Army goes back to the future on GCV

Army goes back to the future on GCV

Army Secretary John McHugh said Wednesday that service officials will reconsider a vehicle they’ve already rejected as a potential candidate for their planned Ground Combat Vehicle. Germany’s Puma infantry fighting vehicle, a version of which was offered by an SAIC-led industry team but not awarded a development contract earlier this year, will be among the potential GCV prospects after all, McHugh said.

He mentioned it in passing in response to a reporter’s question as an example of how the Army would do whatever it takes to save money and be as efficient as possible in its acquisitions going forward. Buzz asked McHugh to repeat it just to make sure we hadn’t misheard — so what does the acknowledgement of the Puma mean for the protest SAIC has lodged over this year’s GCV development contract awards?

“I’m not going to sit here and adjudicate the SAIC protest,” he said, other than to reaffirm that the Army will spend the next two years looking at this thing from vichyssoise to pistachios in an effort to get the best deal possible.


“You have to make smart decisions,” McHugh said — and if that means a [consumer, off-the-shelf] vehicle, “we will do that.”

The GCV effort today is frozen by SAIC’s protest. If McHugh’s concession can open peace talks between the Army and SAIC, the company might eventually abandon its dispute and free the Army program officials now encased in carbonite. We’ve asked SAIC to comment and we’ll update as we hear more.

The Army’s GCV efforts are on two parallel tracks: In one, service officials are doing their latest in the never-ending rounds of due diligence about looking at all options for a large, well protected new fighting vehicle for the whole nine-soldier squad. We’ve heard service officials say they’ll look at Strykers, Bradleys — anything and everything — over about the next two years. That’s how they’ll get the vehicle cost down and get it into the fleet within the goal of seven years.

But the other track is the one that appears to represent the Army’s true desire. That’s the one that led the service to issue roughly $900 million in development contracts to General Dynamics and BAE Systems back in August for those two companies to go forward with developing their contestants for GCV. SAIC did not get one of those development deals, even though it was part of a longstanding GCV troika, and the Army’s unspoken message was clear: We don’t want a “stretched” or “upgraded” off-the-shelf vehicle — we want the new hotness.

Since then, we’ve heard McHugh and other top leaders sing a different tune publicly, but how much does the Army’s true green heart ever change? The service would no doubt pursue a compromise GCV if it had no other choice, and McHugh’s concession about the Puma is a nod in that direction. Still, if it can have its ‘druthers, the Army has already put its money where its mouth is.

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Spinning our wheels (or treads) again.. DoD screwed up by eliminating Mission Needs Statements and Operational Requirements Documents from the acquisition process. Now we have Initial Capabilities Documents, which allow greater freedom, meaning less true decision making, is required. We SHOULD start with a simple statement of the warfighter’s need. The more clearly focused this need is, the more likely we are to end up with a good acquisition program. The Analysis of Alternatives should address the alternatives to satisfying the warfighter needs as expressed in the MNS. If you have an AoA that includes Abrams, Stryker, MRAP, Bradley, and 5 other options, then you do not have an understanding of the warfighter needs. You have a program that is attempting to satisfy multiple needs, and that will inevitably fail.

There are valid warfighter/mission needs for different vehicles of different sizes with different purposes. You try to be to many things to many people, and you become disingenuous. You throw the Bradley in the AoA to pretend to be objective. Then your Senior Leader kneecaps the Bradley. You throw the Puma in the Aoa to pretend to foster competetion, when you really want a new development from GD or BAE. What happens? You piss SAIC off, and you have a contract protest. You end up with decades of delay, billions wasted, and another case study in not how to do things.

Puma is not yet in production, so they have not seen battle anywhere.

“SAIC did not get one of those development deals, even though it was part of a longstanding GCV troika, and the Army’s unspoken message was clear: We don’t want a “stretched” or “upgraded” off-the-shelf vehicle — we want the new hotness.”

I was under the impression that GD and BAE were doing “stretched, upgraded” with the ASCOD and CV90 respectively. Are they really proposing (mostly) new designs?

What is the purpose/value of comparing Pumas to Humvees & MRAPs? The mission & need is quite different. We need armored vehicles to replace our armored vehicles in HBCTs. Humvees & MRAPs are the primary vehicles in IBCTs. Of course Pumas can go places the wheeled vehicles can’t. But Humvees & MRAPs can go places Pumas can’t, and beat Pumas in other areas, such as cost & survivabilty (MRAP). Does this mean that Humvees & MRAPs are ‘better’ than Pumas?

Working with GSG9’s utilizing Pumas, they were able to go places our up armored humvees and mraps couldnt and did well against IED’s. Id say they are already combat proven effective and a lot more cost effective than starting a new program and cheaper to procure than mraps. I would have no issues adopting the puma’s or an improved version.

So probably about 2 to 5 years we’ll read here about the cancelled GCV program because of mission creep and massive cost overruns?

maybe maybe not. it sure looks like the program is not off on the right foot. Fortunately it is not even an official program (MS B theoretically to be achieved in 2013 lol). It’s much more painful to have a program fail when you are years into it & $B’s sunk past MS B, and the decision authorities finally come to grips that the system will not pass testing, something that objective professionals will have been telling people for years lol. The other thing that is pretty bad is that $900M is a lot to be spending on concept development and a bogus AoA lol!!

UH they been around for a while now.

Because they have the MRAP protection levels we want and carry additional personnel and equipment.

let me clarify — the wheeled version (4x4 &6x6) have been around for a while — germany and Isreal have had tracked engineer and combat versions for a while — the new version is tracked and streched that is not in full production yet.

Please read the JCIDS reg before spouting off like this. The ICD is supposed to be supported by analysis. It says so right in the document description itself. And don’t confuse the needs statement with the acquisition strategy. Different kettle of fish.

“The ICD is supposed to be supported by analysis”?? wow thanks for that blinding flash of wisdom. plus with all your military experience i’m sure you’ve observed the gap between “supposed to” and “reality”. now it is you who is the one that is confused. per CJCSI 3170.01E Mission Needs Statements are no more. that was the point, if you had read carefully. We used to have an acquisition process that started with the warfighter stating “Here is my problem”. And the AoA would analyze alternatives to solve the problem. Vague “capabilities assessments” enable DoD to start spending money & committing to COAs without making any real decisions. Combining IFVs and MBTs into the same AoA is an obvious symptom. The mission needs for these 2 distinct types of weapon systems are completely different.

Doubt this will happen soon the budget will be so tight I doubt they will get a new fleet of APC anytime soon.

VP — Good point.

Anyone know where the ref is for including vehicles like the Abrams that Chaos says was included in the AoA? Tough to believe they would look at the M1 as a troop carrying platform.

GREAT point!

I think the writer forgot what he wrote earlier… “
The GCV effort today is frozen by SAIC’s protest. If McHugh’s concession can open peace talks between the Army and SAIC, the company might eventually abandon its dispute and free the Army program officials now encased in carbonite.”

With only seven years and the clock ticking it’s a pretty safe bet to see this decision for what it is. “Let’s move on this! We’re burning daylight!”

Did you see Bradleys in the SAME environment? The Puma has less ground clearance than a Bradley and provides the same protection against IEDs.

Secondly the Puma doesn’t carry a nine man squad. Six guys might be fine for conducting a raid in Afghanistan. It’s not for a unit that may have to conduct a deliberate attack on one day, defend the next day and get chopped to do an Air Assault on the third in the next war in high intensity conflict.

MRAPs and the COE will teach you things about today. Let’s not repeat the old adage of preparing to fight the last war?

Uh, we are talking about the tracked version…

Poorly written article. On one hand Mr Ewing makes the case that SAIC is getting a second chance so GCV can move forward because its locked in limbo over the SAIC protest. On the other hand he tries to make the case that the Army only wants “new vehicles” because it went with GD and BAE’s proposals (which are streched versions of EXISTING vehicles). Yep, try and make sense of that!

Maybe if SAIC hadn’t focused on the PUMA which doesn’t carry enough Infantry they may have not been eliminated from the competition?

http://​en​.wikipedia​.org/​w​i​k​i​/​G​C​V​#​c​i​t​e​_​n​o​t​e​-​A​o​A​-17
footnote 17 original source Inside Washington
I’ve got a reply to VP that hasn’t been published as well. He’s confused. per JCIDS regs, MNS & ORDs are no more. now we have “ICD”. so in other words we do not start off programs on the right foot with a clear, bounded (ie, achievable) statement of the warfighters need. We have vague babble that enables all kinds of silly options to become included in the AoA. The AoA is not focused on a Need that can be satisfied by any one type of end item platform. We will predictably have continued nonsense acquisitions, which may be what leadership really wants.

The Puma offered carried more infantry than the RFP required. An exquisite low risk change to the vehicle.

It’s actually footnote 18 which doesn’t link to the AoA. Trying to find the logic behind evaluating tanks in search for a new Infantry carrying vehicle though the literature placed tanks in the secondary group for analysis.

no logic, besides political pressure. the rule of thumb is that you want 3 quality alternatives in your AoA, and the AoA helps you choose a preferred alternative. The more alternatives, like 9, that you have, the less quality you are going to have with thoroughly developing the concept and understanding of each alternative.

Source?

The requirement has been for a 9 man squad. The Puma carries 6. BAE & GDs options supported the 9 man squad. Might have been cheaper for SAIC to push the Puma, an existing platform vs. doing the work to present a nine man squad vehicle (based on the Puma) like their competitors did. You get what you pay for.

Stretching sounds easier than it is. Stretching impacts length/weight, armor add on packages and suspension at a minimum. May have impact on performance.

I’m ambivalent about the Puma. If its the best I’m all for it. What I’m not a fan of is shorting the Infantry requirement and “Ze German” fanboy propaganda.

Not buying it. I want to read what the purpose was for the secondary grouping in the AoA to undertsand the reasoning. You keep on referring to nine vehicles in the AoA but don’t understand yourself why there was a secondary grouping of vehicles. M1 tanks just fail out of hand as Infantry carriers and they are two of the five vehicles in the secondary grouping. What gives? Then again, so what?

I’m also not buying your less quality argument. Have you seen the AoA, its methodologies and the qualitative/quantitative analysis? You are assuming a lot.

Anyway process interests me much less than product. You can debate the advantages of the MNS & ORD over the ICD til Christ comes back. I’m not convinced that either works considering the track record. Where have we EVER seen a SIMPLE statement of the warfighter’s need? “I don’t care who you are. That’s funny!”

Nitpicking here, but when you said [Consumer, off the shelf], were you paraphrasing Secretary McHugh because he said COTS? COTS stands for Commercial Off The Shelf.

SAIC / KMW were pitching a 9-dismount vehicle adapted from the Puma design. They were not bidding the Puma as-is. There would be no point; the RFP was quite specific about the 9-man requirement.

The confusion may be due to the fact that Puma as-is was one of the NDI alternatives the Army almost considered in their AoA. (The other was Namer.)

Doesn’t make sense. Why then was the Puma dropped? I’d like to see the documentation or at least more on their propodsal.

As much as we’ve discussed the Puma its supposed 9 man capability would have been brought up. In fact I’m pretty confident VP would have made the case for a 9 man Puma if that was SAICs pitch. Then again that may have been the SAIC proposal flaw because they made much of their IFV being based on an existing vehicle and incorporating the lessons of Iraq/Afghanistan. Which if you are looking for a vehicle to address “tomorrow’s“t battlefield relying primarily on current tech may not appear to be an advantage. Add in my previous point about “stretching” and we may be stumbling on why Puma didn’t get picked the first time.

The BAE & GD concepts appeared to borrow heavily from the ASCOD & CV90 (according to moose above) but they also include tech like hybrid electric propulsion, active defense systems the SAIC proposal didn’t. Those would seem like things worth having (IF the tech was deliverable).

If nothing else the reconsideration should be awesome news for SAIC and the Puma’s fans. Here’s an opportunity to actually build a nine man Puma and show its superiority.

I’ve seen the AoA. It was embarrassing. It was essentially an Analysis of Alternative (singular). The alternatives were:
GCV Design Concept (<== THIS IS THE ONE WE WANT, so we didn’t really look at anything else)
Bradley Block II (because they told us we had to, but you can’t make us buy it)
Puma and Namer (but you can’t make us really consider them, or even compare them head to head with our GCV DC)

Keep in mind, at this point 9-man capacity was NOT a hard requirement; that came later.

The AoA consisted of comparing GCV DC against Bradley Block 2, and concluding that GCV DC wins. Oh, but wait! The Army admits that GCV DC is totally unaffordable, ~$27M per vehicle. So they strip things off of it until they can plausibly assert that it might be affordable, then declare the stripped-down version the winner without going back to compare it against the other alternatives, even though they’ve now thrown away most of what caused it to win the earlier comparison. Except for the 9-man capacity, which didn’t actually give it any notable advantage in the Army analysis.

Oh, and because it was required, they included a separate section that gives some cost and performance estimates for Namer and Puma. Which, if you actually put them side-by-side with the stripped-down GCV DC, would give better performance at half the price.

Like I said; embarrassing.

Oh, and while the GCV DC was adjusted and tuned to get the best possible performance for a possibly affordable price, the other alternatives were treated as fixed point solutions, with no possible modifications or improvements.

All I’m saying is that you need to distinguish between Puma, the existing 6-man tracked vehicle design that was an NDI alternative in the AoA, and the (different but apparently related) 9-man proposal from the SAIC team that got dropped from the (second) RFP and led to a protest. The latter is not “Puma”; it’s a new design based on Puma technologies and design elements.

Why do we need this again? Are the red hordes massing at the Fulda Gap? Has the PLA deployed some new AFV that only the Pentagon knows about?

Waste. Of. Money.

Kill the GCV. We don’t need it. We need more Special troops brigades so we can fire KBR and Haliburton.

We need a better service rifle.

the Bradly and the Stryker will do nicely till 2040.

David — Interesting but you aren’t providing me the answers I’m looking for. Why were tanks in the AoA? I’d also like to get as close to the source document as possible.

As for the AoA’s analysis of the worth of the nine man squad I can’t speak to it though I know the Infantry school fought the Armor school tooth and nail ove FCS when they wanted to cut the cost of the Infantry carrier by cutiing the squad numbers. I was involved in months of effort to demonstrate the advantage of nine man squads.

Seems at some point someone remembered and the nine man squad became a hard requirement.

David I understand what you are saying but from what I’m reading that’s not how SAIC sold it.

E.G. “The Puma is the only production-ready IFV designed from the ground up since Sept. 11, 2001, and incorporates the lessons of the wars in Iraq and Afghanistan.” SAIC PR Newswire release 21 Jan 2011 released AFTER the second RFP.

http://​www​.thefreelibrary​.com/​S​A​I​C​-​l​e​d​+​I​n​d​u​s​t​r​y+T…

2040? The Bradley will be some 60 years old by then.

AFV development (and fielding) takes awhile so it would be better to get started sooner rather than later. Even if GCV moves as smoothly as it should, Bradleys will be around in reserve and NG units for many years.

