NATO’s Libya intervention ends Monday

NATO’s Libya intervention ends Monday

If you were planning on going as “French Rafale pilot flying sorties over Libya” for Halloween this year, you’re still in luck — the intervention will run until midnight Monday before it turns into a pumpkin.

Then, if all goes as planned, November will dawn with no allied warplanes over North Africa and relative peace on the ground, leaving the rest of us to figure out what it all meant.

NATO Secretary General Anders Fogh Rasmussen doesn’t need much time to reach his conclusions: In a statement, he said the Libya intervention went exactly as planned:


We have fully complied with the historic mandate of the United Nations to protect the people of Libya, to enforce the no-fly zone and the arms embargo. Operation Unified Protector is one of the most successful in NATO history.

We launched this complex operation faster than ever before.  We conducted it effectively, flexibly and precisely with many partners from the region and beyond. And we are concluding it in a considered and controlled manner — because our military job is now done. I want to thank our commanders and our  servicemen and women, for conducting this mission so well, so carefully and with such dedication.

We have done this together for the people of Libya. So they can take their future firmly and safely into their own hands. Libyans have now liberated their country. And they have transformed the region. This is their victory.

There were times, however, when the outcome did not seem certain. Remember when military officials in the United States and Europe were shrugging about how long it might take for the Libyan rebel alliance to gain enough strength to actually threaten the government? Remember when the European allies were running out of bombs to drop? Remember when Secretary Gates basically said, you guys are the most powerful military alliance in the world — why can’t you take care of a fifth-rate cartoon villain?

Remember how differently the U.S. and European militaries viewed the Libyan operation? For the U.S. Air Force especially, it was a weekend turkey shoot — even North America-based B-1 and B-2 bombers got into the act flying sorties over Libya because, why not, right? The Marines’ attacks with their AV-8B Harriers means they now have a great new PowerPoint slide about the value of sea-based fast-jets, just in case anyone gets skeptical of their F-35B.

For the NATO allies, however, it wasn’t always a party. The U.K.‘s Royal Air Force Tornados flew the equivalent of two years’ worth of home-station training, according to an RAF announcement — a big chomp into those planes’ finite lifespan. The French and Italian aircraft carriers played for a little while, but they did not seem to make much of an impression. And important NATO allies, especially Germany, just did not show up for any of it.

Maybe this is the wrong perspective, though. All’s well that ends well, right? NATO got together relatively quickly, executed an effective air war with almost no notice, stayed mostly united and ultimately helped the Libyan people win their freedom. It’s nothing like the World War III against the Soviets the alliance was built to fight, but maybe it’s not so bad, either.

What do you think? Did Libya expose the dangerous fissures and weaknesses of NATO? Or does Libya vindicate alliance supporters’ belief that NATO can continue to be effective and relevant in the world of the 21st century?

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TWO important aspects for me!!

i) even with an european lead operation and with clear humanitarean goals GERMANY shit themselfs in the pants again. I wonder untill when we’ll have a teenager kind of aproach in germany concerning foreign affairs.

ii) secondly, they improved a litle from the 90’s when NATO interveened in Kosovo but still same shit. Whithout the US things would have gone “not so smooth”.

If europe cannot pay for bombers like the B1 or B2 then at least is expected as a hole can have a stock of precision munitions (such as SCALP missiles) to at least not depend for ever in the United states!

for that I think think this comflict may serve also to improve logistics (again) in europe. .…I hope!

After just about any conflict, there are plenty of “lessons to be learned”, and I think that you are pretty much “on target” for some of the ones that NATO can take away from the Libyan events. NATO has really not been involved in too many modern, fairly high intensity conflicts, and those are very different from “home country, training events” anyway you look at them. The lessons that I think stand out the most are ones that the US has had to learn (over and over gain by the way) since WW-II.

#1: Logistics is the game for professionals not amateurs. Modern warfare consumes massive quanties of expensive ordnance (particularly “smart” bombs and missiles) and more subtle items like the “fatigue cycles” of airframes.

#2: Expeditionary warfare, even as limited as the air cover over Libya, is tough!

#3: No matter how successful (or unsuccessful) the mission, there will be critics. :-(

:-)

I think that the single biggest “lesson” that came out of Libya is that NATO CAN actually be militarily effective in something other than that “WW-III” scenario. Whether that is carried forward, and the other “lessons” pertaining to that military involvement are learned and addressed, is still to be seen.

