SNA: Analysts paint bleak picture of future Navy

SNA: Analysts paint bleak picture of future Navy

A trio of experienced naval analysts laid out a bleak future for the Navy on Thursday based on their projections under current circumstances, and an even bleaker one under the threat of next year’s sequestration.

Congressional Budget Office shipbuilding expert Eric Labs said the Navy could lose between 16 and 24 ships from its 30-year plan if sequestration takes effect, depending on the Navy and CBO’s different assumptions.

If anything, Labs said, he was understating the potential consequences, because the shipbuilding projections assumed programs running perfectly and did not factor in the effects of increased unit costs after quantity reductions.

By 2025, that could leave the Navy with a fleet of 260 ships and decreasing, down from 285 today and well short of its onetime goal of at least 313 – although as Undersecretary Bob Work said in his early presentation, you shouldn’t get too hung up on numbers.

And even if sequestration doesn’t happen, as we heard from Maine Sen. Susan Collins on Wednesday, the Navy’s own projections for the future put it well short of its own goals for “large surface combatants,” i.e. cruisers and destroyers.

Work said during his presentation that the surface fleet would wind up with about  72 destroyers and 15 cruisers – that’s seven fewer than today’s force of 22 cruisers — then backtracked, said he “didn’t want to talk about numbers,” and asked to “rewind the tape.” He may inadvertently have let that detail slip before the actual DoD budget documents go to Congress in early February.

Labs, citing the Navy’s most recent official numbers, said that whatever the exact breakdown between cruisers and destroyers, the fleet would be 24 ships short of its own floor of 94 by the late 2020s. Its options for dealing with this are, at very least, tricky.

The Navy could add 24 more ships to its long-term plan, but “With this fiscal reality, that’s probably not going to happen,” Labs said. Or it could try a combination of adding fewer new ships and trying to stretch some of its existing ones to serve for 30, 35, 40 or even 45 years, but that would also be tough.

Navy officials will talk your ear off about how super-committed they are to getting serious about maintenance, improving sailor training, and generally squeezing the most life possible out of today’s fleet. It has taken on the religious quality of serious fads and trends (“transformation!”) in the defense world. But the fleet’s actual track record is decidedly mixed.

Labs said that the average life of the last 13 types of cruisers and destroyers retired by the Navy was 26 years. Three types reached the end of their service lives; four were retired for budgetary reasons and because they’d been outpaced by other ships; and six types – including the full Spruance class – were retired “strictly for budgetary reasons,” Labs said.

His colleague Ron O’Rourke, a veteran analyst with the Congressional Research Service, gave another glum assessment: Not only does the Navy have many significant problems in its near and medium future, he said, it has apparently given up trying to solve or even think about them.

For example, O’Rourke said he was mystified that the Navy apparently has no official plan to deal with its cruiser-destroyer gap. “This is the biggest shortfall for a major category of ship I have seen in my 28 years as naval analyst – this is huge,” he said. Alluding to Work’s presentation, O’Rourke said “This is bigger than what the network is going to make up – you can have the rest in place but this won’t compensate for that.”

O’Rourke — who stressed, as Labs did, that he was speaking for himself and not on behalf of his congressional agency – suggested the Navy needed to act quickly to figure out what to do about the cruiser-destroyer gap. By the time the shortfall begins to put a real strain on the force, it would be too late to begin building ships or making decisions to alleviate it.

“The only thing more remarkable to me than this shortfall is the amount of attention it receives in Navy presentations – it is completely absent from the Navy’s discussions,” O’Rourke said.

Also absent from the Navy’s official public consciousness these days is its onetime stress on “integrated electric drive” – the ship technology that the Navy used to sell to everyone as a game changer for tomorrow’s ships.

If warships of tomorrow are to field bigger, more powerful new radars, or even electric weapons such as lasers or rail guns, they’ll need more power and more cooling than today’s ships produce. The Navy once thought that required it to develop ships that could direct energy from their main engines to shipboard equipment, the way Captain Kirk could order the fictional Starship Enterprise to move power from its warp engines to its deflector shields.

Commercial and Military Sealift Command ships today have electric drives, but no U.S. warships, and O’Rourke observed that the Navy’s aspirations for a serious integrated electric drive seem to have died with its cancelled cruiser CG(X). But the threats of the future, including advanced anti-ship missiles, haven’t gone away, O’Rourke said.

So where, he asked, is the Navy’s “road map” for the shipboard power that tomorrow’s destroyers would need to support the advanced weapons of the future? O’Rourke described how Navy planners have told him that when or if those weapons actually ever materialize, the fleet can back-fit them to the ships available at the time, but O’Rourke was skeptical.

None of the warships under construction or on the drawing board today could support an electric weapon more powerful than about 100 kilowatts, he said – not enough juice to get the job done.

And, of course, O’Rourke mentioned the littoral combat ship. The Surface Force has got to do a better job selling itself to Congress and opinion-makers in Washington, he warned, because a lot of people view LCS has low-hanging fruit for spending hawks. It needs a “vision” or a “statement” to show people how everything fits together, as Work described.

