Report: It wasn’t ‘hollow growth’ after all

Report: It wasn’t ‘hollow growth’ after all

Chin up, you military services! You actually did pretty well for yourselves in the defense spending bonanza that followed the Sept. 11th attacks, according to a new report out Friday.

Forget all this talk about the “hollow growth” of the past decade, which has resulted in a military of about the same size that costs 40 percent more. According to the study by the Henry L. Stimson Center, the military services have made great progress in modernizing their forces for the present day, both in comparison to where they began and all the other militaries of the world.

Here’s the high level summary, which blew into Washington like a clear mountain breeze after another week of teeth-gnashing and breast-beating and forehead-smiting:


Prevailing wisdom on defense spending in the past decade asserts that despite the large amount spent, we did not modernize our weapons systems. In reality, the military services did take advantage of increased procurement funding to modernize their forces, although not always as expected …

  • The Army had its next-generation acquisition programs cancelled, but that freed resources — enhanced by significant supplemental war funding — to expand and upgrade its primary combat vehicles and supporting capabilities, giving it a fully modernized force.
  • The Air Force modernized its force by fielding the next-generation systems of the F-22 and C-17, and also introduced an entirely new capability — unmanned aircraft. The Air Force bought fewer fighters than it projected because it made a conscious choice to pursue high-end and expensive next-generation systems.
  • The Navy achieved the modernized force it projected at the start of the decade, and relied on the dramatic expansion of procurement funding to achieve that force.

There will always be debate over what forces and equipment our military should pursue, but we should not ignore significant advances. Over the last decade, we spent roughly $1 trillion on defense procurement and the military services used that funding, including that provided in the supplemental war funding, to modernize their forces. In the daily barrage of news about cost overruns and cancelled programs, we can overlook this accomplishment. But after reviewing what procurement funding bought in the past decade, it is clear the military successfully modernized its capabilities, especially in building on existing systems and incorporating those not even anticipated.

Whew! So everything’s OK now! It’s been nice covering the defense beat, but since DoD and the services have reached perfection, looks like there’ll be nothing more for us poor hacks to write about.

Well — wait a minute. Remember the Army’s original goal for a “modernized” force? It was a corps-size battle in which little lightning bolts connected everything on the field, from Captain Power and the Soldiers of the Future, equipped with Land Warrior eyepieces and OICWS rifles; to beer keg-sized UAVs flying around; to 50 different kinds of manned and unmanned vehicles. The Air Force wanted its squadrons upon squadrons of F-22s to blot out the sun. The Navy was dreaming about fleets of 25,000-ton nuclear-powered CG(X) cruisers with Death Star turbolasers that could bounce off a mirror in space and vaporize a single bad guy standing in a crowded market without singeing the goatherd next to him. What happened to all that stuff?

The Stimson Center report is correct in that the military services bought a lot of hardware over the past decade, but there’s a difference between just upgrading an old design and fielding the transformational capabilities for which the Pentagon once planned. Navy officials, for example, boast about the “efficiencies” they say they can get with a restarted run of Arleigh Burke-class destroyers. But there’s an equal case to be made that relying on a ship class for so long is an indictment, not a vindication. The Navy really tried to build 30 or more DDG 1000s, and it tried to get a CG(X), but it was just too hard, so the service had to default back to a design from the 1980s. So the Navy is building capable warships, yes, but the distinctions are important here.

The “modernized” Air Force has never fielded its F-22s in combat, even after leaders teed up that possibility before the Libya intervention. (Plus the jets have this problem with poisoning their pilots.) So decades-old F-15s, F-16s, B-1s and B-2s got to do the heavy lifting in this year’s air war, and it appears the Air Force may have to upgrade some of its F-16s again as it waits for its make-or-break F-35As. Well, that’s what the brass wanted, the Stimson report says: The generals decided to make their bed a smaller, more expensive force, and now they’ve got to sleep in it.

Meanwhile, the report’s section on the Army is worth a close look. It presents the service’s Bradley fighting vehicle modernization program as a smashing success:

In the past decade, the Army has modernized nearly its entire fleet of ground combat vehicles despite its original intent to pursue a much more limited modernization plan. It did so because of the unexpected bonuses from the supplemental war funding. The Abrams and Bradley programs each received more than $1B in both the FY07 and FY08 supplementals. Coupling that extra funding with a decade of procurement growth, the Army has now equipped its entire active force structure with the most modern variants of its basic vehicles.