Too bad we learn these lessons over and over again in actual combat as opposed to large scale war games, and don’t adequately integrates these lessons into our systems development strategy. DoD extorts us taxpayers to “pay the price” for the “best” systems. The billions & decades expended in the pursuit of “perfect” systems could and should have been used for more realistic acquisition programs PLUS large scale testing and exercises, including all the required ad hoc joint / interagency /multinational team making. We could and should have had better results from our acquisition investment, a recapitalized force structure & readiness where we actually understand what we got, less “Lessons Learned” of what we already know (the obvious), and more “Lessons Learned” of what would take us to even the next level of execution of national strategy.

We condemn ourselves to relearning these lessons largely because we have this overpowering “need”, call it OCD in DoD, to “find a better way” where “cheaper” is usually what they really mean.

If we learn the simple lesson, usually attributed to Jubal Early in the American Civil War, that says “get there firstest with the mostest”, it’s expensive in dollars and lives. So… we stage a bunch of simulations, analyses, wargames or whatever to conclusively prove that 1000 Tigers are better than 50,000 Shermans (at only 1/10th the dollar cost and a huge savings in lives!). Since we only get ahead in the “system”, and thereby be better able to implement further changes in the systen, through successes, our exercise succeeds marvelously!, You know, words like “next level of execution of national strategy” certainly do sound like PowerPoint discriptives for that kind of “success”.

But remember, FIRST we have to get ahead in the system, with a higher grade, more pay, better bennies, .… . .. or maybe once we are there we forget the first lesson.…. :-( Sound about right?

you missed the accent “Get that fustest with the mostest”… you made me think something about the value of tests & exercises. People approach tests & exercises with hatred because the attitude is that the exposure of weaknesses and failure will lead to damaged or destroyed careers, as opposed to looking at test & exercises as an opportunity to learn lessons that need to be applied to improve the probabilty of better outcomes when it really counts. Again, we are back to the core issue of Integrity, or lack thereof, and its damage to our economic & national security.

Blame my spellchecker, I originally typed it in the form that Jubal himself would have recognized.

No matter what system, or how much oversight, or how many rounds of training, or… fill in the blank.… you try to legislate, if the people in the system do not have the integrity to actually put their mission above their career advancement,.… On the other hand, if the people in the system have that all-pervasive integrity instilled into their bones, you dont need the overhead from all of the regulatory oversight (and the risk tolerance rises since everyone would know that the “best effort” was in the offing) and before you know it you dont have 30-year development programs EVEN if you challenge the technical boundaries.…. so… Hmmmm.…. Unfortunately, we just legislate left and right, regulate anything that we missed in law, and try to avoid at any cost, a “busted” ACAT 1 because we tried to reach a tad beyond our grasp! Makes sense to me, right?

NATO is nothing without the US, the one-worlders are in full swing, O will do anything for a boost in the polls, and, strangely enough, Hillary will somehow get all the credit — these are the single biggest “lessons” that came out of Libya.

Think the armed OWS’r will get NATO air support? ha ha

roger that. my wife, a hardcore environmentalist, and i were talking about this yesterday. Our politicians create knee jerk legislation in response to any mishap in the headlines, as opposed to fixing what is wrong in the current state of law & regulation, and government organizations. Or even just acknoweldging that somtimes bad things & mistakes happen and there is always residual risk. The new legislation (Sarbanes Oxley, and now we have DoDD Frank, for example) creates other problems & more cost. This pattern is also evident in immigration law. They can’t even use the “lack of resources” defense. There are resources (there will always not be enough from some one’s perspective), but the real deficiency is political will. And you cannot have the political will to do what is in the net best interest of the country unless you have integrity.

even if Nato “can” be militarily effective, this operation was a costly nightmare for many people. A large scale wargame should be created and we could re-enact and re-test different options and improve upon past performance so we would have better performance for the “next” war.

Stand by for “more to come at Six”.

Just saw a news article that described some of the Libyan chem/bio weapons that have been discovered by the new ruling junta. Imagine that, a despotic dictator who had proclaimed himself innocent and cleared of any WMD program having chem weapons stashed away in hiding……Hmmm…. what would have happened if he had defiantly declared to the international news services that he possessed chem weapons and invited a NATO strike against him just to test the weapons in combat! Would we have believed him? Or only believed him until it came time to “second guess” the decision to make the WMD go away, after the fact of course! .… I only wish that I could laugh about the answer.