Today, however, “The LCS is becoming a standard item around town among people coming up with proposals to cut the defense budgets,” O’Rourke said. He showed a list of think tanks “across the political spectrum,” as he put it, that have called for reductions or cancellations to LCS, including the Heritage Foundation, the Center for a New American Security and the National Security Network.

Author and shipbuilding expert Norman Polmar, for his part, seconded their skepticism. Continued shortcomings and problems with the ships will mean the Navy gives up on it sooner rather than later, he argued.

“We say we’re going to build 55 LCSes. Well, I’ll bet anyone here a whole dollar bill we’re not going to build 55.”


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Undersecretary Work saying “don’t worry about numbers” simply because the Navy can’t achieve them reminds of former Secretary of the Army Harvey backpedaling on the Stryker when it first came out. Up to that point, the Army was clear that the vehicle needed to roll off a C-130 ready to fight with a weight of 20 tons. When it became all too clear that that wasn’t achievable, Harvey told reporters “we didn’t really need it to be 20 tons, but we wanted the engineers to think in that direction” or something to that effect.

You know it must suck if the Heritage Foundation is calling for cuts.

The overall problem with today’s military is that once someone get’s promoted to flag rank they become politicians, and no longer are warriors. The warrior (officer) class seems to peak at 0–4 and stop completely at 0–6. I can’t speak for the enlisted ranks. Once an officer get’s a star then he/she seems to lose all common sense and they become simply a cog in the political machine, and their only concern is to get the next star. Much like mountain climbers get summit fever, flag officers get star fever.

So everything that comes out of the mouth of a flag officer is political in nature, it’s not for the good of the service or for the good of the soldiers and sailors, it’s for their own good.

We should have some mechanism in place that will ‘encourage’ our senior leaders to be leaders again and to stop thinking about their next gig at Lockhead Martin or Boeing or in politics. As to what that mechanism may be, I don’t know. Perhaps you all have some ideas out there.

Prove more and more the new DoD plan last week is important and the need to end unneeded and stupid Army programs like GCV and JLTV and the dumber ICC programs and to give the Navy and Air Force those program’s money is more important than ever. I hate to say but sequestration will happen question is how hard and fast will it hit?

The reality is what it would hypothetical very easy with the current navy budget to get a 300 Ships Navy provided the politicians and transformation damaged Navy planners are out of the game. The fact is what the most Allied nations like Germany, Denmark or Norway build their own Warships how are better and cheaper them that the USA build ships in the same class.

The best example the Danish Absalon class support ship how is enabling to cover the entire Spectrum of War from Asymmetric Warfare, ASW, Air Defense, Surface Combat and landing operations so he is capable to transport 55 vehicles including up to 7 MBTs and can also serve as command Ship in such an operation

Hear some information about the Absalon Class:

6,600 tons full load
Length: 137.6 m (451 ft 5 in)
Beam: 19.5 m (64 ft 0 in)
Draft: 6.3 m (20 ft 8 in)
Propulsion: 2 x MTU 8000 M70 diesel engines two shafts 22,300 bhp (16.6 MW)
Speed: Less than 24 kn (44 km/h)
Range: 9,000 nmi (17,000 km) at 15 kn (28 km/h)

Sensors and processing systems:
Thales SMART-S Mk2 3D volume search radar
Terma Scanter 2100 surface search radar
Atlas ASO 94 sonar
4 × Saab CEROS 200 fire control radars
ES-3701 Tactical Radar Electronic Support Measures (ESM)

Electronic warfare and decoys:
4 × 12-barrelled Terma DL-12T 130 mm decoy launchers
2 × 6-barrelled Terma DL-6T 130 mm decoy launchers

1 × 5″/62 caliber Mark 45 mod 4 gun
2 × Oerlikon Millennium 35 mm Naval Revolver Gun Systems CIWS
6 × 12.7 mm Heavy machine guns
MU90 Impact ASW torpedoes
VLS with up to 36 RIM-162 ESSM/RIM-7 Sea Sparrow (Mk 56/Mk 48 VLS)
3 x 2 × Stinger Point-defence SAM
8–16 × Harpoon Block II SSM
Aircraft carried: 2 × EH-101 helicopters
Aviation facilities: Aft helicopter deck and hangars

And this Ship cost just 700 Million Dollar!
With other Words the Navy can buy an Absalon Class Support Ship on the price of a full equipped LCS and this ship will be without any modification largely compatible with the US System. And this is just an example how ineffective the Navy/US procurement is and how easy it would be hypothetical to fix this corrupt and missed system with foreign purchases.

In order to clarify this not means what the US build bad ships on the contrary the USA build definitely the best and powerfulness High End Ships like Destroyer (DDG51, DDG1000) and SSN (Virginia Class) or big ticket Ships like Carrier (Ford Class) or also the America or Wasp Class but it looks like what the Navy and the US Industry is no longer capable to build small Ships like Frigates, Support Ships on an acceptable price. It is simply a disgrace to the USA them he makes a patrol boat like LCS more expensive them a Russian SSBN or a French Destroyer or two times more expensive more expensive them a German High End SSK.