I agree that design work for a new IFV needs to start now, but I’m surf that procurement can wait 15–18 years. The B-52 and B-2 are still supposed to be in service in 2040, while the Abrams is in until 2048–2052 or so. Upgrades to the armor, armament and so on for the Bradley are fine for a few more decades.

The GCV is not replacing ALL the Bradley’s, just the IFV variant. Bradley’s will then be re-manufactured to C&C, Mortar, ambulance variants.…etc.

the Stryker is garbage and tin coffin

Not necessarily — they are looking at accepting a wheeled replacement now that they realize how much quieter they are than tracked vehicles which is why so many bradley units are converting to stryker brigades right now. The current wheeled PUMAS have twice the offroad capability of the stryker and are compareable to a bradley, It is to be seen if they can maintain it after being stretched and with the modular armor upgrade installed which is why they are streching both platforms (wheeled & track).

Great article…it’s about time someone stands up tells it.….being a 20 year vet also worked in the acquisition process as military and civilian I will tell you it’s broke since the war began…Chaostician got it right.…I have watch over and over the same mistakes made…Military senior leadership need to get back to the old ways of asking theirselves is it a need or a want! If it’s a need tell these whiney fat cats like SAIC sorry maybe next time instead of letting them slow the process down.…It’s long enough process to get thru the milestones yet alone adding protests to complicate it further…everybody is tightening their belts these days, some of this stuff going thru the acquisition process is a complete waste of tax payers dollars. DOD needs to tighten their belt also, a great place to start is the Acquisition Process. Listen to the Soldiers if it’s a need. I have heard while testing equiptment with Soldiers and as a Soldier comment many times this is a Waste and I WILL NOT USE IT.

SAIC has always been one of the whiney contractors.…except the fact you are not one of the big five!

To clarify — I was not defending the GCV AoA, or any of the processes used to justify GCV at all. The point about MNS/ORD versus ICD I consider a quibbling waste of time. You can do either process well or you can do it poorly. This board does not need schoolmarm lessons from Systems Engineering 101. Keep in mind that the whole point of the process now appears to have been to pull the FCS MGV prime item vendors out from under the LSI. The fact that Big Army chose that occasion to mess with the requirements speaks volumes for the discipline exercised — or lack thereof. Remember when the big public argument for cancelling MGV was the lack of a V-Shaped hull ? We are way downrange from that point. Too many cooks in the kitchen.

I would not assume that the SAIC team solution had no APS or hybrid engine. One reason SAIC got into the business in the first place was that key persons in SAIC management led a DARPA program for hybrid engine technology.

Tanks were in the AoA, barely, as a reference point for protection and mobility. Nobody (except possible some Congressbeing) thought they were relevant to describing an IFV replacement. It was a hoop the document was required to jump through.

The disconnect on capacity was a function of the combat effectiveness modeling the Army used to compare the alternatives. Whatever simulation tool they were using, it pretty clearly did not incorporate the Infantry School’s understanding of the practical importance of squad integrity.

As a result, the Army’s own results in the AoA showed the stripped-down GCV as performing no better (and often worse) in the reference scenarios, relative to much cheaper alternatives like Puma and Namer. The performance measures in question were blue force crew losses, blue force mounted soldier losses, red force personnel losses, red force threat system losses, and blue force combat vehicle losses.

The Germans started fielding the tracked Puma in 2009. Plain and simple.

if this was quibbling then there was no compelling reason to change the DoD 5000 from MNS/ORDs to ICD/CDD. it’s sad that you do not appreciate the need for investment in systems to be based on a rigorous analytical footing. My suspicion is that the change was made to give leadership more flexibility and justification to spend more development money prior to MS B without committing to a focused MNS, ORD, and AoA. So here we have another Army debacle with GCV, a start-stop-start approach, a contract protest, a readmission of SAIC (which may trigger future protests), Service officials willing to look at “anything” — Strykers, Bradleys, while at the same time throwing the Bradley under the bus as not meeting requirements, and a Service that cannot even commit to TRACKS as a threshold requirement for an IFV. Your oversimplification of the justification for MGV cancelation does not do us any service either. Add in technological infeasability and no basis for sound cost estimates into the mix, and the “upside” of freeing up funds to give us “Spin Outs’ (that plan worked now didn’t it).

i just read that APS was atleast in the original GCV vision, I don’t know if it made it into the latest requirements for GCV. This technology is simply not ready. Show me a technology demonstrator on a moving platform that can reliably defeat incoming RPGs and tank rounds. Does it exist????

Thanks David. Would still like to see the AoA.

Simulations was my area of expertise at the Infantry School. Unfortunately only JCATs provided the quantitative rigor but is really limited to 1 — 2 infantry company size formations. Its pretty easy to understand why the simulations don’t show a difference in Infantry squad size since they are designed to model vehicles and not individuals.

Boomer — Uh, no. You arte factually wrong across the board. The Army is only interested in a tracked solution for the GCV. The tracked Puma is what was evaluated in the AoA and what we’ve been talking about. Wheeled Pumas are NOT comparable to Bradleys. They do not defeat 30mm across the frontal and side arcs. They mount a .50 vs. a 25mm & TOW. They are not as mobile as a Bradley and can not keep up with M1s. They also do not carry a 9 man squad which is the yardstick for the GCV. Case closed.

What you see, I believe, is an attempt to shorten and streamline the bureaucratic process. I wont even try to claim it was really successful, but be it an ICD (at first I thought that was an Interface Control Document, but now I know those to be SV’s, LOL!) or an MNS or an ORD or a ROC (hows that for history!), it is what it is. Now, spin into rafts of fancy but unsupportable analyses (because of the famous GIGO principle), Insure that each angle is “covered” with an analytically derived answer (or is that, “excuse”) so that nobody is responsible should things go sour, and you have your basic 30-yr development program! :-)

The “magic” behind squad size is really tied into your organizational structure. In the Marines, a squad is three fire teams of four marines and a squad leader for. . 13, in AF Security Police, its also 13, and in the PRC army formation I believe its 14. Not sure, but does any army with mechanized infantry REALLY have an IFV (or even APC, and Id say that is a different kind of vehicle) that will carry a full squad plus their gear (based on their definition of a squad or section anyway) or are all of the others essentially looking at 1/2 squad per vehicle?

Could it be that the solution is to reconsider the “mechanical” solution that requires mounting 9 troops on one vehicle and consider the basic concept of redefining the squad to be two IFV’s loaded with troops and gear (perhaps 14–16 troops) with all of the extra gear that seems to be added on every day. IOW, not just X-riflemen, Y-240B gunners, and an RPG/Carl Gustav/LAW/SMAW gunner but also the UAV operator, the satcom operator, the…. fill in the necessary blanks.

I know, already done once, but… perhaps time to do again! :-)

VP — Hilarious! Might be “plain and simple” but the devil is in the details. Mass production of the Puma started in 2009. The first huge delivery to the German Army in Dec ’10 consisted of a grand total of T W O serial numbered PUMAs. Big Whoop!

The German army had 5 proto vehicles before that so on New Year’s Day 2011 (that’s this year) the German army didn’t have enough Pumas to out fit ONE company. Those are the facts behind the “fielded and proven” line in the sales literature.

I’m open to the Puma if it can carry the nine man squad and proves better than its competitors. If not or if the competitors crap out lengthening the Bradley might be tha way to go. What I’m not open to is making stuff up or obfuscate facts to support someone’s BFF vehicle.

Not to be putting words into David’s mouth, but I suspect that perhaps the tanks were in the mix, not in terms of them being a solution to hauling the infantry (picturing the Russian tank rider infantry in 1945 with their PPSh-41 sub-machine guns! LoL!) but with them being a driver, i.e. the GCV would need to be able to keep up with the tanks or the speed of advance of the supporting infantry would the limiting factor for the speed of advance for the tanks, and we paid a lot for the M-1s speed!…think of the Israeli tank losses at Ismailia (IIRC) when they outran their infantry… Model the tanks speed of advance and you know what the IFVs are having to keep up with.…

Well it seems we have identified yet another deficiency in our poor-thinking Army. They will invest billions chasing unproven concepts such as: FCS-20-ton-C-130-deployable-wait-no-scratch-that-only-C-17-counts, then when FCS core fails we have FCS Spint Outs flying beer kegs and SUGVs that we could have gotten cheaper if we just went to iRobot directly, and $900M for concept development for a new GCV, and they will not invest in meaningful simulations, focused Mission Needs Statements, or quality AoAs, to help with the decision making and get programs off on the right foot because they are based on sound analytical foundations.

The Stryker carries a full squad plus gear and weapons.

Thats pretty darn funny considering I could have sworn I was wide awake and not dreaming when I watched side by testing being conducted on them (6x6 puma — stryker — and bradley) at YPG. and at Ft Hood a couple of bradley units are already converting to strykers because tracks are way to noisy and can be heard miles out even in sand. That being said they/we are also looking into how to quieten down tracks to make them viable in the future. Also the GCV & IFV may become one vehicle with modified requirements altogether due to uncertainty of budget and future conflict requirements so the program (both of them) is not set in stone or completely approved as of yet.

USAF — I follow. Just looking for an answer to Chaos’ whining about nine vehciles in the AoA. I think I have the answer. Agree with the reasoning behind two M1’s inclusion and the Namer was there to answer those who think tank like protection is what we need. That means there were actually six IFVs in the AoA though I’d like to see it to speak from a position of knowledge.

Yes, let’s do it the old way because that worked so well!!!

I’m all for efficiency. Promoting the old approach is a losing proposition based on history.

ha… the thing is, DoD is rather poor at following its rules & regulations. The “old way” of following the previous rules & regs and using good risk management would have had a much better chance of working. So instead of soul searching & facing facts of where there performance fell short and they didn’t follow rules & process well, DoD would rather “reform” a create new rules, that they won’t follow either. They will send bucket loads of cash to the contractors, then they will change their minds a million times, and drive everyone nuts, including their contractors, and attack anyone that opposes the practice and demands things done a better way as unpatriotic whiny losers.

Oh yes, “whining” is such a terrible practice that should be ridiculed. No one should whine about the current state of our acquisition practice. We shouldn’t “whine” and understand the screwed up concept development that led to SAIC’s protest, and then readmission into the competetion as an Acknowledgment that the Army made a bad decision, based on a flawed “AoA” <– sarcasm

I’m no BFF to the Puma, I would love to see a replacement made in the USA but the dollar is the bottom line and if we cant find something better or as good as what we already have at an affordable cost then the program is going to die completely. We want our troops to have the best gear available but if we indulge on this project then others will be hurt which in most cases comes from the sustaining and maintenance of currently fielded programs our troops are using right now and that cannot keep happening, its BS when our guys cant get repair parts because the funding has been moved to a developement program.

USAF — No! First the Marines nor the Air Force employ mechanized infantry. For more detail read the “Operation AL FAJR: A Study in Army and Marine Corps Joint Ops by Matthews” Highlights the Marine vs. Army approaches to Mech Inf

Second having tried it the way you described I tell you it was HORRIBLE and we’ve been lucky not to fight an opponent to make the historical case. You can read my debate of the subject in: http://​www​.dodbuzz​.com/​2​0​1​1​/​0​8​/​1​9​/​t​h​e​-​a​r​m​y​s​-​g​c​v-f…

Check out “asdf” initial post with 33 comments but the whole thread is a good primer.

You may also want to read the seminal Infantry Squad analysis: “Development of the Squad: Historical Analysis” http://​www​.cna​.org/​d​o​c​u​m​e​n​t​s​/​D​0​0​0​2​7​0​5​.​A​1​.​pdf

Please don’t go down the road you started. The ice is thin. The water is cold and deep and I have my hand on the clacker to the line charge. ; )

Got to make sure that all of the important drivers to the “real world” are included in the model else …Presto chango, GIGO!

I suspect that the AoA might just be in the classified world…. dont you think?

Im suspecting you might have been at Leavenworth, but almost certainly way after my time. AF/SA and TRADOC used to play a bit.… . :-)

VP — Ugh, BS flag. No Inf unit has been changed to Strykers because they were quieter. The change of certain mech infantry to stryker infantry was to increase their deployability. As a side benefit every infantry platoon enjoyed a 30% increase in boots on tghe ground. That might be good for a COIN fight DUH! Being more quiet? Also nice but NOT the reason. Quit making stuff up!

Strykers operated in comparison to mech units do demonstrate changes we want in the future force like 9 man squads and the mobility of wheels but we aren’t going to replace tracks with wheels until wheels can go/keep up with the tanks and offer a similar level of protection. Can’t wish away physics…

Boomer — I was addressing VP. He loves ze German engineering.

Understand about saving $$$. Also don’t want to go with a substandard solution if we have to go against a top tier competitor. Not making the linkage between this program and spare parts. The GCV isn’t causing the shortage of funds. Much bigger issues at blame there.

Ach… your guys didnt like the “modeling and simulation” of the A-10s either, LOL! Hands off the clacker though, pleeeeze!

My thought was more along the line that “the state of the art” might have progressed from the days when a squad of 9 was originally defined, i.e. M-113 days when the vehicle could theoretically hold 12 but if you included all of the gear and maybe a scrounged “reload” or two, 9 would come closer to right. So.. . the big army goes off and works all of the other “tradeoffs” based on a baseline of 9 troopers per squad, one squad to a M-113. Now we are doctrinally locked into a 9 man squad, and the squad’s equipment loadout looks to a 9 man squad, and nobody wants M-113s any more! A “just so” story, but then I dont KNOW the real reason for 9 being better than 12 and simultaneously better than 6 troopers to a squad. No clackers OK? Cold water is bad for the tender members of the golf course service!

SAJ — I’m all for listening to soldiers but when it comes to vehicles the complaints come when its too late. Tankers weren’t complaining about being outclassed to get the M1 done. Soldier complaints aren’t going to predict the next conflict either. What soldiers might need to fight AQ and the Taliban might not be the same thing they need to fight __________.

Soldier input is priceless but let’s not ignore the threats in front of our nose or assume the present equipment will last forever.

Personally, I’m not convinced an improved Bradley couldn’t buy us another 20 years. No one has asked that hard question yet. Then again, maybe the Army is being cagey for once and promoting the GCV only to “sacrifice” for spending money on the Bradley?

Re: “an attempt to shorten and streamline the bureaucratic process”

Exactly. The dialog goes like this:

OSD/Congress: “You need to do real systems engineering before jumping into these major acquisition programs”

Services: “You can’t make us. It would just get in the way of seizing available funding.”

ODS/C: “Oh yeah? Here’s 7 new regulations requiring SE analyses prior to Milestones A/B/C.”

Services: “Hah! You can make me file the paperwork, but you can’t make me actually do a substantive analysis. I check your box, and move on.”

OSD/C: “D’oh! All right… here’s 9 more required analyses. Eat that!”

Services: <sound of boxes being checked>

Lather, rinse, repeat.