And you are suggesting that the cost is not part of the lessons to be learned? If you took the Libyan operation and used it as a “calibration point” on your simulation, then applied the varitation of parameters approach you might have something.… but you might not like the answer when you were done… :-)

And you might be particularly distressed, if the “next war” deviatied in any way, even some that your modellers assumed to be trivial and inconsequential, from your assumed “requirements” for that next war. (For example, I might “assume” that the next war was going to be a conflict based on IEDs and irregular, assymetric warfare.… … LOL!) And that even presumes that the simulation was not tailored to provide confirmation of the latest and greatest theory (or system acqustion project… ).

A little premature to conduct a large scale reenactment of the last war for learning how to be more effective in the next. Part of that answer can only be learned though time. I personally think we were stupid to say things like no ground forces at all. I don’t think we should have had combat troops in place, but putting advisers for things like planning, or weapon training or commo, or a large field hospital for treating the wounded, puts a face on America. It lets people on the ground meet Americans that are helping them in real ways. Networking with the mid to upper level decision makers gives us that interpersonal connection to what will be the government. Here we are fretting over the presence of AQ in the possible government, personally while we def helped things happen for the Libyans, by and large we did it from 25,000 feet, whereas a lot of these AQ clowns were in the mud and the blood with them probably. Makes a difference in my opinion.

nope that’s not what i was suggesting. the nightmare of financial cost of war is always a lesson learned lol. I also am beyond “deteriministic” models as well. I’m a proponent of Monte Carlo Simulation, where the computer will generate random numbers for input variables into the simulation, do this for a thousand iterations and we learn all kinds of stuff. alot of times when you generate a model or simulation you learn that what you made was no good, and that you have to go back and make a new model or simulation in a destructive evolutionary concept. but having these models is invaluable because the better ones we have, the better we can get at testing out all kinds of future scenarios. Back to “cost”.. what i was getting at was this Libyan operation seems to be unique in that it reflects a new concept of the US not taking the lead and that it was more multinational. I’m imagining what confusion and chaos ensued as everyone had do suffer through wondering “who is in charge?”. I’m starting to think more of the human toll this anguish has on veterans, and their future health costs.

nope. as i wrote above to USAF (if my comment gets published), i am opposed to rigid deterministic modeling and a proponent of probabilistic modeling. and i recognize the limitations of any model. but say we were to build a model for the past conflict. it would take time for us to learn & implement it, and then it would need reiteration following feedback. but in the end we would be further along in the quality of it, then if we let being “premature” prevent us from beginning the analysis/synthesis process. The thing about modeling is.… we do it whether or not we put real analytical rigor to it. The lessons that can “only be learned through time” are in fact mental patterns that form the basis of individuals’ experience. It makes NO SENSE to delay the process of formally capturing data & people’s experience and developing useful models from which to help improve decision making, prediction & performance in the future. We need a model through which we could then do the case study impacts of using ground forces, advisers, weapons training, commo, or field hospital, all of your suggestions.

i agree to early to conduct large scale reenactment. But not too soon to start the ORSA-modeling and computer wargaming. how about this for an idea. DoD could contract with the video gaming industry to build a computer game, with separate classified & non-classified versions. Then after a certain period of time DoD authorizes the video game industry to sell the non-classified version? pretty stimulative eh??

I just don’t think the lessons to be learned from Libya are going to be in regards to military operations or the nuts and bolts of applying military power. Obama shot his mouth off before we had assets in place and Gaddafi made a move on Benghazi.

That was a lesson learned, if you’re gonna use stick talk make sure you got a stick in place.

The technical details of shortcomings on the part of various European militaries were pretty obvious, so that’s a lesson learned, but if the respective governments aren’t willing or able to apply the resources to fix the problem no need to wargame that.

I already posted my opinion on the value of at least some interaction on the ground.

The Arab spring caught everyone off guard, even the Israelis. I supposed if there were something to simulate it would be to compress the time frames we have to react to unforeseen events. That of course raises the obvious question of whether we should bother too.