Now let’s continuing with the building of a hypothetical 313 Ship Navy. So how to get the 300 Ship Navy on low Price first cancel the LCS and buy as replace 30 Frigates based on the National Security cutter at a price of 450–500 Million each and buy also 20 a support ship based on the Absalon Class design this ship cost about 700 Million Dollar and this as a class of two ship and them you buy more of them you get a possible lower price. Continuing the production of two Virginia Class SSN peer Year and cancel the planed DDG51 Block3 in favor of five more DDG51 Block2 and build additional 18 DDG1000 as Ticonderoga Class replacement. As consequence the Destroyer Gap is fixed, the LCS shame repaid and the Navy strengthened with 68 real Warships instead of 60 harbor patrol boats and the planned costly and outdated DDG51 Block3.

The failure is the leadership is in the White House, the Congress and the Senate.

How about we build ships that work instead of more that don’t? Procurement has become a joke, with no real penalties for lateness or shoddy quality. We are getting less for our money than ever before, and we need more for our money now more than ever.

Sometimes you just have to chuckle a bit under your breath at the “newly discovered” problems in the ship building business. Here its the electric drive issue. ROTGLMAO!

The USS Lexington and Saratoga (CV-2 and CV-3), yes those two WW-II warhorses, had electric drive from the time of their original inception, pre-treaty, as battlecruisers. The basic specs: 16 × boilers at 300 psi (2.1 MPa), Geared turbines and electric drive, 4 × shafts180,000 shp (130 MW); 209,710 hp (156.38 MW) reached in service. This electrical generation system and motor drive was designed to eliminate the excessively expensive reduction gearing not run radars, rail guns and lasers, but…. that was the 1920’s and there were no delays because of software development problems! LOL!

Perhaps it’s time to stare down the 800lb gorilla that’s the Monkeywrench in the Navy’s shipbuilding plan. SSBNs. Sure they are the most reliable portion of the nuclear triad, but they are also far and away the most expensive.

Eliminating every LCS will save barely enough to fund 1 additional DDG-51 Flight IIa, and leave the service with a huge capability hole in ASW & MCM, but if you cut the boomer fleet in favor of strategic bombers (who are dual-use) and ICBMs (least expensive portion of the triad) you can probably save enough cash to procure 2 or even 3 DDGs a year.

Now if the Navy & Congress aren’t willing to go that far, then you’ll resort to eliminating the f-35c and 1 CVN (thus eliminating the need for the associated CSG escorts and the cooresponding reduction in air wing components — and of course the reduction in manpower & maintenance for that CVN, escorts, and CAW).

So you are saying to neuter the Navy, screw the only real survivable part of the nuclear triad all for the sake of a few destroyers?

Yah, I agree. New SSBNs are going to be more than quiet enough to sink enemy ships and lay mines in harbors. They will be able to deliver SoF troops to foreign shores. They can launch conventional weapons like TLAMs from torpedo tubes. So no real points for bombers being dual use, which they really aren’t, they are single use, drop bombs, nuclear or conventional, but they drop bombs, that’s it.

The question you have to ask is whether we would put a significant portion of our nuclear retailiatory capability (which a full loaded SSBM is) into a risky environment trying to put a SEAL team ashore, or sneak up on a hostile convoy, or.… . .. WIth the bombers, each mission depends on whats stuffed into the belly. With a boomer, would you “unload” just to go out and chase Chinese merchant ships or sneak SOF into some Godforsaken place? The fact that a boomer CAN act like a bloated attack boat, or be used for covert ISR, or get those seals ashore does not to me mean that one on strategic nuclear alert (aka not one of the SSGN retreads) should be compromised.

Anyone looked at China’s navy lately? We have enemies worldwide.

Not disagreeing with you about the politicos, but the Navy Brass shares in the blame. Their messaging has been poor, their planning sub-standard, and their leadership on many important issues next to nonexistent.

How about a frigate (FFGX) based on the 5 Norwegian “Fridtjof Nansen” frigates. Using the Navantia hull and all US weapons. Not very different from the Nowegian ships which cost about $700 million — $800 million per ship. Replace Perry class and stop LCS procurement at no more than 20 units. Also cancellation of Flight 3 Burkes would allow for purchase of 2+FFGXs for each planned Burke unit. Use gap in DDG/CG construction to allow DDG-1000 and future tech such as railguns to mature by early 2020s. Navantia’s basic design is used in 5 Spanish and 5 Norwegian units (+ 3 for Australia). PART 1.

How about a frigate (FFGX) based on the 5 Norwegian “Fridtjof Nansen” frigates. Part 2.