IFV’s fully compared in the AoA:
Bradley M2A3 OIF (baseline case)
Bradley Block II (point solution)
GCV Design Concept

Other IFV’s partially analyzed/compared:
Various stripped-down GCV DC configurations
Namer (point solution, NDI)
Puma (point solution, NDI)
Bradley Block II + 30mm main gun upgrade

Quite a few existing vehicles were eliminated up front in a “screening analysis”, and not considered. The two modern tracked vehicles that have 9+ dismount capacity but were screened out were:
K21 (Korea)
SEP (Sweden)

It’s called ‘spin’. Nowhere in that statement do they assert that the existing Puma carries 9, or that the vehicle that carries 9 is a Puma. They’re saying “We are basing our design on a modified version of the only really modern IFV design out there.” Which is not such a dumb marketing claim, as these things go.

How much that 9-man design would actually have in common with Puma… That’s a different question.

Are you trying to blame the Service’s failures to develop reasonable concepts that have a good probability of success on OSD?? I’m not saying OSD is perfect, but there are good reasons why you need independent assessments & verifications. like, long hard experience & lessons learned from past mistakes and successes

This AoA suffers from being too broad in perspective, which stems from a problem of not clearly defining & constraining the mission need, coupled with a realistic understanding of technology risk. The more broad the AoA is, the less quality & rigor can be put into developing the concept of each COA. GCV is not off on the right foot as far as having a sound foundation for their program. They want it to be all things to all people, and want to force the taxpayer into a “too big to fail take it or leave it” program, exposing the taxpayer to all kinds of cost risk, in an economic and fiscal nightmare of a situation I might add. DoD continues to have to learn the hard way.

Probably good that it hasn’t. What should be mandated is that the vehicle be multi-purpose with modular turrets that can be swapped from chassis to chassis answering the threat you are facing. There coule be a cannon turret, others for TOW/Maverick/or a follow-on missile; a fire support vehicle with multiple chaingun options and possibly a command and control/drone control or medical insert. The biggest problem with the Stryker was that no one ever thought to make it protected from Heat/RPG type projectiles so now it is too big and heavy for the engine pack to support. Personally I think that a modified Stryker package would be the least expensive way to go. The MWRAP is much too heavy and limited in where it can go. The Puma being a lot like the Stryker could well be a replacement for both vehicles.

I blame OSD for one thing, which I think is a huge part of the problem — namely, letting programs through milestones that they are not even remotely ready to pass.

Mostly, though, I blame the services for caring more about getting funded than about doing the right thing with that funding.

The reason for the bureaucratic bloat (if I wasn’t clear above) is that the supervisory organizations keep trying to force the Services to use good processes. But you can’t make someone do good analysis or good systems engineering; you can only make them turn in the paperwork. Unless you’re willing to flunk their term papers — see Milestone decisions above.

As you rightly noted elsewhere, ANY of the past 5 or so processes would be perfectly adequate, if the services would actually implement them for real. But no process works if it’s just lip service and box checking.

I think this design based off the Puma should certainly be considered. Yet buying the Puma “off-the-shelf” simply wouldn’t meet requirements. It would have to be a pretty different vehicle from the original German design.

My concern for GCV is the amount of electronic “stuff” they are trying to fit in it. From earlier concepts you’d think the Army was trying to fit everything normally carried by dedicated reconnaissance, forward observation, and command vehicles into the same “basic” variant of the GCV.

Incremental change is how 90% of the world makes change. We don’t drastically lose weight or change our habits overnight. It takes incremental change. Throwing $2B at GCV won’t make the change we need.

You miss the point if we wait another 30 years a generation of army generals will be unable to secure retirement jobs with contractors.

And yet, the Army’s own AoA found that the off-the-shelf Puma _would_ meet requirements, and in many cases greatly surpass them. At 1/3 the price of the Army’s preferred solution.

Anyone else see a problem with that? If the Army’s analysis is right, they’re buying the wrong thing. If the Army’s analysis is wrong, why are we making decisions based on it at all? If the Army has two different analyses that disagree with each other… The fortune cookie says “Man with 2 watch never know time.”

Once, when military acquistiion was totally driven by “rice bowl” politics and regional jealousies, Congress started “letting” contracts for military equipment directly. They built ships, bought beans and bacon, and purchased what at the time was called a “Continental Musket”. Looked basically just like a “Brown Bess” and had perhaps a dozen “requirements”. They opened the opportunity up to gunmakers in all of the colonies to produce the weapon, so the money was spread out. The one requirement that I remember from the QA briefing was that the individual gunsmiths, not their assistants, not “helpers” they found on the street, but the gunsmith who made the weapon had to charge it with double loads of powder and ball and fire it from his shoulder to get the QA stamp on the breech.…

Minimized the PMO management team, eliminated progress reports, and produced a significant number of muskets for Washington’s bluecoats. Want an older process? What if we tried this?

You just hit on one of my “hot buttons”. :-) “Following the rules” is an interesting way of putting it, perhaps we should just extend that to say “follow the best practices”.

Best practices, as taught in business and systems engineering courses are based on successful business ventures, and include such things as meaningful risk acceptance/managment, rigorous and proactive requirements development, “fast track” R&D and production, and all sorts of (OMG!) common sense actions that for some strange reason always seem to get “tailored out” of government procurement programs.

Perhaps the REASONS, and Im talking about the REAL reasons not the bureaucracy-preservation reasons, for those tailorings need to be highlighted and addressed! Rest assured that the excuse of the military systems being more technically advanced than the civilian systems has grown very threadbare.… :-)

I believe OSD is to blame for many things — there is plenty of blame to go around that’s sure. But one reality is Washington DC is about power politics. I think OSD can often be forced into positions that they no are wrong. One thing I’ve seen is that even if the USD AT&L is politically forced to give a MS decision, they often document the problems and required fixes. This establishes a paper trail and eventually leads to further analysis at GAO, OMB, CBO, etc. levels and through the multiple analyses & media coverage we can get a general idea of if a program is heading in the rigth direction or not. I don’t think the bureaucratic bloat is the problem. The Services & the Programs have billions and billions of dollars, and they waste billions and billions. They have access to all the consulting help in the world to help them produce the necessary documentation. The problem is with the Senior Leadership, the culture they’ve allowed to fester, and the commitment to ill-advised concepts from the beginning, and a lack of compliance with acquisition governance.

But I think that the Stryker was designed from the start as rather “soft” armored vehicle. Its almost certainly not up to IEDs, and, without the retro-fitted “cage”, RPGs, so perhaps not the best vehicle to run along with the MBTs in a mech war. … hmmm…. or maybe even the “asymmetrical” war either!

Hmmmm. .. . someone speak up! Why WAS the Stryker seen as so attractive (aside from the advantages of wheeled vs tracked)?

I’m confused about the Army’s requirements. I believe Maj Rod’s position is that the threshold requirement should be transporting 9 Soldiers. Do you know if this is clear in the ICD? If the Army is not clear about this, then it does not bode well in their ability to clearly articulate requirements, which is a classic root cause of failed programs. The AoA that includes the wide number of vehicles seems ridiculous. An “Alternative” is a possible Course of Action that enables you to meet your threshold Mission Requirements. Including an Abrams, or wheeled Strykers and Abrams that have no chance of satisfying IFV requirements, makes no sense in an AoA because the Army would never be serious about selecting them for the GCV. That’s more like “Market Research”. Plus the more Alternatives in your AoA, the less quality you will have in developing the concept for each alternative. And quality decision making, system engineering, and acquisition management is something seriously lacking in the Army. They actually do have quality people, it’s their leaders that can’t put the pieces together.

C-130 deployability. The story was Operation Allied Force revealed the Army’s ineptitude to strategically deploy through the Task Force Hawk Debacle. Shinseki wanted an Objective Force that could more rapidly strategically deploy. C-130 deployability got figured in somehow, and adaptation of off the shelf designs won out as the way to go. Mowag Piranha/LAV-III won and Stryker BCTs built around the vehicle were born, always viewed an an interim solution, FCS BCTs were supposed to be the end state solution.

I hate the “wheeled vs tracked” debate. each mode has its advantages & disadvantages. There are valid needs for each kind of vehicle type in varying weights too. For an IFV though, I think tracks are the only way to go, if you want a mobile vehicle capable of handlng more types of terrain.

The ICD statement on capacity is deliberately vague:
288 Ability to safely and comfortably carry the required crew, passengers, and payload for
229 the mission roles currently provided by platforms across each BCT to include but not
230 limited to the Bradley.

The four capability gap areas called out in the ICD are Protection, Network, Mobility, and Lethality (in that order or priority). Capacity is not cited as a gap.

In fact, a stated must-have for the first increment of GCV is a combination of MRAP-like protection and “the ability to negotiate the confined spaces presented in urban terrain, combined with cross-country mobility”. That essentially rules out any vehicle large enough to carry crew+9, if you think about it.

This JROC-approved ICD is dated December 2009.

so sounds to me like they haven’t defined threshold requirements, which means the range of what theoreticaly satisfies the GCV requirement is way too large. If they had defined the 9 man squad as the threshold KPP, we could rule out unsatisfactory options and come closer to converging towards a realistic concept. Plus achieving the survivability requirement makes achieving the mobility requirement impossible. This concept of prioritizing the gap areas also doesn’t make sense to me either. You should have thresholds and objectives. A solution that provides Objective Protection (MRAP) but sacrifices Threshold Mobility should be ruled out as unsatisfactory. Prioritizing them as such makes it more tempting to keep trying for the MRAP Golden Ring. It sounds like the Army is not clear on what it wants, nor what is realistically achievable.

Maj Rod are you understanding the importance of “process” now when it comes to the analytical foundation for a successful development, and that maybe spending the $900M on the Technology Development without being clear on the 9 man requirement as a non-negotiable threshold requirement? The historical pattern is the Army is not clear on what it wants, then it rushes to spend money, creating irreversible momentum & commitment to an impossibly constrained development. Then they drag the rest of the government & taxpayer through the agony as well.

Does anyone ever bother to listen to the troops that actually have to use these vehicles in a combat zone on a daily basis ? Or does some bloated, stateside O-6 type who hasn’t been in a zone in several years write up the mission capabilities, crew survivability factors from small arms, RPG and IED munitions, MPH versus MPG and maintenance requirements ?

I disagree, at least in this specific case. The ICD did an OK job of stating the mission need. It’s premature to start setting thresholds, pre-MS A, before you’ve had a chance to quantify the trade space. That’s how you get JLTV-style requirement sets that turn out to be impossible.

If GCV had set threshold requirements at that point, they would have included all of “9 man capacity”, “MRAP-like protection”, and “Weight under 50 tons”. Guess what — you can’t have all of that. And getting JROC to reconsider thresholds is hard; they’re already on record as saying “no, this is the minimum acceptable”. See, for example, AAAV / EFV / ACV…

I won’t pretend to be an expert on JCIDS, but I think you can make the case that we can expect KPPs in an ICD, or quantified Capability Gaps (eg, Bradley only carries 6 soldier & is susceptible to ICDs),
the reg Appendix A: http://​www​.dtic​.mil/​c​j​c​s​_​d​i​r​e​c​t​i​v​e​s​/​c​d​a​t​a​/​u​n​l​i​mit…
I can totally sympathesize with the hardness of getting JROC to reconsider thresholds. Guess what’s even harder, costs more, and makes everyone suffer more in the long run — having a successful acquisition program without a clear understanding of purpose, misunderstanding of feasible technology, and demonstrated lack of requirements discipline from the beginning.

This would be a reasonable argument if the Army had not already plowed millions of dollars into the MGV requirements and design. Yes, the more they diverge from the FCS baseline at PDR, the more risk they take in — otherwise, it is idiotic and disingenuous to imagine that we are operating from a blank sheet here. The RFP to which the GCV teams responded assumed a substantial design maturity from the get go. Was there a better way to have gone about this programmatically ? I am definitely of that opinion. But that is water over the bridge now…

So — my question is simply this. Really ? Why, exactly, can we not have a 9 man squad inside a 50 ton minus vehicle with a V shaped hull ? Assume everything else is tradeable. Of course, we know that is not the case, because we have to have ATGM under armor, we have to have an APS…etc…and we have to have this all done inside seven years, whether or not there is money available to pay for production. Heaven forbid we throw down the technology wildcard with a game changer that really works. Heaven forbid we give the warfighter what they actually need. Heaven forbid that our engineers simply go out and solve problems instead of trading one problem for another.

millions, try billions. are you arguing that the decisions on future investment should be determined by sunk costs? This is a well documented fallacy, that I’m sure you do not make in your personal life decisions. Soon as we can get the government to shuck this kind of thinking into the garbage can the better. We’ve know it for decades, generals and politicians still keep trying to use it. No wonder we make the same mistakes over and over again.

APS should not be a threshold requirement for GCV. if its in the ICD or RFPs then it needs to be taken out. APS should be developed as a separate commodity item that could be integrated into vehicles in later increments, if in fact its military utility is worth its cost and other downsides, and if in fact it is proven to work reliably and operationally suitably in a chaotic war environment. You don’t want the risk it adds into a baseline GCV program. The high tech gadgetry was a big part of what brought FCS down.

It is a slippery slope. In the case of the M1, the Army started to realize that the M60 was not only not the best tank in the world, but it wasn’t even keeping pace with the T64/72 and the Leo II. We did go through a period in which Leo II was also a potential competitor to the M1. And if you look at the Leo II back then, it bears no resemblance to the tank that currently goes by that name. The turret design is completely different, for example. A redesigned Bradley that comes close to meeting GCV specs would, for all practical purposes, be a new vehicle — just like the M1 descended from the MBT 70, but was an entirely new design. All you are left with is a label that weighs nothing and costs nothing.

Would like a link to the ICD.

According to the 25 Feb 2010 RFP:

“The first GCV will be an Infantry Fighting Vehicle offering a highly-survivable platform for delivering a nine-man infantry squad to the battlefield. The GCV is the first vehicle that will be designed from the ground up to operate in an IED environment. It is envisioned to have greater lethality and ballistic protection than a Bradley, greater IED and mine protection than an MRAP, and the cross country mobility of an Abrams tank.”

Cited in the Congressional Research Report “The Army’s Ground Combat Vehicle (GCV) and Early Infantry Brigade Combat Team (E-IBCT) Programs: Background and Issues for Congress by Andrew Feickert Specialist in Military Ground Forces July 8, 2011
http://​www​.fas​.org/​s​g​p​/​c​r​s​/​w​e​a​p​o​n​s​/​R​4​1​5​9​7​.​pdf

From the RFP 2 Mar ’10

“The first GCV will be an Infantry Fighting Vehicle offering a highly-survivable platform for
delivering a nine-man infantry squad to the battlefield. The GCV is the first vehicle that will
be designed from the ground up to operate in an IED environment. It is envisioned to have
greater lethality and ballistic protection than a Bradley, greater IED and mine protection than
an MRAP, and the cross country mobility of an Abrams tank.“
http://​www​.fas​.org/​s​g​p​/​c​r​s​/​w​e​a​p​o​n​s​/​R​4​1​5​9​7​.​pdf p. 6

It takes some imagination to return to the day back in 2003 when I first read onto JCIDS. A lot of things that were supposed to have been done got abused. There was supposed to be an overarching architecture — DODAF was new and we were all trying to figure it out — for the “system of systems”. You keep defending OSD, but what we never had — at all — was that overarching architecture for the Total Force. The Brits modified DODAF to include capabilities as distinct views in the architecture. You can’t blame programs of record for this level of failure, for operating in a vacuum while OSD and the Joint Staff play the same old games. Either lead, follow, or get out of the way. One thing the building does not need is more Monday Morning quarterbacks, who can always criticize but never quite find a way to be part of the solution.

