquired systems show up in the respective PMs OER or is it just a statement of how well he/she managed the CPI/SPI?

and again.. USAF is accountable to OSD on ACAT 1 programs, ie, you got to make those independent pains in the butt happy. If you don’t keep the DOT&E happy because you have a crummy test plan (POOR PERFORMANCE), and OSD penalizes you on cost & schedule, then that can affect your career. Likewise if the system goes to test and it performs poorly, and the program is held up or canceled, yes that can reflect poorly. Look at that Gen Cartwright on FCS, no 3 star / 4 star for him. I can accept that the world is political and everyone’s job is infinitely complicated and its a shame that good performance is often not rewarded and the careerists make it (just look at John Boyd’s career). The USAF does a pretty good job of establishing career expectations that O-5 is success. I thought I took a guess at answering your question above… “no”???? so what??

Not a MILITARY USE ONLY item

Funny, when Lockheed finished designing the C-130J, they went to the USAF to sell some and the USAF said they had all the 130’s that they needed and were going to do a Modernization program (C-130AMP) to upgrade the old ones. Lockheed went to their congressman & Senators and had a procurement of C-130Js added in as an earmark. The next year, they did the same, then an earmark was added to buy some for the USMC (tankers) and so on.

Basically, C-130J would have been a big loser with little or no sales excpet for political influence.

You are worrying me, friend. You suggest above that “system integration, operational testing, and life cycle management” are programmatic difficulties in major defense acquisition programs? Are you somehow suggesting that MDAPs would run smoother and less troublesomely if we just eliminated these functions or required MDAPs to be of a nature that would not require them? :-) If so, I believe that you have hit directly on the problem here. Some folks actually DO believe that these are “difficulties” to be avoided rather than opportunities to insure programmatic success.

I agree that we should do a lot of risk taking outside of MDAPs, but … you don’t do a MDAP without, I would contend, EMBRACING and EXCELLING all of those systems engineering topics (notably excludes the political swamp running) you see as difficulties!

Its called a “Jobs program”, my friend! Why do with 10 folks what can be done equally well by 100! LOL!

Also for such an important program, Im betting it provides a seat for at least one O-6/SES in each of those offices, probably a half dozen GS-14s or Lcols, and a whole bunch of coffee-fetchers and file clerks! PLUS it provides the extra work burden of sorting out the conflicting mandates of the various and sundry different “directives and edicts” that the organizations all have to send out to prove their existences! ROTGLMAO! ITs called sarcasm, son, sarcasm!

If there is no room for “failure” in MDAPs, I would contend that there is no room for success either. MDAPs that dont provide new, better, cheaper, or whatever, that are just buying the same-ole –same-ole, would leave us fighting with stone axes. Its hard to say that you are going to roll the dice with a billion dollar developmental program, but… thats often the only way forward. You can MITIGATE that risk with good, well conceived, and more risk-tolerant ACTDs and such, but you have got to be willing to fail with them too. My experience is that the game just does not work that way often.

As a long time “tester”, I always have to explain that a test run properly and with supportable results is a success, even if the item under test failed miserably! In my humble little opinion, all of us in the acqusition business need to be willing to accept that sometimes the “baby is ugly” and not just be the mindless program advocates that so often it seems we become. “Ugly Babies” conceived in good faith, honestly tested, and declared to be as they are, should not really be a personal insult to the developers.

But if they only look at what GCV has spent and will spend it is under cost.

you are not understanding. I am all for buying “better”. “Better” than what is currently operationally effective and suitable is realistically achievable. You start with the performance capabilities of what is proven to work, you understand the gaps/flaws of your fielded systems, and you develop the specs for how to get incremental improvement & fix the gaps. You do not reach for “a bridge too far” — we never have sufficiently learned that lesson now have we?