All right — but as we heard this week, the Army hasn’t used the Bradley in combat in Iraq or Afghanistan since 2008. It’s poorly suited to today’s battlefields. As Danger Room reports, the next Stryker brigade deploying to Afghanistan is not even taking its Strykers. And this “modernized” Army has a glut of heavy MRAP vehicles that, by all appearances, it can’t wait to throw away. Instead it wants a brand new Ground Combat Vehicle, Joint Light Tactical Vehicle and — maybe — an upgrade for its pre-war fleet of Humvees. Why buy all that new hardware if the existing fleet is so terrific? Meanwhile, it has been easier for a camel to pass through the eye of a needle than for the Army to buy a new helicopter for the battlefield.

So yes, the military services have succeeded in buying a lot of hardware since Sept. 11, but that isn’t the full story.

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“The Army had its next-generation acquisition programs cancelled, but that freed resources — enhanced by significant supplemental war funding — to expand and upgrade its primary combat vehicles and supporting capabilities, giving it a fully modernized force.” — eat it, Vitesse Puissance

yeah right. Barry obama kills F22, cuts F35, NGB, ABM, space shuttle, carriers, Zumwalt, etc. No more power projection for USA do to his Jerimia right anti-American views.….

The decision to not employ a system (Bradley) for a variety of political reasons, should not be confused with its effectiveness, mission need, nor contribution to national security. “poorly suited to today’s battlefields” LOL. is “today’s battlefields” some kind of definable entity by which we can judge the Bradley to be so utterly deficient? Or rather, would it be wiser to acknowledge the great range of uncertainty and dynamic characteristics of war and that NO SYSTEM will satisfy all circumstances, and that the multi-billion dollar, decades long development cycle, approach, with its inevitable cost overruns, schedule delays, and heartache, is folly???

the case for the new hardware to replace the Bradley is not something that should be debated. It’s a shame that we expect the Army (and the other Services) to perform its missions with antiquated gear. The Services have themsleves to blame, however. We need modern, improved replacement platforms, not Science Fiction.

For once, I find myself almost wanting to agree with you, except for that “variety of political reasons”. Why could you not have said “variety of tactical reasons” instead?

The Bradley, for all of its warts, can still be a very effective combat vehicle on the open, highly-dynamic battlefield, as shown during the many different armor battles in Iraq. In constricted areas, i.e. urban combat or in the pseudo-urban environment you find in the very rural mountainous areas of Afghanistan, it is simply, as Tim Taylor would have said on Tool Time, the wrong tool for the task.

If the next bad guy in line notices that we have a “straightleg” infantry and SOF army, way short on Bradleys and Abrams, Id bet dollars to donuts that it wont be infantry coming across the next hill! :-)

“eat it” — You are exactly correct. I have worked on the three prior to GCV (still in the oven): AFAS, Crusader, and FCS. I am quite certain that none of these ever produced one new fielded vehicle. So, here we go again…
How many mutations can we suffer through. Insanity is doing the same thing over and over and over and over again.…but expecting different results. Call me crazy, but I am skeptical and former Army too.

come on now we’ve agreed on more than one thing over the years lol. and hastily written communications are easily subject to a little bit of misunderstanding where people are not actually that far off. I accept your enrichment of the discussion on ‘tactical reasons’. I guess I am anchored on the political decision to not employ armor for Gothic Serpent and the ensuing tragey. The Pakistani & Malaysian armor we ended up having to use proved ‘tacticaly’ valauble in exfiltrating those guys. I also don’t buy that armor is not effective for Afghanistan. I think a Bradley’s firepower, optics, armor, and shock value would be a valuable addition and deterrent at many a lonely, isolated Combat Outpost out there.

We need to update the Air Force the Army is fine there is no need for a JLTV and ICC competition if they just upgrade the Humvee and other weapons.

I’m loving the phrase “today’s battlefields.” We stopped using the Brads in 2008 because the MRAPs were coming in to theater and tearing up Iraqi neighborhoods and streets with our tracks wasn’t worth the maintenance considering how much better the tactical situation was by that time. The MRAPs provided the protection we needed for that particular scenario at that point. If the tactical circumstances made the Bradley obsolete, then the same rules would apply to the GCV. Being in a war where your biggest tracked vehicles are no longer needed is a GOOD thing. We’ve argued plenty that the Bradley may not be the right tool for future fights, but the article said “today.” What has changed in the world’s armies that would make the Bradley obsolete “today?”

Sorry but it was hollow growth after all. Let’s us consider the reality.

The Air force is today about 600 Fighter smaller them 2011 and nearly all Air force planes are about 25 Years old. Only 160 F22 (not really reedy) there fielded in the last decade. The F22 is the only high end or better said the only toy that the USAF has get in the last 10 years how can be used in a real war the rest are just drones and equipment for asymmetric wars how will no longer needed in the Future without the war in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Or as Short view:

US-AF
– 600 fighter
+ 160 fighter

The Navy looks also bad. The Fleet is now already 25% smaller then he was 2001 and the equipment has still the same. Only the Virginia Class is new but not a real better unit them the improved Los Angeles SSN.