Apologize for the double post. Sight delayed my first entry.

David — Link to the AoA? Confusion can be from misreading the report. If you are reading/citing accurately makes no sense that the SAIC proposal was not initially accepted.

Chaos — Often process takes the place of due diligence to the unschooled, lawyers and vendors instead of delivering a quality product. Understand why it’s important but has to be diligently crosschecked with the the user needs/wants which should be decided before pen is put to paper.

I take issue with the “greater IED and mine protection than an MRAP”. Not specific enough. MRAP is a type of vehicle not a standard. The Bradley today exceeds the capability of some MRAPs.

VP — What tracked armored vehicles have a V shaped hull?

so if it is a contractual requirement then there should be no problem with being clear about it by identifying it as a threshold requirement in the ICD, although David says it is too soon to be defining KPPs. And then there would also be no need to include “Alternatives” that do not meet this threshold in the AoA, not even as ‘secondary groupings.’ An “Alternative” is a possible course of action to accomplishing a goal. If you have no intention to choose an Alternative, then there’s no need to commit resources and create confusion by Analyzing it.

I’m fair in my evaluations. If you look at my comment above you see I wrote that “OSD is to blame for many things and there is plenty of blame to go around.” I understand how unfair OSD can be. This is all the more reason why the Services need to put together “bullet proof” acquisition programs that survive all the scrutiny and independent assessments. My view is that with ACAT 1 programs that require OSD stamp, the Services cannot afford to take excessive risk. With ACAT 2 or lower, or with lab/science type funds, go ahead, push technology to your heart’s content. But technological advances should be developed as commodity items that can be matured/proven/disproven somewhat in operationally realistic environments before they are ready for prime time integration into the operational force.

Lem — You do know we haven’t been using the Bradley in combat for a couple of years now? Most tactical ops replaced Bradleys with MRAPs around 08.

I’m all for soldier input/feedback. How many know what future threats are developing? How many soldiers have faced the RPG 28, Russia’s most modern RPG? Often it’s too late once the GI reports start coming in that something isn’t stopping enemy fire..

“You can do either process well or you can do it poorly. This board does not need schoolmarm lessons from Systems Engineering 101.”

CONCUR!!!

With the RPG-28 it might be “too late” even if we had all of the information in hand…. If the UNCLAS data I googled is right, 1000mm of Rolled Homogeneous Armor and 3000mm of brick! Thats one hot hand-held HEAT round! I know that there are things to do with vehicle armor that improves the performance per unit thickness over the rather standard RHA benchmark, but.… that is a pretty hateful round to counter if you allow it to hit.

Guess its back to the chicken wire and 2X4s, or some similar high tech approach, to keep the round off the armor! :-)

As far as I could tell, the talk about a “running start” from the FCS MGV program was a fig leaf, meant to hide the fact that FCS produced nothing of use. Technologies developed for 20-ton flat-bottom hybrid-electric mobile power stations just aren’t that relevant to a sensible GCV design, especially if you want it to carry crew+9…

Why not?

crew+9 => cubic feet of interior
road/bridge dimensions (and urban requirement) => width restriction
width and cubic => length and height
dimensions => surface area
protection requirement + surface area => square feet of armor(s) of various types
square feet of armor => armor weight
armor weight + GFE + power train + hull + suspension => total weight
(with feedback loop to ensure hull structure can support that weight, power train can propel that weight, suspension can deal with that weight, etc.)

There are hard physical limits to how much protection per pound you can get, and the price goes up VERY steeply as you near the current bleeding edge of technology, especially if you require protection against all threats. Every extra cubic foot of interior drives not only additional armor, but parasitic weight to support the extra armor and payload.

Right. shoulder fire RPGs and IEDs can defeat 70+ ton tanks. So do we put all our eggs in the basket and invest in the heaviest armor & most costly vehicles? Or do we invest wisely in the MANY areas of warfare that can increase probability of Survival? Like.. maybe we would be more survivable with smaller, lower profile, more affordable (so you can have more) vehicles, and more air & artillery support?!! Better & better simulations would sure help. Maj Rod said the one that he used was pretty limited, ie S*CKS!!!

V-shaped hull gives you a higher profile doesn’t it? being taller reduces survivability correct? is their a way to have it both ways? shaped underbelly armor without having to sacrifice being able to stay low?

USAF — Very simply put, Bradleys carry 6. Infantry made three STUPID concessions to field it.
1. split squads across vehicles
2. accept 1.5 less squads in a mech platoon (30% cut)
3. field turret system requiring a tanker’s expertise to use properly

For 30 years we’ve been “trying” to link up sqds on the fly under fire in a mech battlefield (NEVER been done before or IMHO well yet). We also had grunt weak plts required to do infantry intensive tasks e.g. clear trenchlines/urban ops. To illustrate, a 101st line company has 35% more ground Infantry than a Bradley company. Impact — when a Bradley co executes soldier intense tasks where Bradleys can’t go (e.g. air assault, heavy urban ops) its already combat ineffective (70% strength and below) .

The complicated nature of the Bradley also caused us to in effect have two diferent trainng regimens in an Infantry company. VERY difficult to resource/train both well. Its a credit to the force what we’ve done already but one can understand why this is not the way to go. A similar approach in armor would be running 3 man crews in their tanks. Possible but at huge cost to efficiency and personnel.

USAF — Stryker advantages: Squad arrives in better condition to fight. Faster on roads. Quieter. Lighter but not necessarily more deployable on C130s. NINE MAN SQUAD!!!

The Stryker actually surprised us in its ability to handle IEDs because of its standoff. Totally coincidental!

non concur. DoD could have developed much better inhouse Systems Engineering capabilities, trained, certified, experienced, personnel — with the same dollars that are now in fat Boeing contractors bank accounts. Keep neglecting Systems Engineering and enjoy watching program after program fail, billions of dollars & decades wasted, your force structure becoming more decrepid, and stakeholders getting more and more pissed off. As the world becomes more uncertain, risky, and chaotic, you will need more Systems Engineering to navigate territory you do not understand. Systems Engineering is not “schoolmarmy”. It’s current. GET WITH IT!!!

VP my apologies. Above was directed at Boomer. You calling in reinforcements?

You’re getting the cart before the horse. The ICD predates any contract (in theory) by years. It predates the AoA. Part of what Congress has been yelling at the Army about on GCV is that they keep putting out RFPs before they’ve finished analyzing what it is they ought to be requesting. “Ready, Fire, Aim.”

But maybe you don’t mean literally KPP. The ICD certainly had prioritized capability gaps to be addressed by the GCV. I listed them above — Protection, Network, Mobility, etc. Capacity was not on the list. Presumably, that’s because the JROC did not feel (in 2009) that the Bradley’s inability to carry a full squad was an important capability gap.

Of course, the question of how the Army managed to get into a position where two (or three?) of their four “untradeable” requirements were not mentioned in the ICD is an interesting one.

The M48 had a boat shaped hull, not V-hull.

Tracked vehicles gravitate towards flat bottoms because of torsion bar suspensions.

V shaped tracked hull? Possible. That why we have engineers and vendors to see what’s possible. I’m not hopeful.

CONCUR as well, and I have even got to own up to being a Systems Engineer by degree, by profession, by experience, its been said, by (in)ability, and by choice!

On the other hand, when “good systems engineering” runs into schedule and cost, it would be really nice sometimes to have a PM go for the good systems engineering, otherwise, admittedly SE’s all tend to get a little “schoolmarmy”!

On the other hand, as Rev Tevya would say, we, SE’s, need to have long memories in order to be around for the “I told you so!” session! :-)

Chaos — I said it long ago and USAF hit it recently. Our nation is overly casualty averse which is driving the train towards a tank like protection expectation.

Like I posted, I’m not convinced the Bradley needs a complete replacement. Remote turret, 9 man squad and drive on which may be the Army plan all along with the GCV thrown under the bus as a“sacrifice” to get the “consolation” funding.

well of course the nation is casualty averse, everyone should be casualty averse. But I don’t think we are casualty averse in a way that would drive poor system design. It’s not too hard of a concept to grasp. MRAPs are great as the last line of defense against IEDs, but have very limited utility. It just takes a little bit of guts to lead people to understand that a new IFV must satisfy many more criteria than IED survivability, and the excess zeal for IED survivability, which can then be defeated again with the 3 155m shell example, is past the point of diminishing returns that threatens all those KPPs. There are needs for systems of all shapes & sizes on the battlefield, and they all have their advantages & weaknesses. A football team, with its specialized players of different stature, but also some “tweener” players, would be a good example to follow.

Now I am all for ‘total replacement” of systems that were manufactured in the 80s, on the simple justification of obsolesence of parts. The necessary cannibalization of parts and other bad maintenance practices and operating systems out of spec creates friction that threatens the entire organization’s ability to accomplish missions.

only sick egomaniacs would gain satisfaction out of getting to say “i told you so”. My purpose is to get people to stop wasting resources repeating past mistakes, and to get on the path of continual learning.

so maybe for an ICD it better to think about “capability gap” than “KPP threshold requirements”. To me it seems the glaring gaps with the Bradley are its age and I’ll give Major Rod the benefit of the doubt that carrying only 6 passengers is a critical gap. Regardless, the Army needs to define this gap (or requirement) as early as possible to improve its chances that a satisfactory system will emerge from the chaos. By being vague, they are spending money and hoping for a miracle to come out of the $900M technology development investment. In the process, they run increased risk of contractor protests, as we have seen, and p*ssing off Congress as you’ve noted.

Yes everyone should be casualty averse but you are missing something if you don’t see as a nation we haven’t taken it to an extreme.

Casualty aversion isn’t going to impact system design but it will impact how criteria are weighted.

I disagree that it is to an extreme. We’ve endured 10 years of war and thousands of casualties for undeclared wars of dubious justification, execution, and value. Imagine how patient Americans would be if military & political leaders presented good justification to fight a war for vital interests and demonstrated more proficiency in getting the job done. Frankly the financial cost of war and the lack of perceived return on the investment, and the glaring problems on the domestic front, are what is driving an end to the GWOT/OCOs then the steady trickle of casualties. Suppose we fielded lighter IFVs and it was the root cause of us sustaining heavier than tolerable casualties. We could cope in a number of ways to reduce the casualty rate. Most of the IED casualties are probably not even from lack of IFV armor, but lack of protection in Humvees & trucks.

Blah Blah Blah. Look The men doing the fighting are putting it all on the line. It not as hard as you make it out to be. Do the right thing, tell the rest to get out of the way or be eliminated from further competitions. Get the men doing the trench work what they need PERIOD. While people squabble men perish, and for what, someone’s sense of being told there good are not as good as someone else’. This is not supposed to be politics it’s about the needs of the defenders of the Nation PERIOD.

Stryker has thinner armor than most IFVs, but it’s more of an infantry taxi than an IFV. As MAJ Rod stated, the troops are more effective since they’ve got more room in the back and therefore not cramped or dizzy when they dismount. They can carry rucks and some heavier weapons with them and get a little A/C back there.

It was designed with ground clearance which incidentally helped mitigate the thinner armor. The latest version has a slightly thicker bottom and is V shaped. When we first sent them to Iraq, RPG gunners kept missing because they drove twice as fast as a humvee. The biggest downside came when we tried to attack into a new area with them in the lead. They weren’t designed to be the pointy-end of a major assault.

Boomer, the only unit at Hood to convert to Strykers was 3rd ACR. They weren’t “Bradley” units. The regiment turned in ALL of its tracked vehicles to include the tanks.

Great explanation. I am curious what is your opinion on APS? Is the technology mature enough that it is worth the risk and drawbacks? Following your logic, APS would take up interior space, increase the height (which also decreases survivability), increase surface area, increasing the armor requirement, increases the weight, and cost.

LOL it’s not me that’s putting the cart before the horse… it’s the Army!!!

I have been selling connectors and switches to BAE, GD and the like for many years. Over the past 2–3 years I have seen many forward thinking advancements for the layouts of the HUMVEE, MRAP, and other Special Ops vehicles. They are packed full of stuff the soldier needs and would use, based on soldier input working with engineers designing the systems. The problem is with both Corporate and Military hiearchy, where every CEO and General wants to look like the hero, and nothing ever gets done. SAIC and Boeing bled the FCS program dry by stuffing their pockets with cash and left the soldier empty handed. I got into this business because I was a soldier, and I wanted to work with the engineers that strived to continually give our guys and gilrs better equipment. And I know engineers that really want to deliver that equipment if management would just get out of the way! Thank you all for your service!!

The issue that you refuse to address is that where 5,000 casualties was considered a pretty good ‘dustup” in WW-I, and a pretty serious battle in WW-II, its now considered to be excessive and “heavier than tolerable” casualties for a 10-yr long war! Armor protection for fighting vehicles (even in relative terms) that would have been considered totally ridiculous and excessive in WW-II is now considered woefully inadequate. And we are driven to focus solely on the defensive aspects of our vehicles and tactics instead of the offensive aspects, which are of course the reasons that they are there to be shot at in the first place, as well as the economic aspects and the PRACTICAL aspects. Tunnel vision is NEVER a good thing and is pretty much the anti-christ incarnate for good systems engineering. To be perfectly frank, we have become so good at minimizing the KIAs that now the American population expects perfection, and perfection is not going to happen.

A prime example of your “label” can be found by looking no further than the F/A-18E/F. It shares a sillouette with the A/B/C/D models but just about everything but the shadow and the emblem changed (and the shadow got quite a bit bigger too!)!!

USAF — very well put. Good job on elaborating the impact on unrealistic expectations on systems engineering. Some don’t get it.

Sadly, it’s not just ‘some’ who don’t get it, and for many more, they astutely choose to appear not to get it! They are the politicians, in and out of the military, in and out of DoD, who pander to the delusion that armed conflict can truly be made bloodless, except of course, for those stupid bad guys who allow themselves to be killed left and right, without recourse! Afraid that you and I have a long and perhaps fruitless uphill fight with very little cover!

Sent from my iPhone

The ICD is not yet publicly available. However, see LTG Vane’s Oct 2009 brief on the GCV program: http://​www​.dtic​.mil/​n​d​i​a​/​2​0​0​9​c​o​m​b​a​t​v​e​h​i​c​l​e​/​G​e​n​era…
Note the complete lack of reference to capacity.