In the middle east I think we are kind of stuck, it isn’t a region we can afford to not be involved in. I think at the end of the day when people say we shouldn’t have supported the rebels my question is things would have been better if we did nothing and the Muslim Brotherhood and AQ were left to be the only players? Syria is far more capable and the ‘resistance’ far less serious and they haven’t been able to stamp it out, so I think the rebels would have survived without our help. It just would have turned Libya into another multi year mess. Bottom line is sometimes we have to involve and our choices suck when we do.

ahh but is not DoD in fact on the hook for outcomes besides just “military operations”? Clauswitz teaches us ‘war is a continuation of politics’ would it not be wise for DoD to develop analytical tools to help support decisions and their strategic political effects?? Think OIF. You said you posted your opinion, well that’s fine, someone else may have a different opinion. How is ‘who is right” to be determined and when planning for the next war comes, how do we determine what to do, or referee between disagreements over courses of action? Models, simulations, games, exercises. We need much more investment here and less investment in the pursuit of doomed to fail programs with way too long development phaes.

Have you ever actually constructed a Monte Carlo simulation of a complex system of systems? Do you understand the special circumstances required and the implementations necessary to make a Monte Carlo meaningful? Just saying “monte carlo” solves very little in terms of the modeling problems or insuring the value of the output. At one extreme I could “model” an entire campaign as a single dice roll, i.e. assign probabilities and roll the dice, or I could model discretely down to the individual round of ammunition and do a monte carlo on the probability of kill, which would be more valid? Think about it! .… . :-)

More than once I have run into situations where “the answer” had to come from a computer model or a computer database or a computerized simulation for the sake of credibility. Unfortunately those assessing the credibility very rarely understood just how easily an answer, any answer, could be forced from the model without the casual observer even recognizing the forcing function.

The thing about modeling is.… far too often we do it to obscure the fact that we do not really know an answer, perhaps even, quite cynically, recognize that we will never know the answer, and still try to pretend to be analytical in arriving at AN answer!

I indeed have. I don’t know what you are getting at with the second question. My view is MCS is one of the most beneficial and underutilized tools of the modern era. Some valuable books I’d recommend are Flaw of Averages and Failure of Risk Management. If leaders would listen to simulation practicioners we would have avoided a plethora of unwise choices. The resulting better decisions made by a a quantitatively literate population would result in virtuous circles and we would be free of a plethora of the problems that plague us today. The other concept I would like to promote is “destructive evolution” when it comes to M&S. Suppose I build a model. We put it to the test. People hate it. We take that feedback and then we have learned more about the type of model that needs to be built. It is an iterative, continuously improving process akin to Toyota kaizen and Boyd’s discourse on Destruction & Creation.

As far as your point on model fidelity, with structural decomposition (hierarchies, eg WBSs) it is possible to has a model for the campaign that can drill down to granular level. With expandable & collapsable structures you can produce models that suit the needs of the General with the 50,000 ft view, the Infantry soldier, and the ammunition item manager. =P i didn’t say it would be easy… but it’s sure a heck of a lot better than Ready Fire Aim.….

totally valid point of view. but you can’t blame the process of M&S on people’s laziness to understand them and their limitations. Your last statement proves my case of the fallacy of deterministic modeling. We need to chuck deterministic thinking into the toilet, and start to add uncertainty & risk analysis, and we’ll start getting somewhere. The other thing to keep in mind, is that we create mental models whether we choose to recognize this is going on or not. They are called heuristics, or rules of thumb, or biases. Everyone’s got em. The question is… how much are we willing to invest in capturing people’s experience (which we paid dearly for them to get) and including them with analytical rigor into useful models that can help us make better decisions in the future?

I’ll try in somewhat non-technical terms (of course Im only somewhat technical these days! LOL!)

As I understand it… A Monte Carlo simulation works by generating a “distribution” of possible answers around the deterministic answer. If I cant model the deterministic process, the monte carlo just produces a “fuzz ball” that is little more than the summation of the uncertainties.

By the way, the only models that Ive heard people to “like” are the ones that give the answers that those people happen to “like”. Models that dont give the desired answers are universally hated. As I have suggested before, “liked” answers rarely have anything to do with “accurate” answers.

You dont need to “capture” the knowledge from people’s experience, you capture the people with the experience and put them in the decision making positions with the authority to make the decision! Sort of shuts down the opportunities for personal advancement for those who have never “been there — done that”, but.… we have discussed before that its first and foremost about getting the right tools to the troops in the field, and not the career advancement of those in the acquisition system. :-)

MCS can be done with a simple Excel add in. So in a deterministic spreadsheet model (Excel use is pervasive), you have input variables and outputs related by functions. MCS forces the modeler to think about the uncertainty in the inputs themselves, and specify the uncertainty as probability distributions. Then MCS computes the “aggregate uncertainty” in the model. The whole process forces us to think harder (something badly needed), and collect better data (badly needed, since most of our data is crap). It is a valuable way for us to escape the flawed deterministic thinking that is, quite frankly, killing us in multiple ways.