Basic specs:

Displacement: 5,200 tons full load (approx)
Length: 133.2 m
Beam: 16.8 m
Draft: 7.6 m
Propulsion: CODAG. 1 x GE LM-2500 rated at 21.5 MW. 2 x Navantia Bravo 12V diesels rated a 9MW.
Speed: 27 kn
Range: 4,500 nm @ 18 kn

Armament (proposed):
Aegis weapons system
AN/SPY-1F multifunction radar
2 x fire control illuminators
2 x eight-cell Mk 41 VLS
64 RIM-162 ESSM surface-to-air missiles (quad packed)
2 x Mk 141 Harpoon launchers (amidships)
8 Harpoon surface-to-surface missiles
1 x 76mm Oto Melara Super Rapid gun (updated Mk 75)
1 x Mk49 RAM launcher (or 1 x SeaRAM CIWS launcher)
21 RIM-116A RAM surface-to-air missiles (11 RAM surface-to-air missiles)
2 x twin fixed 324mm torpedo tubes
1 x MH-60 R/S Seahawk (+ 1–2 MQ-8 Fire Scout VTUAV’s)

As continuation of my last contribution:

I believe what the ship Numbers are not so important, they speak all mostly about magical Numbers like the Navy of 313 Ships or Horror Scenarios like the Navy of 230 ships. But I think what the Question of the final Number is unimportant in compare with the question of the composition of the Fleet. With over Words a fleet of 260 High End Warships is better them a fleet of 313 incapable ships like the LCS. The Navy does not need the LCS or outdated unarmed Frigates like the Perry Class but the Navy need significantly more Submarines and better Surface Combatants and also more sophisticated ASW, Surface and Air defense Weapons to beat or better to deter high end enemy’s like Red China or Russia.

And as Alternative to my political unrealistic plan of a Fleet of 313 Ships how is surge to this Number with cheap foreign buying of ships like the Absalon Class hear a plan how needs only a change of the transformation damaged Navy Planers. I call this Plan the Fleet of the 260 Ships and this Fleet is based completely on US Products but buyable and effective against real treatments like Red China or Russia.

So hear my Plan:

1.Kill the LCS and also the plan to build DDG51 Block 3 Destroyer immediately and use this money for life extension and weapon improvement of the already fielded Surfaces Fleet of DDG51. So the killing of the LCS program alone will save about 40 Billion Dollar and the killing of the DDG51 Block 3 Program possible another 20–30 Billions. This is more them enough money to finances the live extension and weapon improving program for the existing fleet.

2.Buy 5 additional DDG51 Block2 to strength the Destroyer fleet and retire also all Perry Class Frigates without replacement and give all already produced LCS to the Coast Guard as support for their really to small Fleet.

3.Extend the production of the Virginia Class from 2 to 3 Ships peer Year how fast is possible to push the Submarine fleet and start also a study for a low cost SSGN like Virginia Class Submarine.

4.Develop a new mobile mine and a new more effective Torpedo for the Submarine Fleet how gives them the option for an Asymmetric response on the rising Chinese Navy.

5.Improve the Navy ASW skills with better sensor and training to combat the treatment of the large Chinese SSK Fleet.

6.Build a minimum of 18 instead of the currently planned 3 DDG1000 and categorizes them as Cruiser as replacement for the old Ticonderoga Class.

7.Develop a new anti-ship missile/cruise missile like the DARPA Arclight Project to give the Navy finally an accurate and modern anti-ship missile and cruise missile.

8.Hold also the Fleet of 11 to 10 active Carriers and not delay the Ford Class how is now planed why this will not save money in the reality.

9.Continuing the F35B and C Program on all cost and field also how quick is possible a larger version of the X47B Drone for Long Range Attacking.

10.Develop a new Generation of See surveillance satellite to improve the Navy superiority on the See through the information superiority.

11.Categorizes the America class to a See Control Ship or Escort Carrier and rise is carrier skills.

As consequence of this Plan the Navy will never rich the 313 Ship target it is even possible what he will be smaller them 260 ship but it will be a fleet how is based on real Warship and not on port patrol boats and under armed Surface Ships. You will have under my Plan on 2025 a fleet of approximately 70 SSN/SSGN, 85 large Surface Combatants (Destroyer, Cruiser), 11–10 carrier and also 8 Wasp Ships and 4 America Class Sea Control Ships in your Fleet this make more them 178 heavy Warships the rest of the fleet will be based on 12 SSBN and cheap Support Ships.

your plan is too simply and common sense to ever make it in today’s Navy, you’ll need to have several power point presentations, a 4-star to run the program with a staff of 300 just for starters, oh and let’s not forget we’ll need 4 billion to “study” this proposal of yours before we proceed. ;-D

sounds like a good plan overall, but #6 needs some work. A cruiser’s primarily role is escort of carriers, therefore the DDG-1000 would have to be built in perhaps two variations, one as is, and the other an air-defense variation. So it would loose one of the 6in guns and in it’s place would be a lot more missile tubes, and perhaps even more tubes on the back end of the ship. It’ll need a load out equal to or surpassing the current Tico ships. Perhaps you could even take away some of the aviation space and put in more tubes?

Yes, there are penalties for lateness and shoddy quality, the contractor is forced to make a bigger profit if any of these things occur. It’s hell.

If we’re going to assign blame, let’s not leave out the corporate sector, whose main interest is increasing the flow of tax dollars into their coffers, even at the expense of national security. The only mistake Eisenhower made in warning about the Military Inductrial Complex was underestiamting how pervasive, greedy and corrupting it would become.