LTG Vane also discusses GCV requirement priorities toward the bottom of http://​www​.ground​-combat​-technology​.com/​g​c​t​-​h​o​me/…

That “pointy end” part is one of the issues often overlooked in an armored vehicle of any kind. One has to understand the limitations as well as the abilities. As I mentioned in an earlier thread, PT-76s may look the role, sound the role, and smell the role, but on the Golan they demonstrated that aluminum armor, including spaced armor (the amphib floatation tanks) would not do much against even a rather anemic by todays standard 105mm M-60. Turned into one big OOOOPS for the Syrian tankers and an enormous pile of smoking hot rubble.

There is armor and then there is ARMOR. APCs, even nice comodious and high tech APCs are not MBTs.

Crazy thought for a Monday morning.… could it be that we have wrapped ourselves around too many axles and treads trying way too hard to build the one answer to all of the questions related to IFVs? In an urban environment you need a very different vehicle than out on the plains of Iraq. (not to mention desert vs swamp, arctic vs tropic, etc). Not that we can address ALL of the angles but could a MRAP type vehicle just be accepted for the tight quarters of urban combat and whatever the current term is for “counterinsurgency” and a more Bradley-esque or BMP-3-like type vehicle for the “mechanized infantry” war out in the open? Put all of the effort into optimizing the vehicle for the battle at hand and then accept the fact that you will have to do that again for the other side(s) of the equation. It would obviously compromise the NUMBERS for any one variant, but at least you would have a few of that “right tool for the task” when the task appeared and a chance to build more of the right ones once you know which is which.….

this is what i’ve been trying to get through to ya’ll, and i’ve received comments like “we don’t need no stinkin schoolmarmy thoughts from system engineers”. You have to start with a clear understanding of the warfighter needs and a realistic appreciation for technological feasability, constraints, and limitations. You need to be clear what is minimum (threshold) required KPP and what is desired (objective) KPP. If you rush to spend money ($900M) without doing this, you are going to end up wasting precious resources one way or the other, and if you try to do too many things and pleasing everyone, you end up getting yourself into a hopelessy constrained failure of a program. I suspect the Army is stubbornly trying to salvage as much face as possible from the FCS debacle, resulting in a repeat of FCS’s mistakes, as opposed to truly learning from past mistakes, fessing up, coming to Jesus, and starting again, with realism, adhering to governance, and satisfying stakeholders. Plus YOU are still focusing on the end item vehicle. National security problems require end to end, life cycle solutions, and the thinking that’s going to get us there.

OSD tried to get the Army to consider a mixed solution to Bradley replacement, with multiple platforms that could be selected from based on mission. (The phrase “motor pool” was used, IIRC.) The Army fought that tooth and nail, and insisted on assuming 1-for-1 replacement with a single platform in their AoA and RFPs. I don’t know the rationale behind that.

I think the Army rejects a concept of ‘tiered readiness’ because you end up having a bunch of neglected, broke units, and a hollow force. Tiered readiness emerges as reality, often because of the exorbitant cost of the high tech military. The Army wants units to train with the same gear that they fight with, which makes doctrinal sense. We could solve this problem if had leaders who were realistic about technology and its costs, risks, and limitations, and a commitment to affordable, operationally suitable systems.

I suspect that the issue would be logistics, i.e. having to maintain multiple sets of spare parts, repair facilities, and training. Still, its a tradeoff that does not always have a “book answer” if you put the numbers together. And as I said, if you can afford 10,000 IFVs it would be nice if a given scenario did not invalidate 5,000 of them. But then.… neither you nor a single design IFV can always be all things to all people all of the time.…

And dealing only with the “high level”, philosophical issues ends up sounding very schoolmarmy and stilted when the question is how to put treads or wheels on the dirt. Dealing in principles is cheap and easy but will not provide the first combat vehicle and will lead to a massive inertia of inaction burdened by interminable analyses and models and bureaucratic hemming and hawing. Personally, even though in many ways Im one of my own “bad guys”, I would much rather spend the tax dollars on a few reasonably good, reasonably servicable and effective IFVs that a whole building full of schoolmarmish bureaucrats spouting platitudes and torrents of white papers (supporting the politically acceptable position of the moment).

Sorry, but thats the truth! :-) I for one, can at least accept that truth!

actually you are not accepting the truth. I am not talking about high level, philosophical, platitudes, principles disconnected from reality, and white papers. I am talking about the JCIDS analysis and it’s lead in to the DoD 5000 acquisition regulation, WHICH IS HOW we get a “first combat vehicle”. The process itself is not to blame for inertia and inaction, NOR the commitment to foolish courses of action that predictably lead to failure. The problem is leadership that does not know how to navigate and/or ignores the the process. So how are we going to fix it? By not studying the process and repeating past mistakes? Oh yes those darn schoolmarmish bureaucrats (you can tell the quality of a person’s logic by the extent to which they have to resort to smear words).

Let’s take a look at one of your statements: “I would much rather spend the tax dollars on a few reasonably good, reasonably servicable and effective IFVs…” GOOD FOR YOU ME TOO. Do you think that the Army’s course of action is a wise approach to accomplishing this goal? Throw $900M at two different contractors, give them vague requirements, invite a contract protest (ya think KC-X history might repeat itself?), cave into that contract protest, and be open to considering anything, wheels, Strykers, MRAPs, 6/9 passengers, tracks/wheels, etc? I wonder if you can make this connection: You’re stated goal of acquiring a “few, reasonably good, reasonably serviceable and effective IFVs” can be achieved for much less cost and much sooner than the Army’s approach.

Point missed altogether. At some level, you have to put together all the piece parts into a working systems architecture. I keep seeing the legalistic arguments based on horseshoe nail level failures. If we had had an overarching DoD system of systems architecture that said, in effect, “these are the systems we need, and this is how they fit together”, you could have an intelligent conversation about what you need when. You would not be able to whack out major systems willy nilly when the money ran out, just because that was the most expedient thing to do. Decomposing the problem to the smallest parts looks efficient, but in point of fact, it leads you into ORSA hell, where CAIV rules. The bean counters like it that way. The warfighters hate it, and for good reason.

I think we will be discussing the merits and drawbacks of FCS for years to come — and it is in the public interest to do so. Of the thousands of people who worked that program, a great many were dedicated and intelligent people. Now, one could look at the whole exercise as a silly attempt to solve for pi. However, the skeptic in me asserts that the FCS concept was, in the words of Carneades, “not disproven”. Why is the army going in a different direction ? In my view, they walk by faith, not by sight. There are a number of questions that the FCS program failed to answer that I would personally like to have seen answered. That’s what you get when you cancel the program before testing to failure. The problem is that, at this point ‚we do not know what we do not know, and that is really a dangerous place to be. And the more the K Street think tanks guide policy based on sweeping assumptions, the more likely it is that we’ll be wrong when it really matters.

disagree. whatever its flaws, we have both DoDAF and JCIDS — Joint Capabilities Integration & Development System whose purposes are to satisfy the concerns you address. you’re also off the mark if you think that systems get whacked out “whilly nilly when the money ran out”. Evidence FCS canceled in development @$15B into development but $200+B in programmed baselined funds to go. Systems get knocked out as a rule of decisions made by political leaders (either politicians or appointees), based on a variety of reasons, actual or projected cost overrun, actual or projected late delivery, unnafordability from a greater portfolio perspective, and failures in test. Your next to last 2 statements are unsubstantiated smear wording.

To say that FCS “produced nothing of use” is an amazing claim. Obviously if you throw away years worth of work, and start with a BOGSAT of retired general officers operating off butcher paper charts, you get what you deserve. But that was not a foregone conclusion, and it need not have been this way.

LOL exactly what MERITS from FCS?? This is the funniest thing I’ve heard in awhile. Your point that there were “a great many dedicated & intelligent people” is irrelevant, and also reveals yet another HARM caused by FCS — that it sucked valuable human resources from other areas in the defense investment portfolio, putting those areas at risk as well!

APS is no a requirement for anything, much less a threshhold requirement. APS is (or at least ought to be) a design feature that enables you to meet the requirements you have. If you need APS to meet the requirements, then clearly you have to accept the risk that comes with that approach. Same goes for piling up tons of armor on the vehicle, so that it weighs as much as a main battle tank. There are other possible approaches, and this is what I’m trying to get folks to understand and to focus on.

I thought above you said “we have to have an APS” now you say “APS is no a requirement for anything”. You also say “APS is (or at least ought to be) a design feature”. How is a design feature not a requirement, or a driver of requirements? From internet searches & Army leader’s statements it seems the APS “is a requirement”.. meaning a threshold requirement.

I would sincerly hope that if the above quote WAS in an RFP it would have been expanded to include hard and fast metrics for those qualities, for example, how (in measurable/quantifiable terms) survivable is “highly-survivable”? How big are those IEDs that it will operate against and how are they deployed? How much greater than a Bradley or an MRAP will it be? and does this mean that it has the SAME speed, obstacle crossing and range requirements as an Abrams? When a requirements document (not an operational need document) deals in such generalities, real systems engineers start to shake in fear knowing that they are on another “lemon” program, irrevocably destined to crash and burn, air force or not!!! :-)

This is the guy who attacked JCIDS and the ICD, but appears not to have known that ICD does require objective and threshhold KPP values to be assigned. In essence this guy is accusing the thousands of professionals who worked on FCS of rank incompetence, because in fact that did all those things he talked about. Now, as the demotivational poster says, it is possible that none of us is as stupid as all of us. For my own part, I would have settled for an MCS with a top hatch on the turret, a coaxial machine gun, and testing the NLOS Cannon to failure when executing networked fires. As long as you wish to stay in concept exploration, everything is tradeable, which is where we’ve been for two decades now.

The sad thing is that you, David, highlight perhaps the biggest problem we have had in the last 50 years of weapon system development, IMHO of course!!. The priorities are protection, communications, and mobility with the true weapon sytem function, el numero uno, the raison d’être, ranking a sadly distant fourth! The PURPOSE of an infantry fighting vehicle of any flavor should be to deliver its firepower (troops aboard) and then contribute offensive capability itself. The other three are “enablers” for sure, but the primo purpose is, or perhaps should be, to FIGHT. In a totally different venue, consider the Navy’s LCS. Long on Comm, long on Mobility, perhaps confusing and confabulating mobility with protection and…. . where are the teeth to the tiger? Has it just become unfashionable to consider killing bad guys?

It really would be the death knell of the heavy force, and would essentially make the Army manage its vehicle fleet the same way as the Marine Corps. I’ve taken Major Rod to task over the self-identification (or lack thereof) of armored infantry. When you hit bottom, his bottom line argument for the nine man squad is that it eases the training burden for infantry leaders as they cycle through light and heavy assignments. What you end up doing is reducing the Armor Branch to managing the motor pool — which is how marine armor officers do, cycling through AMTRAC and the very few tank assignments. Just why OSD has it in for the heavy force, I cannot say, given our performance when it counted. But there it is.

The issue now isn’t whether or not I am critical of JCIDS, the latest issue was you not saying there is an overarching enterprise architecture system that helps in the decision making of how to go about desigining the defense program. Your assertion that I am “accusing the thousands of professionals who worked on FCS of rank incompetence” is the finest example of slimeball straw man argumentation to be found on the internet. My position is that you can have the finest professionals of good integrity doing a bang up job on a system, but if it doesn’t begin on solid analytical foundations and realism, it’s probably doomed to failure. I’ll give you another insight into my position on FCS: I TOO would have been 100% supportive of the concept if they had stuck to the C-130 deployability requirement, and didn’t have the high risk gadgetry, and if they actually produced quality work. Your last statement “as long as you wish to stay in concept exploration” seems rather inconsistent with FCS’s position in the system life cycle, does it not? FCS somehow managed to achieve a MS B — with a fully vetted APB? Kind of limits your options in the tradespace, eh?

I look forward to Maj Rod’s response to you. Hope he gives it to you both barrels. I wonder how good of a job you’ve done with characterizing (limiting, fencing in) his position.

Attacking the past makes for good soapbox material for those who seek to proselytize the masses, and perhaps pass the hat later on in the revival meeting! LOL! Even if nothing positive whatsoever came out of FCS in terms of deployable systems, the knowledge of where not to go again can not be valueless. I always had to explain that a test where the test article failed miserably was not a failed test! LOL!

LOL! So we should not engage in lessons learned of past acquisition failures because that’s just “soapbox material for those seeking to proselytize the masses”. And you’ve lowered the bar so much that the billions, years, political capital, and reputation LOST in FCS was not waste, but valuable knowledge (which actually seems hypocritical to your slanting of those that would “attack the past”). Awfully painful education to get there, much less expensive ways to get greater return there.

Burden of proof is on you here, VeP. What did the FCS program produce that (a) is still potentially useful, and (b) would not have been developed if there hadn’t been an FCS program?

If you get 10,000 of the smartest people together to develop and implement a perpetual motion machine, you might very well end up cancelling the program with nothing worth keeping. It’s not about how smart the people are or how hard they were working.

(Note that if you had put 1,000 of those people to work on basic research related to perpetual motion, you would still fail to get perpetual motion, but you might very well have discovered several other useful things along the way, for a fraction of the cost. Development programs are the least-efficient way on earth to do basic research.)

VP — I was up to my neck in FCS and did probably a half dozen major studies developing data for the program. What exactly were the advantages that FCS brought to programs like the GCV? The ONLY one I can think of is situational awareness software/networks and some unproven tech regarding power. That’s it!

Unfortunately the FCS program was very successful at convincing senior leaders that we could “see first, know first and act first” with superior technology. The reality is we weren’t even halfway there and the powers that be all the way up to techno wizard Rumsfeld did there best to ignore overwhelming amounts of data saying the program was too ambitious.

FCS did provide us with some tech and tools, the advantage of superior SA and UAVs/Robots. Pretty much came to a grinding halt after that.

Chaos — Where did VP say FPS “must happen”? Where are the army statements that APS is a threshold requirement?

Sources?

Chaos — Where did you get that APS takes up internal space, increases height etc.? How are you attributing that to David (not a wordAre you familiar with APS systems and approaches?

You’re making stuff up. That isn’t a very accurate “process”.

VP above: “Assume everything else is tradeable. Of course, we know that is not the case, because we have to have ATGM under armor, we have to have an APS…etc“
Army: http://​www​.dodbuzz​.com/​2​0​1​0​/​0​2​/​0​4​/​a​r​m​y​s​-​p​o​u​r​i​n​g-7… http://​www​.dodbuzz​.com/​2​0​1​0​/​0​7​/​2​8​/​b​a​e​s​-​g​c​v​-​w​e​i​ghs… http://​www​.defensenews​.com/​s​t​o​r​y​.​p​h​p​?​i​=​4​4​9​8​478 http://​www​.aviationweek​.com/​a​w​/​g​e​n​e​r​i​c​/​s​t​o​r​y​_​c​han…

Major Rod it sure would help if you read some of the discussion before jumping to try to gun me down. Follow David’s logic above. An APS is going to have to have electronics to drive and control it, which means internal space. APS will require power & environmental control, increasing the demands on systems that provide those capabilities, which guess what, makes them bigger & heavier. And when your commodities get heavier, you then have the feedback loop on the transmission & struture to support everything, making them & everything heavier. Internal space & the width restriction result in an increase in height because.. nowhere else to go.