For example, CBO “scores” legislation and always warns of the uncertainty in the analysis. The polticians cherry pick the result they want (like Obama saying how much his health care bill is good for the deficit and the economy). If Obama, or the public, were MCS-literate, we would learn to not fall into this trap. Another example, Bush & Cheney, would not have a justification to believe the Iraq War was affordable. Wall Street Execs might think twice about the “value” of complex derivatives, Mortgage Lenders would think twice about lending to uncertain & risky people, and retirees would learn to spend their nest egg more wisely and not count on a 10% annual return.

You should, if you want decisions to be made with better information. it’s inadvisable to trust in fallible human beings, no matter how competent and experienced they may seem to be. The Peter Principle, for example, shows us that people will rise to their level of incompetency.

LOL! So I take all that vital human knowledge, transcribe it into computer model, let the model print it back to me and Im home free!

heaven forbid, no! that’s the type of thinking we need to stop. even Rumsfeld understood unknown unknowns. All models (and all data) have some error, and they all have limitations. they are a useful tool, but they do not guarantee success, as much as understanding how the Problem of Induction would help you not to make the mistake to assume that all swans are white, just because you’ve neve seen a black swan.

Does that little axiom of yours apply to the fallible folk running the sims, or would you decree them to be immune?Sent from my iPhone

The successful conclusion to the Libyan war is a bit of a disaster for the US military. It proves that spending more than the rest of the world together is no substitute for strategy and training.

As a Brit put to me last week — there is the American way of war — hubris, spend a lot of money, blunder in waste a lot of lives and then lose or there is the European way — worry about the results, spend comparatively little do it smart and win.

He made a joke that if the Americans had come to liberate the Falkland Islanders from Argentinian after 3 months the islanders would be fighting along side the Argies. Of course that is basically what happened in Fallujah but I didn’t tell him that.

Is there any doubt that itfunk aka Oblat here is a troll?

Not only did USAF and USN provide AEW&C, UAV, CSAR, and other critical tasks, we supplied them with precision munitions because they were using up their stockpiles all too rapidly. After months of NATO bombing Libyan tanks, the rebels were finally able to drive Gaddafi out and take control. Yet we still have little idea of who these rebels are and their connection to groups like Al-Qaeda.

The European way to win a war? You mean blunder into a conflict with no idea just who your new allies are, use American supplied munitions to destroy Libyan vehicles, and pray that the rebels prove slightly less incompetent than Gadaffi’s forces? That is brilliant strategy?

Are we talking about the battle for Fallujah where your beloved insurgents were cornered and exterminated by the “incompetent” US military? Does General Oblat and his non-existent friends think he could to it better?

Like I said the successful conclusion to the Libyan war is a bit of a humiliating disaster for the US military.

Better to pretend it hasn’t happened.

Of course. The solution to prevention of logical fallacies is to make sure that models & simulations are done with stakeholder engagement on the methodology. A wargame modeler should not be developing in a vacuum. It’s impossible for anyone to be an expert in infantry, armor, artillery, communications, and logstics for example. SME’s from every area need to be engaged to help develop better methodology. Another safegaurd is to have independent modeling done by another agency (such as OSD CAPE) to help mitigate the problem of organizational & cultural bias.

I will give you credit, your story twists and turns every which way but the theme stays the same, at least on this issue. Models and simulations are a fact of life today in DoD. We “know” what we know because models provide the answers, or at least some folk think that they can and others try desperately to sell as fact the answers! Model this one then.… . how many “next generation” AFVs can we afford to put into the field where one of the criteria is casualties in combat vs a modern combined army. :-) In your modeling, how do you assign a “value/penalty” for each casualty vs the cost of the “unobtainium” armor, Monte Carlo or no Monte Carlo?

Could a model find the “happy point” in a trade between a given such as the mobility requirements, and the free variables of horsepower, fuel consumption, and firepower for example? Of course. Could that model deduce the acceptable number of casualties vs the price of the project? Hmmmmm. .… And I would contend that unless the latter answer is known, understood and accepted, the former answer would not matter. (And that second answer is of course a purely human “best guess” and subject to all sorts of “second guessing”, particularly by the “modellers” who are wanting to sell their wares!)