I think also what the DDG1000 needs more Weapons like more lunch tubes for ESSM and SM6 Missiles but the DDG1000 has in compare with the planed DDG51 Block 3 more Room and can also generate more energy for future improvements and Weapons and it is also bigger them and heavier them a Ticonderoga Cruiser. And in the moment the Ticonderoga’s doe the same missions like the DDG51 and it existing no longer a clear difference between the Arleigh Burke and the Ticonderoga class both are comparable Firepower and the same sensors so it makes no different them a Arleigh Burke or a Ticonderoga defend a Carrier Group. So my decision to categorize the DDG1000 as Cruiser has the goal to secure firstly the money for these ships because it is easier to defend a “cruiser replacement program” for cuts them a Destroyer Program. And it is also clear what the Navy will simple no have the money to start before all Ticonderoga’s are gone for a completely new replacement program.

And in contrast with the Ticonderoga and Arleigh Burke the DDG1000 can do also Missions far from a carrier Group how can be extremely useful in a War against a peer Enemy and the predicted Anti-Access environment . So the DDG1000 is at first a stealth ship and enable to go on areas how are too dangerous for conventional non stealth ships like the Arleigh Burke or the Ticonderoga’s and this is exactly that the Navy need in is new Asia Focused Strategy. In my Vision the DDG1000 should mostly to operate separated from the Carrier Groups why in a carrier Group there lose their most important ability the stealth. A DDG1000 is the ideal weapon for land Attack Missions and them a Weapon like Arc light is fielded for long range strikes and Surface to surface combat why is can go closer to the enemy and is a much harder to detect after is fire is Missiles.

The Navy most change their Way of thinking them he will stay superior against the Chinese Navy on long Term. The Navy is in the moment largely depending on Carrier and nearly all is other surface ships have a lack of Firepower so the newer DDG51 have for example not any Anti-Ship Missiles and the Tomahawks are incapable to penetrate the standard Chinese or Russian Air defense Systems and so the Navy is actually in a Situation in that he has all is Eggs in the Carrier basket and this made it for the Chinese easy to counter the Navy with a carrier Killer Missile like the DF21​.My strategy is to distribute the Eggs on different Platforms like SSN,SSGNs the DDG1000 and other Surface Ships to make the Navy more flexible and survivable in a Anti Access environment.

Modern mobile Mines, superior Ship to Ships missiles and a Long Range Strike Missile like Arclight can be more valuable them entire Carrier Groups in a conflict with China. A good example is how devastating a mobile Mine System can be for the Chinese Fleet so only a small group of SSN or a Stealthy Bomber can made with a modern mobile Mine System a Port like Guangzhou useless but the Navy don’t invest in Mines why it is “dishonorable”. The Navy looks like to be in battleship thinking and they should all know how it ends with the great Battleships as they faced japanese carrier based aircrafts in the World War 2.

I won’t get into dueling hypotheticals, that’s pointless. The fact of the matter is a boomer as you pointed out with the SSGN example can be re-tasked to do more than a bomber, period.

All the ideas presented are fine but they aren’t taking into account the fiscal reality the USN is facing. I think it’s pretty obvious everyone agrees LCS was an interesting idea that can’t be delivered in the appropriate price point for capability added. We need a new frigate that is ASW centric and with a cost delivered in the 500 to 750 million range. We are putting off a destroyer decision and not really saving any $$ with the new Burkes. We do have our act together with attack subs but we are going to have to find the $ for new boomers. I’m not as convinced the America Class is such smart money.

yes sadly the Navy has seemed to forgotten the motto “the best defense is a good offense” by forgetting
ASuW capability in surface ships. Tomahawks and Harpoons are still capable but there are very few ships that carry them anymore, save the Tico. I mean what good is a destroyer that has no ability to attack another warship? It might a well be a type 45 destroyer which only does AAW.

how about the type 45 ( UK)

If I had my way the Navy would continue with one of the LCS designs and get a more combat focused frigate similar in layout and armament to some of the NATO frigate designs used by our allies. The selected LCS design would be used as a multi-role support ship. Its high speed, large hanger bay, large helicopter operations deck, and free internal space would make it valuable for any number of missions. The armament would remain the same but ideally it would get something like the (now cancelled) NLOS-LS to engage small boats and such.

However this all would rely on the Navy having money to work with. They don’t have that much. So maybe trying to get a proper armament onto the existing LCS designs is the better options.

This is all too true. Meanwhile we’ve been reducing requirements and cutting training. Even if the Navy could have a 600 ship Navy it wouldn’t do any good if this rot is allowed to continue. Admirals try to run the Navy like a business rather than a military branch.

The problem is what the Navy put all in eggs in the Carrier Basket the Carrier and is Fighter should to combat enemy surface Ships. The DDG and all over Ships have only the mission to defend the Carrier and this is a very dangerous and very inflexible doctrine. Because them the carrier is killed or heavy damaged the entire remaining Surface fleet is useless so the Chinese and Russian have to concentrate all there energy to kill just 11 targets to eliminate the offensive capacity of the entire Surface fleet of the US Navy and under a realistic scenario they should to concentrate all there energy to kill only 5–6 targets. The Solutions for this problem is simple and not very costly but it needs a more flexible thinking of the Navy Planers and I see no hope that this will be in the next time.