Don’t make me laugh about making stuff up. The Army’s been tossing billions at contractors to “make stuff up”. Be fair.

VP — My bottom line argument for the nine man squad is effectiveness in combat. I’ve provided you ample sources and reasoning confirming that. Characterizing it any differently demonstrates a very short memory, reading comprehension issues or intellectual dishonesty.

As an Infantry officer having attended just about every Armor officer’s professional development course and served as a mech company commander in a tank heavy task force in combat and training I can attest to the ignorance and arrogance some armor officers have of Infantry forces. Gen Dempsey (current JCS chair) who was one of my task force commanders knew enough to listen to the grunt company commander when he asked more of the Infantry than it was capable of doing (fighting in the security zone and prep a defensive line simultaneously). He changed his mind. I suggest you take my advice and listen vs, characterize it as something totally different and lazy.

Training issues I mentioned had to do with the complexity of the Bradley and conducting gunnery and infantry training regimens at the company level. It had NOTHING to do with the size of the squad.

USAF — Having different vehicles for different environments is quite attractive if you don’t have to account for:
1. Open areas have urban areas distributed randonly inside them. How does a force keeep two types of vehicles manned & close proximity to switch as needed? How do you predfict which one you’ll need? How does that impact the deployment of equipment into theatre?
2. What about the training requirement of troops with their vehicles. Does the Air Force expect pilots to operate various aircraft to the point of excellence expected to outclass the enemy in an air to air fight? Now multiply that training requirement across the nine man squad that operates differently depending on the carrier?

3. Enemy gets a vote. Noting a mech/wheeled force to their front wouldn’t they operate in areas most advantageous to them. E.G. Facing mech, make it a city fight. Facing wheels make it an open areas fight where more weapons could be brought to bear? At a minimum, we pause to change vehicles, at best we’d attack and take the casualties.
4. Increased cost to field a force to transport the Infantry force in two different manners?

Those are off the top of my head. I can devote more attention to the matter if you aren’t convinced. : )

Now for the counterbattery.…:-)

1. Didnt mean to imply that you change your IFV as often as your socks, but then the Army has straightleg infantry (10th Mountain) and heavy armor (1st Armor), they just dont send them into the same places necessarily! Yes there will be “non-optimum” places when your Mech War machines run out of farm fields or your Urban War machines run out of city, but… if you have some choice in the matter, you can pick and choose as with the 10th and 1st!
2. Nope. Few self respecting F-16 pilots will cross over to the dark side and fly a B-2 and vice versa. There are very different things that the two A/C do and different skills for the pilots that go along with them. Training would be a problem, but would it be a bigger problem than taking the knife to a gun fight, if you catch my drift.

3. Dang those nasty enemies that dont play by the rules we modeled and analyzed! LOL! Cant trust them, you know!
4. Logistics for two types of vehicles ususally turns into some multiple of owning only one. BUT are we talking long term logistics (perhaps higher than the development) or spending an arm and a leg on a development program trying to build the impossibily compromised single vehicle?

Hmm.… should I really be all that convinced? :-)

Hmmm… have been thinking about your nom de guerre! A mathematician is a person whose primary area of study is the field of mathematics. From some of your posts I almost believe that you are one whos primary area of study is the field of chaos, fomenting and abetting it for the sake of the discussion. Could that be true?

haha my degree is in mathematics. Chaos theory is an advanced area of mathematics. I’m a student & proponent of the field, with some training, but hardly no expert. The correct term for a practicioner is actually Chaotician but LOL i created a new word cause i thought it sounded better. I probably have a lot of original thought in its application to the defense system life cycle management & macroeconomic problems, especially in regard to uncertainty & risk analysis & its impact on strategic decision making, where there are way too many institutionalized bad practices that need to be destroyed. The destruction of bad practice & ideas is a concept I’ve picked up from studying a lot of Colonel Boyd’s work.

My reply to VeP was eaten by the mods, but I would ask him to name something that was developed by FCS, that is likely to be useful going forward, and that wouldn’t have been developed anyway if there hadn’t been an FCS program.

The UAVs/robots fail that last test; they were absorbed by FCS, not developed by it. And I’ll believe in superior SA and/or battle command developed within the FCS program when I see it deployed for real.

Yes, but Major Rod is right here. APS simply doesn’t use that much power, or take up that much internal space, or weight that much. I worry much more about effectiveness and fratricide than I do about marginal cost.

In the case of FCS, none of us is as stupid as the AoA.

Let me put it this way: in the FCS AoA, “make evolutionary enhancements to existing forces” and “invent magical capability to substitute information for armor” were treated as EQUALLY RISKY ALTERNATIVES.

‘Nuff said.

Chaos — There’s a time, place and degree to address the “process” of acquisition. In your efforts to communicate how pathetic the acquisition process for the GCV is (which I think you have succeeded for most parties) you’ve exceeded the point where information and debate ended and in effect injected “chaos” into some of the threads. USAF might have a point.

I appreciate process. Its important. Your attempts to inject it at every point have not been helpful. Maybe a separate post vs. injecting into a thread discussing firepower, protection, mobility etc.would have resulted in your perspective being better received?

USAF — 1. You may not have meant to compare changing vehicles to changing socks but the truth is its exactly that kind of flexibility that’s needed. An Infantry company might find itself in a city and open terrain multiple times in a given day. The enemy decides where to fight. How do we devine where the enemy is going to fight and what unit to send on what axis of attack? BTW, the 10th is straightleg inf. They have no vehicles and would need training in excess of their present regimen to be prepared to conduct ops as a mobile force.
2. Big problem. Instead of F16s to B2s think F16s to F15’s.
4. My initial point was having a motor pool with two types of vehicles to transport the same 100 men. Half are going to sit and rust. Think two planes but only one pilot and one ground crew.

Why would we want to do this to ourselves? Do we get more points for difficulty?

Yep, he said it.

Not sure what Infantry branch says but I don’t believe we MUST have ATGM under armor. I also don’t buy APS is a MUST or the vehicle has to be 50 tons. Then again, I’ve only a mechanized infantry perspective which is pretty comfortable keeping the tankers out of designing Infantry vehicles. That’s how we ended up with a two man turreted system with higher demands of tank gunnery than an M1 tank.

More importantly what does the Army proposal say? I have not seen any of those capabilities specified.

Chaos — David stole my thunder. APS not that big a deal (space, power, height, width). Tech is a big question but the rest is a red herring which was my point. Nail that one. As for the Army making stuff up are you now saying two wrongs… Let’s keep it real?

My gut tells me APS in the RFP, but we’ve got nothing more specific than MRAP like survivability in the ICD. We’ve got vague & unrealistic expectations and conceptual planning that maximizes Senior leader’s desire to be vague & have unrealistic expectations. This justifies an approach of dumping millions/billions into contractor laps, and praying for a miracle. This is not a wise way to be spending money on tech development & prototypes. First off I question the technology readiness & operational suitabilty & affordability of the system. When you are planning an ACAT 1 program, you need to lock into Threshold & Objective KPPs, informed by a realistic view of technology & its limitations.

“not that a big a deal”… famous last words. if an APS system gets into a SWAP constrained vehicle, and the problems mount, and the system ( & lifecycle cost) grows and increases risk for everything, I would like you remember this conversation!! I’m not saying two wrongs… The dicussion just proved I’m right.

Chaos is present in reality whether or not anyone wants to recognize it. The sooner we start addressing it, the better. This is a rowdy public forum for pete’s sake. I don’t expect my perspective to be well received by all takers in this forum full of type A persons. We are limited by the medium to some extent, and the probability for miscommunication is high. But I’ve studied these problems in depth, and the US suffers from a quantitative illiteracy problem, resulting in a systemic poor ability to understand risk. I’m doing my part to correct this.

Chaos in mathematics or physics is far different from what you do with some your comments. Mathematics-based chaos is a method of understanding and appreciating real world processes, intentionally fomented dischord and disruption in what should be an intellectual, thinking discussion is not mathematical, its just bombast.

The Maj is giving you good advice. You have some good points, but presented as they are, its very hard to give them the consideration they deserve, even for those of us who might be prone to try.

Yep, know about the 10th, but you sort of missed my point. The point is that the army sees a need for both the light (10th) and the heavy (1st). They would probably not pull the 1st out of the line and roll in the 10th just because of a passing town or city in the line of advance, but… there are times where the army WOULD send in the 1st and not the 10th, or vice versa. Both would have to function, after a fashion, in any situation that they might run into, but the two formations are optimized for very different battlefields. My suggestion was that a Bradley type vehicle might equip the infantry of the 1st and work with the MBTs, and that something akin to a Stryker perhaps be the only real armor for the 10th. The 10th would not “gear up” when they rolled into open country, and the 1st would not “gear down” in the hillcountry, but you would have a vehicle matched to the primary “focus” battlefield and it would be permanently assigned to the unit in question.

I have every intention of having professional, constructive, intellectual, and thinking discussions. On this particular story things took a nose dive with the “schoolmarm” taunt and subsequent pile on. It’s ironic that you would accuse me of detracting from an “intellectual, thinking discussion” while at the same time my efforts to nudge the discussion in that direction are met with ridicule. No worries though. Like I said I don’t expect type A personalities to accept challenges to their thinking. I’m not here to be chummy, I’m here to contribute to the debate, and if the Army is going to waste money and act stupid, I’ll fight with the gloves off, because soldiers and taxpayers deserve better, and because the fomenting of systemic stupidity does not bode well for the country’s future.

Do you think that the injection of YOUR viewpoint, challenges you make to some people’s thinking, and your call outs of inaccurate statements, and your manner of presentation (LOL!) could be construed as “fomenting dischord and disruption” and detrimental to an “intellectual, thinking discussion”? How receptive are YOU to advice on altering your manner of presentation??

I have no problem with finding my faults, or having them highlighted, at worst, its a way towards self improvement and heaven knows, I have plenty of room for that! The first step is, IMHO, of course, is recognizing that those who disagree with me are not inherently and irrevocably wrong!

Often I try very hard to go for the lighter, less judgemental, “Will Rogers” approach to debate, but sometimes and with some people, the feeble attempt at humor unfortunately falls flat. If its wrong to try that approach, sorry! LOL!

You didn’t answer my questions. But if I can read between the lines, answer to question one is “Maybe but it’s their fault because they don’t have a sense of humor”. Answer to question two is “No”. Now do you honestly think that this is the time in our nation’s history where we need Will Rogers’ non-judgmental debate? As in, the Army will sink $15B+ into FCS and we get zero, actually a negative, return? F-35 grows from $233B to $380B and we are just starting to get into the hard part, and we still don’t have a rebaselined program? We invest $7.3B in NPOESS and get nothing but a canceled program? And all these failed programs leave us with a more and more antiquated force structure?

We have a $14+T debt, and maybe a $100+T unfunded liability because people are so corrupt and stupid and don’t know how to estimate, or worse yet, ignore professional estimators? And that all these problems have common root causes, practices that are being repeated in the current GCV acquisition, but we don’t need schoolmarmy lessons on good engineering or understanding & application of chaos theory through monte carlo simulation? The approach we should take in debate is not striving for intellectual rigor, but for non-judgmental & humorous behavior?

Counting the question marks.…

Question #1. YES!
Question #2. where is the question?
Question #3. where is the question?
Question #4. where is the question?
Question #5 …. question marks usually are an invitation for a response, but all I see are at least your statements of what you see to be “facts”.

But I will try to provide an answer to what might have been that last question. .. if we execute only successful, “no chance of failure”, ACAT 1s we would still be building wooden sailing ships to replace the last generation of identical wooden sailing ships, and THAT would still be the “antiquated force structure”. just with new hulls to feed to the toredos. BUT we would have successfully managed to spend not just the R&D but also the production funding and have a pile of wonderful EVMS charts! LOL!

ROTFLMAO! Do you want “good engineering” or an excuse to do M&S, or just an opportunity to blame everyone but yourself for all of the flagrantly obvious failures of the DoD procurement system.

Fix the problems where you sit and all of the rest of us, except perhaps for those who actually do fit your broad brushed classification, will gladly follow! Loudly berate everything in sight, pontificate on truth, justice and the Chaostician’s way, and you just sound shrill and make my head hurt. :-) ExAF, OUT!

In my last reply there was really one question, with the remaining ??s used for rhetorical purpose. Your “wooden sailing ships” argument is a straw man argument, non-representative of how I propose we should invest in defense technology. Do I need to explain the concept to you again?

good engineering & M&S go hand in hand, its not an either “or”. I’m not blaming “everyone”. I’ve posted repeatedly that there are many great professionals with integrity who do a great job. The decision making at the top is flawed. Plus this isn’t even about a “blame game”. It’s about learning from the past and trying to get us on a learning trajectory, not a repeat the same mistakes over and over and over again trajectory. The reason this sounds shrill and your head hurts are due to your own biases, misunderstanding, and misrepresentations of my position. no OUT!! Sir!!! please come back!!!!

if your head is hurting, maybe that’s cause your learning, and that’s a good thing, eh???

No it didn’t. You just want to obfuscate your ignorance about APS systems and the room inside an ICV (ever beeen in one?) with engineer/process talk and make it sound more difficult than it is.

please excuse my ignorance about APS then. perhaps i’m in good company given the dearth of available information & US operational experience with APS? please enlighten me. What are the SW&P requirements of APS? Which one will be in GCV? Quick Kill or Trophy? How many US vehicles are equipped with APS? How many test live fire rounds of various combinations (RPG types, tank rounds, ATG missiles) have been fired at said equipped vehicles? The marketing brochure touts 360 hemispherical coverage — these rounds have been fired from all angles to ensure no blind spots in the system? Of course the Army has considered electromagnetic compatibility of all the APS emitting components and their potential deleterious effect on the other systems, like communications? Maj Rod I don’t need engineer/process talk to make it sound more difficult — it already is infinitely difficult.

So what will happen with APS is as the system is deployed more and more deficiencies will be found, which will result in more and engineering solutions to correct problems, for example cosite mitigation. You’ll find that the radar is not “strong enough”, so you’ll need a bigger radar. You’ll find you’ll need more “reload capacity” in order to stand up to real war conditions. You’ll find blind spots, requiring more radar & antenna coverage. APS has infinite growth potential for cost and demands on already constrained resources in the vehicle. Having said all this, I’m not opposed to the concept entirely. The technology just needs to be developed separately. It is not ready for integration into the GCV technical baseline. Stick it on more test vehicles in live fire testing and when we’ve addressed the daunting technical challenges, I’ll be a believer. Until then, APS is as much of a risk to GCV as it was one of the causal factors of FCS cancellation.

Like I said before there are tech issues (and you are totally right in bringing them up). The size issue is neglible. Thanks for making my point. :)

Also great job at getting back to the details of the system vs. the over analyzing of “process”. Way to go!