AGAIN, how does the “stakeholder engagement” do more than to make sure that the model is providing the “right” answer? If I knew the answer in the first place, to the point that I could recognize it when its presented to me, why bother with, and PAY for, the model to simply place that correct (by whatever means you care to define “correct”!) answer in front of me? If the logic sounds a bit circular, then I have communicated the idea, not screwed up the syntax and grammar! :-)

A term used from time to time is “the self-licking ice cream cone”! :-)

not just DoD, any decision is based on a model, whether it is recognized or not. there’s a whole discipline of cost effectiveness analysis which could be used to address the questions you raise, but to produce professional answers would cost time & money. Given uncertainty, I don’t think there is such a thing as “happy points”, though, no matter how badly DoD leaders think they can try to find them. Think ranges instead, with low probabiliy high impacts tails on either side of the range. Since there is so much uncertainty & these questions are so difficult to answer, I advocate the “low risk incremental improvement MDAP” strategy as the least risky, most certain way to get better systems, hopefully creating virutuous circles leading to a better DoD & Nation.

And the “least risky” during the acquisition process turns out to be buying anachronisms that are far more risky on the battlefield.… and the self promotion of all of those involved in the acquisition program for being able to effectively maintain CPI and SPI while producing the technically outdated equipment. Hopefully reality would not be quite so bleak if your approach was adopted but.… do you see my point?

I would rather risk every PM’s backside than risk a regiment on the battlefield, but I guess Im funny that way.

no no no… first off our disastrous results on the battlefields of Korea, Vietnam, OIF, and OEF are not attributable to lack of performance capability in our end items. In fact we have technical overmatch and we have F-22’s that are unsuitable for the conflicts we are in. Meanwhile there are glaring gaps in our ability to produce quality products and understand the costs of our operations, as well as accomplishment of political objectives through the use of the military instrument of power. There are vast areas that are begging for investment, such as reliability improvements and development of alternative sources of supply. Take our Bradley for example. It’s got flaws, it’s got people who love it. Overall it’s a credible valuable contributor to national defense. We COULD reuse the good from its design specifications, fix what is known to be deficient, and integrate the next level of proven technology (commodity items developed separately), and go competetive with the procurement, helping us get a better Bradley for a better cost.

OR we could have a “GCV AoA” that includes the Stryker, Bradley, Abrams, MRAPs, and 5 other various types of vehicles, NEVER make up our minds as to weight & survivability tradeoffs, and have 10 years of investment in a doomed to failure program. An AoA should address different alternatives to accomplish a focused purpose. I’m sorry but if you are combining treads & wheels, and tanks and IFVs into ONE AoA, then you really don’t know what you want.. you are trying to be all things to all people and you are going to end up with another fubar. Meanwhile those 80’s era & upgraded Bradleys will be deterring & fighting war, and we could have had a better modernized replacement for them with sustained production lines. I don’t understand your obsession with EVM either. To me its a flawed, costly, but necessary evil. EVM is also focused on contract performance. Program performance is evaluated at the OSD, LCC, APB level. So comprende you can have a contractor performing to CPI/SPI against a fictitious baseline, you still are not convincing anyone in the Building, OMB, Congress, and GAO that you know what you are doing.

stakeholder engagement makes models better due to the limitations of any one human being’s ability to model complex phenomena. Plus stakeholder engagement increases ownership in the decision making process. If you thought you knew the answer in the first place, then you are probably overconfident and you would be amazed what you would learn through the modeling process. Plus when you have a base model it then helps you estimate “excursions” and answer the infinite # of possible “what if” questions by changing input variables. You should read Boyd’s discourse on Destruction & Creation if you have not already. You will find that this is a repeated pattern in scientific advancement. We build models that “work” for at the present time. Then the models fail to “work” and new models explain things “better”, eg how Einstein relativity superseded Newtonian mechanics. The process is a rather difficult one, where an individual has to come to grips with the inadequacy of their current models’ ability to help them cope with their unfolding reality. I see you are beginning the journey.

I am obsessed with EVM because we have a total procurement system that is obsessed with CPI and SPI as being the measure of fittness for programs and the people that run those programs.

If the current emphasis stayed in place, but there was a totally unrealistic mandate that any PM who had ever had a position on a program would be fired from his current job (or have his pension rescinded!) should the product fail OT&E, THEN I would be less concerned.

We are accountable for CPI and SPI, but not system performance. When that “tradeoff” shows up, what gets tossed to the roadside? (and you wonder why our weapon systems dont quite live up to the promises.… . )

If that was a “disaster”, as you put it, I would hate to see your idea of success.

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