What you say is absolutely true but the LCS has already politically eaten the chances for a new frigate. The reality is also that to get a new Frigate on the price of just 500 Million is theoretical extremely easy it needs just an armed version of the National Security Cutter not more but how long the LCS exists is this option just a beautiful mind game. And the LCS has already become an obsession for the Navy they have this completely useless ship but they have invest a lot of energy and credibility to get it to kill it will be admission what they are completely incompetent. So the LCS eats and will continued to eat the money of the Navy and as consequence the capability gaps will raise for example the ASW capability. But them the LCS can be killed the Navy will receive political room for a needed ASW Frigate but the decision to kill must be come from the Congress why the Navy has already declare the LCS as one of his holy cows.

What means the America class so I’m also a bit skeptic but this ship has much potential to make the Navy more flexible through the distribution of the Offensive Force (Fighter)on more ships​.So the America class is a masked Carrier a Sea Control Ship how long the F35B exists but without the F35B the America class is just a waste of money and should be kill.

The LCS is not a real Warship and surly not a blue water ship it is simple a conceptional disaster of the War on Terror idiocy. So the LCS has structural problems and cannot operate on High See effectively why is not safe by a Sea state higher them 6 and this is not really high. So in the Pacific and the Atlantic Ocean you can have Sea states between 8 and 14 or higher and this make the LCS a risk for every mission. The Name Littoral combat Ship said it already what this ship is not a Frigate it is a ship designed for operations in littoral waters not on high see and for the new pacific focused strategy the Navy will need high see ships not Port Patrol Boats.

It is hard or better said impossible to find a right of existence for the LCS under this budgetary situation.

1. So it is not enable to combat small boats why the most of these boats are better armed them the LCS and much cheaper and movable them the LCS.

2. It is also not High Sea reedy as consequence useless for the entire spectrum of High See operation.

3. As Littoral ASW Ship it can be used but it is a very limited mission to justify is right to eat an important part of the navy Budget.

4. It can be effectively used for the hunting of Somali pirates but you can for the Price of 700 Million get a private security company with a fleet of oven ship to hunt the pirates.

If I way reply on your #3 topic there,

“3. As Littoral ASW Ship it can be used but it is a very limited mission to justify is right to eat an important part of the navy Budget.”

The oddest thing about the ASW capability: well, the LCS was designed with that shallow draught, less than 20 feet, which enables it to enter ~littoral~ shallows where no combat submarine can safefly enter submerged and remain submerged for a mission. So effectively, in deciding the LCS needs to have ASW Mission Modules, it IS in effect being intended then as the ASW replacement for,..hmmm,… Perry class frigates, it seems. Few, if any, of even the smallest SSKs are going to conduct operations in waters shallower than 30m, and as such, a number of larger hulls (dedicated frigates, destroyers) with much more capable ASW suites will be far more useful than any ASW system shoehorned into a connex.

yep, we lost a lot of our surface strike capability when all of the Spruance destroyers, with their VLS filled with Tomahawks were retired and sunk

Littoral combat, what in the h e l l is that supposed to mean anyway? All of the boosters for the LCS say that we’re going to be taking the fight to the littorals. Here some question for those LCS apologists:
–WHO are they going to fight in the littorals
–HOW are they going to hide a 3000ton ship close to shore
–LCS makes big claims with it monster flight deck and hanger, has any LCS carried anything? NO they haven’t because they realize that it can’t without compromising it’s stability and speed
–HOW wlll the LCS protect itself while its in the littorials, a huge 3000 ton aluminum ship will be an easy target to take out, a few 50 cal rounds will do nicely

here is HP and MW version of horsepower onboard LCS-5,3,1. Notice that if you multiply the HP by two, since there are 2 of these monster rolls royce engines per LCS, then you are getting pretty close to the total HP/MW that USS Lexington and USS Saratoga had long ago.
<a href=“http://​www​.lmlcsteam​.com/​a​r​c​h​i​v​e​s​/​222″ target=“_blank”>

Of course, each LCS is about 3,300 tons with roughly (almost) the same HP as CV-2 and CV-3 had.

here is HP and MW version of horsepower onboard LCS-5,3,1. Notice that if you multiply the HP by two, since there are 2 of these monster rolls royce engines per LCS, then you are getting pretty close to the total HP/MW that USS Lexington and USS Saratoga had long ago.
<a href=“http://​www​.lmlcsteam​.com/​a​r​c​h​i​v​e​s​/​222″ target=“_blank”>

Of course, each LCS is about 3,300 tons with roughly (almost) the same HP as CV-2 and CV-3 had.