So you basically have no answers, but you are confident that the size issue is neglible. You are either sarcastic or patronizing me for asking a few technical questions, but you’ll continue to mock attempts to study and learn about defective decision making processes that gets us committed to immature technologies that lead to costs & schedule overruns and failed programs, so that maybe we might not repeat the same mistakes over and over again. Maybe there’s a better use for $900M in investment capital, then throwing it at 2 contractors without defining realistic criteria??

just did a little bit of Internet reading. APS’s increase height & overall profile even if you do believe that internal space issue is no biggie. I am especially fond of “iron Curtain” (sarcasm). What are the weight of these systems? I’ve seen from 200kg — 1 ton.

APS (necessarily) sits outside the armor, C. That means it doesn’t contribute to the volume under armor, which is the big driver of weight. It has a profile, but it’s lower than the mast and the various antennae. It weighs some, but not enough to make a significant difference.

If you want to pick on APS, pick on it for technical and CONOPS reasons, not for weight. You’ll be on much firmer ground there.

Every RFP has a technical spec annex that lays out all of those details you are concerned about, and their relative priorities. GCV wasn’t any different. The protection spec was probably classified; vulnerability data usually is.

The problem here is not that the RFP was too vague. Quite the opposite; the RFPs narrowed the development down to a single point solution (twice) before the Army had finished analyzing what it was they really needed.

First off, to use the term “APS” itself does not bode well for constructive debate as the systems do come in various shapes & sizes. So until the Army actually specs the APS for the GCV, all potential risks for the system are fair game. I’m surprised you can’t make the connection between the technical & CONOPS risks and the impact on weight. Please spec for me the weight of a light weight APS system, it’s TRL, and how much live fire testing its been subject to. Then we can have a fair discussion on whether or not its worth the weight (and other) penalties) of the already constrained GCV program.

Let me try saying this a different way, C. Worrying about how much an APS will weigh is like worrying about what a car accident might do to your haircut. It’s so far down the list of things to worry about that you are wasting time. The low TRL is vitally important, for both cost and performance risk — but not because of anything to do with weight.

No idea what your concern is with the term “APS”. The purpose of the TD phase is to turn requirements into designs. It would be way premature to specify a particular APS going into TD, and I would criticize the Army roundly if they did that. The RFP specifies a level of protection; how that protection is achieved is up to the offeror.

VeP, I think you underestimate the extent to which the “FCS concept” has been totally discredited. For FCS to work against a heavy force, an FBCT needed to destroy most of its enemies with indirect fires before they got close enough to shred the lightly-armored vehicles with direct fires. To do that, they needed fully-networked fires and extremely efficient sensors.

What they learned was that (a) they can’t make a network with enough throughput to support the required information load, (b) they can’t make good enough sensors to be able to find and destroy enough of the enemy at range, and © the whole concept is useless in a COIN environment, where every attack is from close range.

So even if they had solved all of the (many) technical issues with the vehicles — mobility, the armor, the power train, the thermal issues — it still wouldn’t have worked as a brigade. And a lot of people knew that by 2003.

Provide some weight specs of candidate systems and we can have a fair judgment. The Drozd system supposedly weighs 1000 kg http://​warfare​.ru/​?​l​i​n​k​i​d​=​2​4​3​7​&​a​m​p​;​c​a​t​i​d​=​314
Whatever we think a “lightweight APS” will weigh, what will happen through the technology maturation process & operational use will find all its deficiencies and it has the growth potential to get to that upper limit if not more. There is no reason to believe otherwise unless the Army actually has specifics of a technologically mature system, other than “wishful thinking”, which hasn’t worked so well for us in the past. I am hung up on APS, since it seemed one of the most unbelievable technologies of FCS, which I believe was one of the main causes of FCS failure.

I’ll buy that… and also the problem you mention where the specs end up channelizing the solution space. The Systems Engineer in me just cringes when I see “motherhood” statements anywhere near an RFP.

Chaos — My position on APS is let’s evaluate it fully recognizing it has technical challenges. I engaged you on it because you dismissed it out of hand for mostly “cosmetic” reasons.

You implied it took significant space under armor. Not true. Now, its “heavy” but the ONE system mentioned accounts for less than 3% of a 40T vehicle. Vehicle height? How much and are we talking about a house sized satelite dish or a mast? C’mon antenae raise profile also. Should we not have radios?

At times you just want to inject chaos in the argument. I’ve already stated APS has tech issues. No problem. This grasping of straws is just ridiculous and a waste of time. My apologies for not being as winsome with my time as you are.

David — IMO the RFP as I’ve quoted it is not too narrow. Where were the two points you felt the Army “narrowed” things “prematurely”?

USAF — yes the devil IS in the details. I’d love to see them and just have to have faith they are listed somewhere. My personal beef is the MRAP requirement. Saying have MRAP like protection is like saying having car like speed. There’s just too much variability in the genre.

We have the same problem when we start debating the pros or cons of “APS” when there are no specs for “APS”. The Iron Curtain APS increases the profile of the vehicle considerably more than a simple antenna. Of course you should have radios, when the APS interferes with the radio maybe you will get beyond your disparaging remarks and we can have a substantive discussion. OSD’s LFT&E program to competetively test out these systems so we can discern the good & the bad is a step in the right direction.

3% of a 40T would be a big deal too btw, per the feedback loop on the supporting structure, the demand on the vehicle power system (you want that APS to operate with the enginge shut off?), impact to environmental controls, etc.… now if the Army had done a better job with claritiy in mission need, definition of APS threshold & objective requirements with technological realism, perhaps we’d be in a much more confident position to say that APS weight is no biggie. but the Army likes to keep its option open, especially it’s most risky technological ones.… ends up stretching out the schedule quite a bit, and drives up costs, increasing risk of program cancelation.. oh but this boring to you too, sorry…

Sounds like double talk to me. The worst sort of analysis is that which underwrites and justifies decisions made from the top down. I do believe that the Army had its frustrations with the LSI, and indeed, utilizing the LSI concept in a program that large and important to the Army ran against a wide variety of vested organizational interests within the Army. You could see this play out across the FCS IPT structure. But, except for a number of renegades within the uniformed ranks, I do believe that the Army supported the program’s continuation up through and including SOS PDR. This was a decision forced on the Army from top down. I also assert that for the most part, the LSI performed the role it had been given. However, there has been very little migration of the actual people who worked the program within the IPT structure into the successor programs, and I just think that is a wrong choice on the Army’s part. You spend $15 billion dollars learning what you can and then throw that investment away ? Only the arrogant and the ignorant do things like that.

I’m sure that if a Puma-based design were adopted by a major US acquisition program, there would be a coproduction agreement. That’s just the way these things go.

I think I understand the point being made here, but disagree on several not-academic points. We are simultaneously being told that the Fulda (or Chorwon) Gap scenario is passe, so we don’t need the FCS BCT, and (it is claimed) the FCS BCT would have to win the deep battle better than the deep battle was ever won before to work. Well, which is it ? It can’t be both.
Lesee — 2003 — it is hard to remember back that far, but IIRC, that would have been before MS B, either during or before the original AoA was done. Is the assertion that we learned NOTHING from 2003 to 2009 ? What nonsense. And some of this comes from a legacy of attrition-based modeling learned at Monterey, reinforced by hundreds of JANUS and CASTFOREM runs, and a dogmatic refusal to think out of the box the Israelis made for us in their 1973 war experience. It’s just pathetic, and I really don’t see it changing. Good heavens, Alternative to Armaggedon was written by 3 WWII generals. In 1970.

Well, I think the Army sold itself short by cancelling both the Class I and Class IV UAVs. I personally think the MULE was an interesting vehicle, and definitely should have been tested to failure to explore its capabilities and its limitations. Some of my friends felt the same way about the Class II UAV. If you think about the challenge of getting around on the ground in Afghanistan, of supporting units in very inhospitable terrain over large distances. The benefits of these systems should have been self-evident. And time will not change that equation, as long as the current operating environment persists.

I do think that the people who said “it is all about the network” were passing gas. You don’t need omniscient SA with perfect real time video transfer and fancy data fusion to lessen the fog of war. Believe it or not, I’m also a John Boyd fan, and the proof of the pudding is how these technologies improve the military decision making process. in terms of speed, in terms of accurate and reliable decisions. Oh, and our 3 WWII generals made this self-same point in Alternative to Armaggedon. In 1970.

Final point. What about networked fires and the NLOS Cannon ? It seems to me that the integration of AFATDS into the maneuver battle command system was kind of a no brainer. At the end, that was about the only thing FCS Battle Command was ready to do. While I’m sure the contractors will love it if the SIGMA start lives forever, the advantages of the C4ISR architecture of the 1980s are rather lost on me.

There is something to be said for the assertion that FCS reached Milestone B maturity at PDR. The program only spent one year going from Milestone A to Milestone B, and then was promptly restructured after MS B into the incremental model. Then the went to FAR contract. I honestly thought the Army put itself in the catbird seat by structuring a program baseline (after MS B) with the least defiinition and the most risk mitigation possible. If you had told me in 2005 that they would kill 17 out of 18 systems at the conclusion of Spin Out 1, I would have thought you were crazy. And it is crazy. A lot of STO owners and ACAT II and III PMs were told, “make your program relative to FCS or lose your program”. Those folks were well rewarded for warping their program objectives to fit in the FCS box. Did you know that the FY 2010 cut the Army’s STO lines by 50% ? I just look at this stuff and shake my head. That money ain’t coming back.

Think of an APS as the MGV/GCV’s counterpart to the Crusader’s liquid propellant gun. There is a bad tendency among some combat developers to latch onto promising technologies, and to build requirements around the technologies rather than the warfighter’s needs. My statement, “we have to have…’ was the wry recognition of this reality.

You didn’t get it the first time. Here it is again…
“I engaged you on it because you dismissed it out of hand for mostly “cosmetic” reasons. You implied it took significant space under armor. Not true. Now, its “heavy” but the ONE system mentioned accounts for less than 3% of a 40T vehicle. Vehicle height? How much and are we talking about a house sized satelite dish or a mast? C’mon antenae raise profile also. Should we not have radios? ”

Quite different than the points you’ve brough up since (not disagreeing with some of it). I believe the specs are out there, you don’t. Considering no vehicle system has been pursued without specs. I’d be willing to wager they are there but not available.

The electronic box that controls the system takes up space in the already tight vehicle. The control panel takes up space inside the vehicle, making egress even more difficult. The electrical wiring adds weight & increases maintenance demands. The demands on power and environmental control drive those systems to be larger & heavier. The Iron Curtain system looks like a freakin breakfast in bed tray on a person’s head, much greater problem than a Direct TV “antenna”. These are not cosmetic issues.

Your gut said APS was in the RFP. Uh, not in what I cited or found. Your source, gut 101? Since then, you’ve been talking APS up one side and down the other. You’re annoye at me because I called you out on the space etc. red herrings you tossed out there. Don’t get mad at me because I don’t want to waste time. APS doesn’t seem to be part of the RFP but IMO might be a nice thing to have if it works.

You can debate the implications of APS as if its in the RFP eventhough its not. I’m more of a mind to devote the time to it that a “nice to have” capability deserves.

Feel free to overanalyze, must be a “process” thing? Don’t get angry if I don’t want to play in that magical fantasy world of yours. :)

isn’t GCV inheriting a lot of the promising technology from FCS? They are not throwing the FCS investment away. They should be. Sunk cost fallacy. Logical people do not put a whole lot of weight into sunk costs when deciding what to do next. Congressmen usally do, which should tell you something.

VP — OK, what’s your point? Sure the Puma can be made in the states. You were the fella championing “ze superior vehicle design of ze Germans” which when you get right down to it doesn’t prove true. Don’t see how a “yet to be built” stretched Puma is better than the BAE, GD or (God Forbid) a stretched Bradley.

We’ve gone round and round on the Puma/Bradley comparison. Remember? Bradley narrow track (which is wider than the Puma), Bradley clumsy height & width (which is .1m thinner/taller than the Puma) and Puma’s “fielded/proven” quality (seven vehicles on 1 Jan “11). Seems a 40 year old design pretty much is on par with a 10 year old design which is why I’ve benn pinging you wit “ze German engineering” quips.

I just want to measure vehicle against vehicle and the requirement. No favorites though US produced solutions are attractive (and should be ONE criteria though not the only one) we really need to look at all vehicles realistically and without emotion.

USAF, that’s how we do business now.

http://​contracting​.tacom​.army​.mil/​m​a​j​o​r​s​y​s​/​g​c​v​/at…
pg 23 C.20.5.3.2 Energetic/Active Protection

It might be more useful to think of the Army in terms of brigades rather than divisions. The Army is organized, trained, and equipped into modular BCTs. There are about 20 Heavy BCTs structured around Abrams & Bradleys. There are about 70 Light BCTs with Humvees maybe MRAPS. There are about 7 SBCTs structured around Strykers (no tracks). When the Army chops forces to JTFs, all kinds of ad hoc formations can be put together to address your proposal of tailoring organizations to missions. This is pretty chaotic and all kinds of tragedies can result. One of the biggest problems I’ve commented on is we do not have adequate large scale live fire exercises to test the JTF concept. So the first time organizations & their gear are thrown together is under fire. DoD probably intentionally shies away from large scale realistic exercises because it would expose our weaknesses, which is exactly what training & testing should do. Instead we get debacles like Millenium Challenge 02.

Re: “You spend $15 billion dollars learning what you can and then throw that investment away ?”

It depends. Is the thing you were developing relevant to any current program?
In the case of FCS, the answer (in my humble opinion) is:
1. The FCS vehicle work is not relevant to any current program. The exceptions might be hybrid-electric propulsion and modular armor. Those were not FCS-specific.
2. The Battle Command subprogram might have something that doesn’t require WNW to work as originally advertised. If so, move it into the FBCB2 program and use it in JBC.
3. Apart from that, Mrs. Lincoln…

FCS was trying to do the wrong thing. There’s just not much to be salvaged from that. They didn’t spend $15B learning how to build vehicles; they spent $15B (mostly) on SEPM and software. The vehicle work was aimed at meeting a set of incompatible requirements in a part of the design space far away from any current program. And that’s a good thing — FCS was aiming for the “sour spot” of vehicle size/weight/performance, too big to transport and too small to protect.

It CAN be both if the case for FCS was incoherent to begin with. And it was.

The original motivation was a replacement for HBCTs, Fulda Gap etc. The rhetoric and spin changed that over the course of the program, because the Army really didn’t want to say they were spending $300B (OSD estimate) on the wrong problem.

But the new claim, that FCS was “full spectrum”, was nonsense — it’s a standoff-only formation. All of the simulations showed it getting reamed if a red force got close with anything. COIN is worst-case; an IED turns an FCS vehicle into $50M worth of confetti, on the other side of the hill. Even a .50-cal was a serious worry.

From 2003 to 2009 they weren’t trying to learn anything; they were trying to figure out how to put 20 lbs of information dominance into a 10-lb bag.

FWIW, I had nothing against NLOS-LS; I like the idea, and it seemed like it could have worked to bring timely indirect fires down to a lower echelon. It was canceled for cost, not technical failure.

Of course, it also wasn’t developed by FCS. It was one of the co-opted pre-existing programs that repackaged as “Spin Outs”.