Or as Short view:

US-NAVY

- about 50 Ships since 2011

USMC

The USMC has lose is identity with the ECV and other small programs and become a second Army with fewer ships.

US-ARMY

Is the biggest loser, he lose is entire modernization program he was not even enable to give is soldier a better Rifle. The Army has buy MARPS and M-ATV how will be after Afghanistan useless and scrap or give away to the Afghan Army.

The USA has spent Hundreds of Billions to get nearly nothing for them, for the same money how was spent since 2011 you can buy thousands of up to date weapons in the foreign countries. For example only for the price of the money how was waste for the canceled FCS Program you can buy for example 4400 new Leopard 2A7++ or buy more them 1500 AH64D. The Army fight today with the weapons how was acquired in the time of the Reagan build up how was just improved a bit and this for a price of a new weapon.

PS: For 1000 Billion you can buy about 5500 F22 or 500 Virginia SS or 125000 M1A2SEP or 33000 AH64D sorry it is unbelievable how hollow the growth since 2011 was !

Sorry but such allegations how was made by stimson are just ridiculous and malicious lies to support irresponsible progressive groups in the congress to cut more from the DOD!

That Wired article is full of holes about 3–2 Stryker’s deployment and the Stryker’s history. “The vehicle is flimsy and can’t handle homemade bombs…” Really dude, where have you been? The Stryker has been great against IEDs savings the lives of hundreds of soldiers. Do you know where the brigade is being sent in Afghanistan? If it’s somewhere different than where they’ve been, then the Stryker may not be appropriate for the terrain. There are many places in Afghanistan where virtually no vehicles are welcome. The MATV is designed to do one thing well. The Stryker is designed to do a lot of things, therefore there are tradeoffs. Vilifying the entire concept of the Stryker the way the article does is short sighted and poorly researched.

Should not be debated? Why not? Of all the equally-antiquated gear we have, what makes the 1,874 Bradley IFVs so urgent to replace that we’re willing to live with the other antiquated gear for another decade?

Post-FCS, the Army did a Big Picture review of all of their combat vehicle needs and gaps, called “Task Force 120″. The results: the highest priority vehicle gap in the Army is protected transport for IBCTs, followed by better recon/scout vehicles for all 3 brigade types. Bradley IFV was way down the list, thanks to the effectiveness of the upgrades (BRAT, BUSK) that had recently been completed.

The Army promptly buried that report just in time for the GCV program to be announced as the way they were going to spend their ‘fenced’ FCS dollars.

You have to love the conclusion after listing all the colossal wastes of money the solution is to waste even more.

k u win! let’s debate it then. I’m not saying that a modern replacement for the Bradley is the most urgent priority. I’ve suffered through electronics obsolesence issues, and my instinct is that even with the upgardes you mention the Bradley still has some 80’s era electronics. So with no supply chain for spare parts, I know what people have to suffer through in order to keep a fleet of systems alive (or half alive), and the ensuing issues with readiness reporting. The dissonance between our readiness reporting and our actual readiness and its impact on national security is horrifying to me. So we’ve got what 20 HBCTs? If our national security strategy says we need 20 HBCTs, then we should have 20 HBCTs that meet spec, not 20 improperly equipped HBCTs. So if a JFC cannot count on an HBCT = HBCT, the ensuing lack of trust creates chaos that threatens our national security.

It might be possible to consider your comments if you showed some respect for the office. Your manner of communicating would lead one to believe that you really know very little of what you speak.

This is not a solution but them the Budget is cut deeper it will not be better. You came in a situation in what you waste money without to get nothing for it. The DOD needs a reform but cuts are not a reform they are a disaster. I not call for a rise of the DOD Budget but also it is irresponsible to cut it! Them you cut the Budget deeper you will lose so many power what the USA will no longer a real world power but you will not save money. You will continued to spent Hundreds of Billions for a striking and updated force how is not enable to give you a real advantage or real security so I prefer to spend a bit more money for a force how can give you a advantage and real security !

But to a hypothetical acquisition reform.

1. The DOD cannot afford any other cuts, the DOD cannot afford the cuts how was already made. This must be understand by the politic the DOD need to go more efficiency but not to save money for Medicare cost explosions or for progressive projects ! He needs more efficiency to survive as the strongest Military in the world and to deter coming real enemies like Red China and Russia.