Lots of Big Flaws in this LCS concept. One that gets little attention is the extended use of those waterjets in shallow water. They are limited to a tiny percentage of their duty cycle since very shallow waters (less than 30 feet depth) will cause wear and tear on those waterjets. IIRC, restrictions are 5 percent duty cycle in waters less than ____ feet, and no more than 15 % ops in waters less than ___ feet. I’ll go back and poke around google. Don’t forget, even the world’s modern 4,000 to 4,500 ton frigates only have a draft of 14 ot 16 feet, if you exclude the screw. So, if you put those delicate waterjets onto a modern frigate, they would have extremely small drafts, akin to an LCS. But they wouldn’t be able to spend more than a tiny percentage of their time actually operating in said shallow littorals, due to the limitations of the waterjet manufacturer. My dog ate my old homework on this subj, but I’ll re-do this homework later this week.

“Littoral combat, what in the h e l l is that supposed to mean anyway?”

A good Question, my theory is what the LCS was an attempt to create a Frigate but under the War on Terror/Asymmetric Warfare/transformation/COIN mania or better said idiocy it was impossible to justify a Frigate so the Navy made the attempt to create an ideologically conform Concept and the result was the failure called LCS. The LCS is like the ideology/thinking on what his based a costly complete failure not more. The LCS is like the entire FCS Program of the Army an accumulation of PowerPoint Presentations, nice Graphics, C&C Thinking, an unintelligible terminology and billions of waste money. So i really hope what the Congress will kill the LCS to save Money this will also the best for Navy.

that “Lots of Big Flaws in this LCS concept… ” post was mine. For some unk reason, this dod buzz web site will auto-delete about half my posts, saying something about them being blocked.

I have found some interesting Numbers about the Fleet strength of the Navy in the early Bush Senior Years and the Fleet strength today. Hear a simple comparison between the Navy on 9/30/1989 and the Navy from 9/30/2011 the Numbers alone speaks for themselves.

US Navy on 9/30/1989:

US Navy Budget 1989

$97,675,000,000 better said 97, 7 Billion Dollar

Battleships 4
Carriers 13
Cruisers 40
Destroyers 68
Frigates 100
Submarines 99
SSBNs 36
Command Ships 4
Mine Warfare 23
Patrol 6
Amphibious 61
Auxiliary 137
Surface Warships 212
Total Active Force 592

US Navy 9/30/2011:

US Navy Budget 2011

$160.6 billion

Battleships 0
Carriers 11
Cruisers 22
Destroyers 61
Frigates 26
Submarines 53
SSBNs 14
Command Ships 0
Mine Warfare 14
Amphibious 31
Auxiliary 47
Surface Warships 122
Total Active Force 285

And let’s be serous the ships of the Navy of 1989 were much better armed what concerns offensive weapons (Cruise missiles, Torpedo’s and Ship to ships Missiles). The shocking on this Numbers is what the navy Budget has doubled since 1989 but the Fleet has halved since then and this unstoppable decline has start with the Busch senior and Clinton Budget cuts in the early nineties. Now the navy faces a comparable Decline and I fear what 2030 they will look back on 2012 and compare the Fleet of the 285 from 2012 Ships with the Fleet of the 140 Ships from 2030.

From an offensive ASW standpoint, you are dead on I think! That “big hull” or at least relatively big hull, will have no problem navigating in the minimum depth for even the smallest attack sub operations. In that shallow water though, with all of the bottom trash, traffic and surf noise, etc it might be a very dangerous place to send a very expensive Burke or similar ASW vessel, which is why the coastal SSK is considered such a nasty threat. The LCS is perhaps just a little bit more expendable?

Running the Navy, or any military organization as a business is NOT a bad idea in my simple mind, you work with what you have and try to do the best possible job you can do. That said, you have GOT to remember what the business of the Navy actually is. Its not a business that is building cars, or selling hamburgers, playing pentagon politics, securing promotions for senior officers, or justifying unnecessary acquisition projects. It is in the business of enforcing the national will on the sea, killing “bad guys” and denying them the advantages of unencumbered access to the sea lanes.

You know, Rick, even if your perception is wrong with respect to the senior leadership, it speaks volumes that the perception is even possible. Unfortunately, Im thinking that the solution is beyond legislative purview and more a matter of the standards applied for advancing to that flag rank in the first case. Once a person advances to that position of power, its too late.

In the early ‘80s, in Squadron Officer School, we actually joked about the difference between the “professional officer” and the “careerist officer”, with the standard “wink-wink” disavowal of the party line “professionalism” that was part of the curriculum and acceptance of the pragmatic “career-advancement” mentality. Sad.

It wont do diddly for exorbitant costs or late deliveries, but… Admiral Rickover used to invite the senior VPs of Electric Boat out on a little sub ride when he took a new submarine out for a shakedown. Id bet that there were more than a few guys in three-piece suits sweating blood in the anticipation of finding out if there were any bad welds when he ordered the first crash dive. (And a few more of their underlings making sure that all of the xrays were clean beforehand!) :-)

here is HP and MW version of horsepower onboard LCS-5,3,1. Notice that if you multiply the HP by two, since there are 2 of these monster rolls royce engines per LCS, then you are getting pretty close to the total HP/MW that USS Lexington and USS Saratoga had long ago.