You use a competetive prototyping & downselecting process until the contractors have proven themselves to a point where there is an acceptable amount of risk to the government. We do not apply this concept currently. The industry & senior leadership are constantly promoting & promising revolutionary & leap ahead technologies — a paradigm shift — that introduces a whole new set of problems. the “fighting with stone axes” is a straw man argument. not even close to my position. Spinney’s views on F-22 and F-35 prototyping was right on point. These prototypes didn’t demonstrate squat. Another example, JTRS GMR…

For all the billions wasted in failed programs, had it been invested in this incremental evolutoinary improvement approach, we would have a DoD that could live within a budget, we would have a DoD with properly recapitalized, organized, trained, and equipped forces. Measuring uncertainty and risk is not as hard as you make it out to be. We’ve had the algorithms since WW2. We do not have the political & military leadership culture with sufficient quantitative ability nor integrity to make the strategic decisions that they do. We do have plenty of smart people but they are in the wrong positions, and we have too many dumb, corrupt people high up in the food chain.

Did you and EngineerEconomist decide to write the same? :-)

If we lived only with incremental improvements we would be fighting our wars with the most marvelously refined and efficiently evolved stone axes that the world has ever seen. LOL! But I would offer that the lesson from history is that war machinery advances in little tiny incremental steps.… until a revolutionary change hits. A musketeer from the mid 1500s would have been right at home with a Brown Bess musket from the early 1800s! On the other hand, a Royal Navy captain of a ship of the line from 1855 would have been at a total loss if faced by a dual turreted, steam powered, iron clad, seagoing monitor of the US Navy from 1865! Nice safe MRAPs give you the beautifully refined wooden three-decker. The MRAP that pushes the limits often fails but SOMETIMES turns up that nasty, ugly smelly monitor that could take on the entire Home Fleet. Guess the point for me is that you have to roll the dice, take your chances, and from the appearances, accept all of the second guesses! :-)

perhaps you missed all my previous posts of technology development strategy. I support DARPA, I support high risk taking, just not in MDAPs. The Wright Brothers were funded for prototypes, the Army did not plan 20+ years of their future based on undeserved confidence in the technology. You take risk prudently. If a prototype goes down in flames and we kick it back in the ‘tech base’ — great. If FCS fails and we’ve wasted $B’s on Boeings “program analysts” to make power points and EVM analysis of a fictional baseline, well, that’s, what’s a good word… retarded? If we assume a stable inflation rate and ‘configuration stability’ throughout a 10+ year production run for F-35, when we haven’t even achieved configuration stability, and have entered LRIP without a production readiness review, or a valid basleine that is… again, retarded. DoD’s MDAP technology development phases are ridiculously too long, because they reach time and time again for ‘a bridge too far’. With this concept of “optionally manned bomber”, I belive any acknowledgment of “lessons learned’ from past failed acquisition to be lip service.

Hehe! You did! You just changed your name to mess with me, didnt you? :-)

Lets try a different angle … since you obviously have all the right words for all the right concepts!

Would you agree that the U-2 and SR-71 were two of the MOST innovative and revolutionary, and unabashedly successful, aircraft development programs of the last 75 years? Both of these would have not made it as MRAPS and probably not as ACTDs given your risk averse approach, right? Would these two perhaps offer a better “development model” than any one of the programs we haggle over here?

Just let me offer one salient difference between both of these and the F-22, F-35 or most any other aircraft developed under the current “managerial mindset”. These two aircraft required a MINIMAL acquisition infrastructure on the part of the customer, in other words, far fewer cooks in the kitchen. Toss in the Saturn V program for another “minimal interference”, “minimum management” program, but from the white world. Now… think hard…what caused what you call ” the waste” in the F-35 program? :-)

wearing me out.. about U-2 and SR-71 i don’t have much info to judge. open source media i’ve been exposed to hasn’t been anything too negative. i met someone once who said the sr-71 needed to be rebuilt after each mission. there is no reason why any concept cannot be matured deliberately & methodically through an ACTD/lab/whatever process. Plus you can capture emergent technologies and formalize them for military service this way. You label me (u b*strd) as ‘risk averse’. WRONG!! It is a common misconception for someone who sees a wide spectrum of future outcomes to be labeled as a ‘pessimist’ by mathematically illiterate, marketing focused, optimist ‘leaders’. re-read my comments above regarding prudent risk taking.

now regarding F-35 ‘waste’. we have to be careful about what we mean by ‘waste’. for me a canceled program is waste. I acknowledge a possibility that F-35 could eventually become a ‘grand slam’ and maybe could even meet all its APB/threshold requirements within the ORIGINAL budget, which would be my definition of success from a cost perspective. But it’s undoubtedly a failure from a schedule, and hence strategic perspective. There are an infinite # of possibilities why there could be ‘waste’ in the F-35 program. It could have been a hopeless concept from the start. There could be failures up and down both govt & contractor chains of command.