2. The best strategy to be successful with an acquisition reform is to go international. The buy American is not really good for the country why he handicapped the entire acquisition and generated massive cost explosion why the US Companies have not to fear competition. It exist also a lot of weapon system how are superior to anything what the USA have and this Weapon system are bu ilt in Allied Countries. For example the Army seek a replace for is old Bradley’s why he not buy CV90? The CV90 is cheap, it is superior to all exiting US Vehicles of the same class and is satisfies the Army requirements for a better protected vehicle with more firepower. Other example the LCS why the USA should to spend 600–700 Millions for a useless ship how cannot beat a 40 Years old Soviet build Corvette them he can have for the same Money a Absalom Class warships how have the Firepower to sunk a Carrier and can be also used as landing Ship ?

3. Fire 2/3 of all acquisition employers to save money. The only part of the DOD how has permanently grow is the bureaucracy the DOD is not enable to buy a new Rifle as M16 replace why he needs tens of thousands of well-paid bureaucrats how consume Billions for nothing ?

4. Be realistic, the most cost explosion were the result of unrealistic requirements and also of an unrealistic cost calculation. For example a F35 should to cost 50 million! Each man how have a bit of brain could have seen what such a price would be impossible to reach.

5. Reduce the influence of the politic by the decision of the DOD how far is possible. The most destructive element in the acquisition is the politic how kill finished programs and forces the military to make irresponsible and costly decision. For example the F136 Engine, the LCS or many other Programs.

Araya, agree except for the FV90 pint. Doesn’t clearly outclass the Bradley.

Worked for the stimulus!

Hey buddy, if your going to bash a comment, fine, I can see your point, but let’s not be pretentious here, and try to sound more intelligent than you really are.

Well, arguments from authority using Stimson Center position papers are hardly logical or convincing here. What they seem to be advocating is a sort of reverse sour grapes rationalization where we just declare victory and be happy with the state we’re in. It is really more cute than it is clever. Those guys had a job opportunity posted not long ago, so if you go in for that sort of action, there it is…

If I read what this article says correctly:
http://​www​.army​.mil/​s​t​a​n​d​t​o​/​a​r​c​h​i​v​e​/​2​0​0​9​/​0​7​/​10/

the Army had its mind maid up before the “blue ribbon panel” and before it even had an ICD for the GCV…one supposes that those insiders who were in fact involved in the decision making process understand what was going on there, the rest of us can only guess. FWIW — I don’t consider BOGSAT a good way to formulate armored fighting vehicle requirements. The only evidence I can produce to support my viewpoint is the continued churn wrt GCV. But this is a tiresome subject, because I recognize you just can’t talk sense to people who don’t “get it”. They’re always right and you’re always wrong. Especially when they have the power.

ok here’s some logic for you then. The Army sunk what $15B into FCS development, and the balance of the program was like $140B. What do you think happened to that $140B in the FYDP? still not convinced? I’m not surprised. oh and FCS wouldn’t have brought us to modernization nirvana neither, given only 15 BCTs were in the baseline, and it would have taken til what, 2030 to get them all?

Araya — Second time, agree except for the FV90 pint. Doesn’t clearly outclass the Bradley. Doesn’t make it more true saying a second time.

The major impact of FCS restructure/cancellation was to move 6.4 and 6.5 money to the right — and in some cases out of the POM altogether. I hate being this cynical, but I happen to think that was the whole point of the exercise. Oh, yes, there’s lots of talk about reset, and the GCV money is hypothetically still solid. No — Lucy won’t pull the football the next time Charlie Brown goes to kick it this time. FWIW, MGV was eventually supposed to replace the entire armored fighting vehicle fleet, Tanks, Bradley, Stryker, the lot. So I question whether the 15 brigade number is historically accurate. Could they have slowed the FCS production schedule down even further and kept the program going ? That was the path not taken, to the surprise of many.

You question my facts? http://​www​.acq​.osd​.mil/​a​r​a​/​a​m​/​s​ar/ Am I going to have to teach you to read SARs too or do you already know? You can dream all you want about what “MGV was eventually supposed” to do. I deal in reality. The planned & programmed future steady state of the Army never called for MGVs to replace Strykers. It called for 15 FBCTs, something like 12 HBCTs, 7 SBCTs, and 70 IBCTs I believe. The “MGV as a replacement for the Abrams and Bradleys” was a marketing myth.

To be fair, the _original_ FCS plan really was to replace all of the heavy brigades with FCS. That only lasted until about 2003, when at least a homeopathic dose of reality was applied. 15 FBCTs was the final procurement objective, from about 2003 forward.

One has to wonder what was in the Kool-Aid in 2000…

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