We agree on the head-shaking, V&P. But’s it’s misleading to say that FCS reached Milestone B maturity, ever. It was allowed through MS B with averted eyes (and nose held); it didn’t earn that.

The problem with being too big to fail is that, when you do fail, you take everyone else down with you.

“We are simultaneously being told that the Fulda (or Chorwon) Gap scenario is passe, so we don’t need the FCS BCT”… WRONG. FCS wasn’t canceled because this strategic requirement has disappeared. On top of the lost $15B and the opportunity cost and lost return had we spent the money more wisely, we have lost a decade in sensibly modernizing the Army. FCS is still causing us even more pain, because Army generals are still cling to it, won’t acknowledge and learn from their mistakes, and repeat the patterns of behavior that led to its failure.

M.R — the first RFP had a bajillion specific requirements that pretty much boiled down to “make it exactly like the demonstrator, except a little better in every way”. There is no chance in hell such a vehicle could be built with current tech; the demonstrator was already missing thresholds.

The second RFP only has 4 “untradeable” requirements:
1. Force protection (classified details, but roughly “MRAP-like”)
2. Crew+9
3. Weight and power headroom for future enhancements
4. 7 years from first contract to first delivery.
AT&L added
5. APUC of $13M (FY2000 constant dollars)

The problem is that 1–3 make 4 and 5 extremely unlikely. It has to be a new start, it has to use immature armor tech, and it has to be a faster development than any past system of comparable size and complexity. And it has to beat the independent cost estimate by 30%. Any design engineer will tell you that of better, faster, and cheaper, you can have at most 2 at a time.

they actually shield design engineers from that kind of reality. A good system engineer & maybe an engineering program manager would be able to calculate probability of success = 0.

Okay, that’s nice summation, but no answer to my — rhetorical question. So — let’s assume for the purpose of this discussion that a one meter increase in vehicle length results in a 10–15% increase in weight. (i’m being deliberately vague, and you can play around with the numbers as much as you like — but I do think this is a liberal estimate. How much weight gets added by V-shaping the hull ? Have I hit 50 tons yet ? As far as ‘protection against all threats” — this a a pretty broad statement. Personally, I would argue that driving down the horsepower to weight ratio and vehicle speed by piling on more armor does not enhance the vehicle’s survivability. In point of fact, the Puma is a longer vehicle that the Stryker (7.4 m versus 6.95 meters) What the length of a BFV ? 6.55 meters.

Please read what I said. What I said in effect was the FCS hit MS B maturity by 2009. Now, the irony of this is that the DoD revision of 5000.2 puts PDR BEFORE MS B now. Having failed to accelerate the FCS program (or any other program), we are now expected to hit that maturity level even earlier in the process. Are we aiming higher or aiming lower now ? Goodness knows…

Noted. But the public source reports were that NLOS-LS wasn’t quite hitting its reliability numbers. And of course they had TRAC do a cost-benefit analysis to justify killing off the program. Even handed out awards for the trade study. Amazing, when you think about such things.

Here is another little nugget for you, Major. FM 71–1 (1998 version) instructs the company commander to go into bounding prior to contact because it assumes that the information will be available to support this. This contrast strongly with the tone of corresponding language of the 1988 version, the author of which I happen to know (as well as why the offensive section tones down the use of bounding prior to contact — a practice I strongly agree with as part of my upbringing on Depuy tactics). Why did the Army assume in the Nineties that SA would be this good ? Was this a good assumption for have made ?

Well, as I used to say, “a good light tank doesn’t come around every day”. I do question the idea of stand-off as a means of protection. Simply put, even in the delay, even more so the defense, there are times when you just have to stand and fight. That does not mean you should not seek to maneuver, whenever and however possible. BLOS fires — interesting concept. I’d like to wring it out. But forget about JANUS and CASTFOREM results. Those models teach us nothing. JANUS is totally pucked, and CASTFOREM decision tables do not capture military decision making in anything but the crudest manner. As far as spending money on the “wrong problem”, yeah, there is a problem keeping a program sold in wartime — to fight the next war.

One reason I believe that the MGV was cancelled in the first place, and GCV will likely not get fielded, is that the Army has had a fundamental problem since the end of the Cold War. Bob Gates just couldn’t believe that someday, in some way, we might get caught with our backs to the wall (or more likely, the sea) in a way that we would have to fight and win — or lose big. Was Shinseki right or wrong in the first place in the direction he pointed the Army ? What I really think is that the Army lost out back when it did Division XXI and Brigade XXI, by not going with MacGregor’s approach and going to fixed brigades. What they did back then was not rigorous and mostly a CAIV of Division 86, even while they doubled the operationa areas of divisions and brigades. I also think that airmobility is the real future, and that we are not well-structured to synchonize what the Germans call “air combat brigades” with either the light or the heavy force.

So FCS came along, and while we still don’t know the extent of the concept’s imperfections — the idea of chucking main battle tanks out of the force may not have been such a good idea after all — at least it was a way forward. It was a plan, and if it had gone forward, we would have fixed what was demonstrably broken. Is there a better idea out there ? You tell me, but here is a Richard Simpkins quote from Human Factors in Mechanized Warfare that I kinda like:

“Rotor is to Track as Track is to Boot”.

Still disagree. FCS never hit MS B maturity, and was never going to for the simple reason that the concept does not work using anything like current technology.

The point of putting PDR before MS B is not to force you to reach maturity earlier in the process; it’s to force you to delay MS B until you know enough to make a go/no-go decision on production. When PDR happens is supposed to be determined by when the development effort is ready for it, not by when it was scheduled at MS A.

Of course, that’s totally lost on the services — their schedules are driven entirely by externally-imposed arbitrary deadlines, rather than by how long it would take to do the job right.

your backward looking time horizon isn’t far enough. The Army has had fundamental problems since its inception. One of its problems is that its Generals will never own up to their mistakes and take the proper corrective actions. The gaps in their logics are glaring. Task Force Hawk failed to deploy Apache helicopters. So rather than address the problems leading to that deployment, Shinseki started us on the FCS course. Hmm FCS, Abrams, Bradley replacements, Task Force Hawk — Apaches… As the FCS core program was going down in flames, rather than cancel the program outright and start fresh with technological realism and fiscal responsibility in mind, the Army tried to salvage FCS as Spin Outs. Now that Spin Outs has proved itself to be another debacle, we still see traces of FCS mentality still present in the GCV program.

The Army had enough sense to realize that FCS could not replace 100% of Abrams & Bradleys — the idea that MBTs would be chucked out is inaccurate.

Turns out my Gut 101 is pretty accurate. Care to admit that your judgment was wrong?

I’m not sure what you think I didn’t answer. By “all threats” I mean small arms, RPG, IED, artillery shrapnel, airburst… the usual suspects. Modern armors do not protect equally against all of those, so you need a more complicated design.

“How much weight gets added?” isn’t exactly the right question, because there’s usually no base design you’re starting with and stretching by a meter. You have design the whole thing for the capacity you want. It will use a different space frame, different suspension, and different armors in different places, versus a smaller vehicle.

The very unfortunate thing is that this magical fantasy world is not a lonely world, at least not if expanded to include many of the bureaucrats involved in weapon system acqusition. Sadly they tend to be both in uniform, or in business suits, both inside or outside of the DoD. Im begining to believe that we should also research the definition of “sociopathic narcissism”, but thats just the guess of a non-clinician. :-) (Inbound… Im sure!)

Back two years ago, there was talk of “Unified Battle Command” that would merge the ABCS systems (not just FBCB2, but the BCS/PASS server) with FCS Battle Command. I don’t know the details, but what I’m hearing does not lead me to believe this has ended well. The interdependency with WNW strikes me as contrived. SOSCOE pretty much hid the transport layer from the FCS Battle Command applications. With the demise of PEO-I, its really an historical question now.

As far as vehicle development, there were the six NLOS-C prototypes mandated by Congress. A good bit of money got moved around to make this happen. The last sentence above strikes me as tendentious, as if the C130 transport requirement ever had any reality to it. “Too small to protect” just begs the question — protect against what ? RPGs at 50 meters and IEDs at 20 meters ? Larger vehicles make larger targets. It is the unwillingness of many in the Army and in industry to make sensible tradeoffs that got us in this mess and keeps us there.

Let me put it this way — as IFV designs go, Puma is a pretty conservative design, but its innovative elements definitely go in the right direction. So, I’ll concede that the BFV has less ground pressure, but Puma is faster (not hugely so, but 4 kph faster. But its horse power to weight ratio is way better — 28% better at its high (43 ton) protection level. That’s important, because horsepower to weight is a key indicator of vehicle maneuverability. But basically, I see Puma as a good solid design with some advanced features. Those people who keep bleating about technology risk and cost should’t turn their noses up at an off-the-shelf solution that costs half of the GCV projections. There may be a better, cheaper design out there, but I haven’t seen it. Yeah, the CV 90 is a big brute of an IFV — the latest Russian BMP version is kind of interesting. But not one of those vehicles carries eight men in the back.

It would appear that we have different interpretations of what MS B is (or should be). But don’t shove this on the services. It is also OSD that keeps pushing the acceleration button on the system lifecycle. As far as I’m concerned, that is really what has broken the system. Mr Hollis used to talk about “degraded states” — and what he was really getting at was whether system performance degrades gracefully and slowly as one or mor eof the pieces fail — at some point the failure becomes catastrophic. All this drivel about TRL levels and risk management is making the process more brittle and increasing the stakes of failure. The PMs who are succeeding these days are doing so by flaunting the process, not be following it.

This is not the place to get into a technical discussion of how to design an optimal IFV with the most modern technology. While I do have my own set of opinions on what might or might not work, only two approaches are possible — either one “hacks” an existing design as I suggested. Or one designs a vehicle from scratch. Now, I would be inclined to constrain that latter more tightly. I want a vehicle so wide, so long and so tall, and to weigh no more than X tons. I want this top speed, that ground pressure, and this horsepower to weight ratio. I want it to have these many people on board, doing these functions. That’s the start of the discussion, not its conclusion. I want to know how far I can push the envelope. A superior design may cost more, but put the bottom line up front. If I have to trade something off to get what I need, fine. But that begs the question — what do I need ? I’ll tell you one thing, designing armored vehicles to defeat bottom up attacks is a loser. But measures that limit damage and protect the occupants — that’s all good. We need to learn to stop paying too much for the whistle.

Are we still under the impression that a vehicle lighter than 50 tons can’t carry 9 soldiers in back and provide decent protection? The CV90 built with series holds 8 in back and is pretty well armored. An unmanned turret would clear up some room in a vehicle, plus save some weight allowing for additional armor.

FCS didn’t work out, but there were certainly some promising technologies for lighter vehicles in that. New composites, hybrid-electric drives, etc.

VP — Granted, the Puma has 28% better ground pressure. Considering Bradley’s keep up with M1’s fine its not going to sell me on the vehicle but its a nice to have.

Second you can’t compare the Puma at half the cost without the HUGE caveat that it carries 33% less of a squad! What’s the cost (in all critereons) to add three more seats (no small feat)? This point alone KILLS the conversation!

I’ve said I’m open to the Puma but my haranguing you over the Puma was because of your emotionally based admiration of the vehicle over its performance. Looks like you are coming around.

No, I think I’ll quote you…

“only sick egomaniacs would gain satisfaction out of getting to say “i told you so”. My purpose is to get people to stop wasting resources repeating past mistakes, and to get on the path of continual learning.”

I maintain your inane and comparison size of ONE to prove “whatever” has been a colossal waste of time.

LOL! And what happened to Cost As an Independent Variable?

In many procurements, particularly those led by unimaginary, risk averse, self-serving leadership teams, 2 out of the legendary three would have to be termed an uncompromised success, just check their “outbrief Powerpoints”!!.

Hmmmm.… I wonder what would happen to the analyses IF you swapped out the current turret for the most lethal turret/weapons loadout possible, trimmed back the armor and redundant systems to the credible limits, took advantage of the lighter weight in terms of mobility and speed, and accepted the higher casualty rate for a shorter engagement? Hmmmmm……

Just one of those “trade space options” that seems to have been very successfully applied to what are nowdays considered legendary armored vehicles….… . (Sherman take comes to immediate mind!).

And yes Im only on my first cup of coffee, so watchit.… :-)

I thought the latest disagreement was whether or not APS was in the SOW. My gut was it was in the SOW your gut was that it was not. You’ve been a d*ck at every opportunity and challenged me. I found the source, and was hoping we could atleast agree on the factual outcome of the matter. apparently you can’t handle that. we’ve run out of space here. look forward to more future productive discussions with you.

Sociopathic narcissism would be demonstrated by leadership that repeatedly commits the taxpayer to multibillion dollar failures and failures in reaaching for “a bridge to far”. Such leaders are unable to cope with objective profesional advice that maybe changing course and setting sights to more realistic targets would be advisable, and would likely demean such viewpoints as bureaucratic fantasy land. It counters the marketing spin of a favored contractor that’s for sure.

“Are we still under the impression that a vehicle lighter than 50 tons can’t carry 9 soldiers in back and provide decent protection?” No. I am even willing to accept the survivability tradeoff.

TRL levels and risk management are not drivel, they are essential. We should not be approving programs at MS B that are not integrating mature technology, or we end up with programs doomed to failure like FCS. If we had used TRLs & risk management better, we could have disapproved FCS from going forward, saving billions, or we could have delayed the program from FSD and matured the technology more properly, resulting in improved probability of a successful program. The Army flaunted the process in getting FCS to proceed, has it resulted in “success”?

on size & weight (again).. iron curtain APS adds a lot of height to the vehicle. it looks like balancing a cafeteria tray on one’s head. No one has produced any specs for any other system. there is no basis for assumption that size & weight are “no biggie” (your characterizations). i’ve brought up the arguments on the electronics controllers, the wiring, the control panel, and its impacts to vehicle electrical power & environmental control systems. you’ve admitted the system is technologically immature. You’ve admitted that APS is technologically immature. You need to make the connection between technological immaturity and its increase in SW&P reqts as its immaturity is exposed. SW&P growth over current reqts, which you can’t even specify. Your minimization of these factors is based on wishful thinking, which has not worked very well for us in the past.

Actually narcissism might be a player in some of the bad program management decisions that have been made, but not sure that even the most cynical would see those as having a sociopathic tilt. I guess I was hoping that the definition might inspire some of that introspection that I had previously suggested.

sociopath definition: “one whose behavior is antisocial and who lacks a sense of moral responsibility or social conscience.” Fiscal irresponsbility = lack of moral responsibility & social conscience. Derision of professional analysis on aquisition process, leadership, and cultural improvements for the sake of improved fiscal responsibility = sociopathic.

narcissism. for exhibit A can we submit the officer performance evaluation system?

I’m a sweet, caring girl , I met my boy-friend, an uniformed-guy working in Air Force, on— s e e k i n g u n i f o r m.c0m –. It’s a 10-year-old club for uniformed personnel finding their intimate lovers. Try to find your uniformed one there!

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