A shelf full of program management books have been written about the development of the U-2 and SR-71, and these days most of the technical discussions are in open literature. Until you read about, and UNDERSTAND, how Kelly Johnson and his crew managed those aircraft development programs, and the technical challenges that they accepted and overcame, you might want to dial back on some of the high sounding rhetoric.

Aside from suggesting a quick hit on Google Books, try http://​ftp​.rta​.nato​.int/​p​u​b​l​i​c​/​P​u​b​F​u​l​l​T​e​x​t​/​A​G​A​RD/…

:-) BCNU, hopefully first, EE!

we are almost there. H*LL NO do i think should we eliminate life cycle mgmt and acquisition discipline from MDAPs. what i’m saying is all the integration difficulties — the rules you gotta play by — are difficult enough — in ACAT I programs — that it is inadvisable to make life even more difficult by trying to integrate immature technology. i LOVE system engineering reqts and complying with them. they are a darn good reason why they are there — lot of painful lessons learned from systems not being developed right. it’s like difference beteen healthy babies and crack babies. i like your characterization of sys eng reqts as ‘opportunities’. NOW, if you size your programs so they are lower on the ACAT thresholds, then you are free to do more risk taking without having to worry about OSD sticking their noses in your business as much.

Let me see, “the rules you gotta play by” are too hard? Must mean that some of those rules are just plain wrong! (at least in your opinion of course). Now which of those rules would you want to impose on MY MDAP program (cause Im a dummy) that you would arbitrarily waive for YOUR MDAP? :-) At least in my experience, many of the “rules” for ACAT 1s that are most often whined about are precisely the ones that make the program, and specifically the program manager, more personally accountable for its actions.

Yep, slice up that ACAT 1 into five, totally interdependent little, ACAT 3s and nobody watches! LOL! Of course if any one of those five little interlinked “pie slices” fails the whole house of cards comes tumbling down.

If a person do his job RIGHT, he wont care who watches! AND reporting a long string of ACAT 1 successes is not really a chore! You might even call it “career enhancing”! ROTGLMAO! Try again, EE.

wtf? i think we agree on a lot of things, but then i can’t tell if you are being sarcastic. w/e this conversation has become tiresome..

give me the cliff notes version. i’m a busy man. explain to me how in my proposed strategy, would U-2 and SR-71 development would not be possibly given my acceptance of high risk technology development? don’t bother really let’s move onto other discussions. it’s a pain to have to research these old ones. final comment on Integrity. sure a lot of advances have been made by people that ‘bucked the system’. However such utility & progress comes at a cost that will be paid for one way or the other. We have a $14T, $100Ts??? in unfunded liabilities, and the real risk of a currency/financial/economic collapse and ensuing national security nightmare. We did NOT get into this situation because rationale people who expressed the opinion “hold on let’s think this through for a moment” ended up having the votes that counted.

You gotta look for the 1102 jobs. At the PEO, they were offering early retirements/separation incentives to technical employees but Uncle Sugar is STILL hiring 1102’s (contracting and acquisition series). Lots of people are coming in at lower grade levels and then within shoot up to a GS-13 in a few short years.

I am working in an acquisition type position in a PM. Basically making powerpoints to feed technical information to people who think they are experts because they have seen dozens of powerpoint presentations on any given subject.
I would rather go back to work as an engineer (subject matter expert) and have a boss throw work over a wall, let me do my stuff and I can throw it back. Then I can go make sure it passes developmental testing before it goes to the field. The way it should be done.

M-ATV (Oshkosh) and the Falcon III tactical radio (Harris) were both developed by the contractors on their own dime, then sold to the Army.

This used to be a much more common model; most of the legendary aircraft up through Vietnam were developed in-house by the contractor, then sold to the government. We got away from that when the services’ appetites started to exceed the amount of risk contractors were willing to incur with no contract in hand — and when the number of competing major contractors collapsed from “dozens” to “4”.

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