Of course, each LCS is about 3,300 tons with roughly (almost) the same HP as CV-2 and CV-3 had.

notice the pitiful total Electrical generation total onboard LCS.

Approx 3 MW total, assuming that all 4 tiny generators are actually working, and you can run all 4 of them 24/7. Note that LCS-1 has had chronic problems keeping even 2 of their miniature diesel electrical generators running 24/7.

So, does this stop Lockheed Martin from “advertizing” that an LCS can have a version of AEGIS and the SPY-1 radar installed ? Assuming LCS-3, 5, 7… can keep 2 of their 4 SSDG generators running 24/7, then this “combatant” has a total of 1.5 MW of electrical power available.

So, this “fact” alone kills the entire LCS-1 class and should stop all those who suggest that LCS-1,3,5,7, could someday become real warships !

that’s very interesting, no one has talked about that before. Are you an engineer by trade?

I’m not going to try to check your numbers but the Command Ships line for 2011 is wrong because the Blue Ridge and Mount Whitney which were the two Command Ships in 1989 are still serving in that role.

If we don’t have the money because of Social Security, Medicare, and Medic-aid automatic increases. Then we should cut from those programs by freezing at current levels.

Mechanical (structural) engineer. Retired, twice now. I’m still looking for those references. Unfortunately, the Navy isn’t making small mistakes lately. Funny thing, now that I am retired for a few years, I don’t seem to have any “free” time anymore !

Armed forces needs some how stop the defence contracts from profiteering off of research and develment of their ships. Prices of developing these new classes of ship is hamstring anything the service needs put into service. Chinese doesn’t seem to have as many problems getting what they need built. US is unable to approve or develop successfully new full-fledge designs such as new Cruiser without some over-spending or political interferrance. Sometimes I wish the Navy had kept its own Shipyards and design houses intact contracted for the higher tech equipment instead. Were going have 40 year old Guide Missile Destroyer design incontinues production because the Congress can’t come grips to actually approving something NEW. Time elect some moderate candates to least try get both parties to agree on something, clean up the defence industry before don’t have one.

It would be interesting to take a poll to find out if there are any warriors in leadership positions

Ah, but the real dilemma would be whether to poll those in leadership positions or those who serve under them. (And most certainly the poll would have to be via secret ballot! LOL!)

But then the standard “excuse” is always something along the line of. . “I know its not right but Im just “playing the game” so that I can make a difference when I DO get to those positions of authority.” Sadly, the positions of authority, where those people think that they can really make a difference, are always one promotion board away, all the way to retirement. And I dont believe its a perogerative of rank to be a careerist; I have known Lts who’s most critical training requirement was to learn how to play golf so that they could credibly lose by a stroke to the Colonels!

As for the Lady Lex and the Sara, their powerplant did have a bit of excess capability, actually supplying the city of Tacoma with electricity during the winter of 1929/1930. The report from that emergency effort can be found at http://​www​.researcheratlarge​.com/​S​h​i​p​s​/​C​V​2​/​T​a​c​oma

IF you note the data, on 15Jan30, the Lex supplied 330,000 kwh. A little low brow math, gives me 13.75 MW of excess power passed over to the city electric grid CONTINOUSLY for 24 hours.

And those two carriers were NOT the only US capital ships with electric drive. You might also scan through http://​www​.navweaps​.com/​i​n​d​e​x​_​t​e​c​h​/​t​e​c​h​-​0​3​8​.​htm for a very good writeup on electrical main power for US warships. The bottom line, as I originally stated, is that electrical main power is NOT ANYTHING NEW on US warships!

Anybody remember the Knox class? I served on one. Even my lowly bottom of the barrel ship could reach out and touch another warship with it Harpoon missiles and its 5in gun.

The Harpoons were launched from the same pepper box as the ASROC, and the Knox class had a massive magazine right behind the launcher. We probably could have put 30 or more Harpoons in there if we had to. So my little frigate had more ASuW power than today’s destroyers!

We also had a pretty big magazine for the 5in shells :-D

For all LCS Fans hear a nice Artikel about the LCS.

“Navy’s New Minehunter Can’t See or Stop Mines”

It’s bad enough that the Navy’s newest ship has had wicked problems with corrosion, missed out on the latest naval wartime missions and is generally something of a Frankenstein’s monster. Now the Pentagon’s top weapons tester has found problems with its abilities to find and withstand mines — which is a big problem for a ship that’s supposed to be the Navy’s minehunter of the future.….…

LCS= Loser Can’t See. Hope my nephew doesn’t get stuck on this POS.

Is it really analysis to claim that they wont build every single last one of the 51 LCS ?
After all the real question will be how close to the 51 will it be.
Even 45 will be adequate based on existing numbers of frigates

Not new read Neptunes Inferno to see how the cocktail circuit admirals screwed up the first part of the war in the Pacific. Incompetents promoted due to their golfing ability and faked personnel reports is not new.

Defense Media Network did an article on this as well. Talks bout the Navy in 2030 and where we’ll be. For those interested here’s the link http://​www​.defensemedianetwork​.com/​s​t​o​r​i​e​s​/​t​h​e-u–


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