An altered landscape

An altered landscape

After months of debate, contemplation and worry inside the Iron Triangle, Thursday was the day the big crunch became real.

No more leaks and speculation — the Pentagon, Congress and the defense industry are now looking at an actual roadmap for what could happen to America’s forces and programs for the coming few years, one that will leave the services with diminished reach and contractors big and small wondering about their futures.

There was no huge single victim as in years past, when DoD cancelled the Army’s Future Combat Systems or truncated the Air Force’s F-22 Raptor. Indeed, much of Secretary Panetta’s and Gen. Dempsey’s announcement was expected – major end strength reductions to the Army and Marine Corps; delays to the F-35; calls to reform pay, benefits and retirement – though some of it did come as a surprise.


For example, if you thought America’s strategic shift to the Western Pacific meant a privileged status for seapower, that was not borne out.

The Navy will lose seven cruisers and two amphibious transports from its current fleet, and endure delays across its shipbuilding program. Its Ohio-replacement ballistic missile submarine gets pushed back two years; a new amphibious assault ship is delayed by one year; a Virginia-class submarine is pushed out of the future years defense plan, as are two littoral combat ships and eight Joint High Speed Vessels.

DoD’s budget documents Thursday also mentioned generically that the Navy will give up some “fleet logistics ships,” but the number was unclear – the Republican-controlled House Armed Services Committee, which howled about the announcement, said the fleet would end up down a total of 19 ships. That means the Navy will fall ever shorter of its onetime “floor” of 313, which as we’ve already heard, the Navy may need to just bury at sea.

If there’s a silver lining for the Navy, it’s that DoD will keep its 11 beloved aircraft carriers, 10 air wings and its big-deck amphibious ships. Pentagon officials probably reckoned this process was going to be tough enough without going up against the carrier cabal and the Marine Corps.

That doesn’t mean congressional opponents slept through Thursday’s announcement. HASC chair Rep. Buck McKeon blasted “President Obama’s vision of an America that is weakened, not strengthened, by our men and women in uniform.”

McKeon, a California Republican, renewed his declaration “not to be the chairman who presided over a hollowed force,” concluding: “This month the House Armed Services Committee will continue and intensify our rigorous oversight, keeping in mind that while the President proposes, Congress disposes.”

Virginia Rep. Randy Forbes issued an acid statement all but accusing Obama of helping potential enemies.

“PLA Admirals will welcome the news that the President has no plans to catch up to China’s sixty attack submarines nor to invest in a missile defense system that can rival China’s mounting arsenal of missiles,” he said. “North Koreans will feel more secure as America prepares to dismiss almost 1 in 6 soldiers.  Tehran will be pleased that one-third less American cruisers are slated to patrol the world’s sea lanes.  Foreign shipyards will embrace a shift toward outsourcing defense manufacturing jobs.”

The Air Force fared a little better, losing six tactical squadrons, leaving it with 54, as well as 130 cargo planes. HASC critics said this would leave the U.S. less equipped to deal with the “tyranny of distance” as part of its shift to the Western Pacific, and would worsen the strain on the Air Force’s already overworked airlift fleet.

The Air Force’s new plan to “divest” 38 of those cargo planes – its C-27J Spartan mini-lifters – represented the end of its latest inter-service tussle with the Army. At one time, Air Force Chief of Staff Gen. Norton Schwartz was making a solemn pledge to Congress that he had given his word to former Army Chief of Staff Gen. George Casey that the blue-suiters would do right by the C-27, which began as an Army program. Troops on the battlefield needed a smaller cargo plane to resupply their forward bases, the Army said.

But the Air Force eventually got hold of the C-27, as you’ve read about before, scaled it back and now has declared it a “niche capability.” That whole getting to rough fields thing? Turns out C-130s can do the job just fine, according to DoD’s documents on Thursday:

“In practice, we did not experience the anticipated airfield constraints for C-130 operations in Afghanistan and expect those constraints to be marginal in future scenarios. Since we have ample inventory of C-130s and the current cost to own and operate them is lower, we no longer need – nor can we afford – a niche capability like the C-27J aircraft. The Air Force and the Army will establish joint doctrine relating to direct support.”

So we can all look forward to that.

Perhaps the most intimidating aspects of DoD’s announcement Thursday were the things it didn’t say. As it cuts eight brigade combat teams, the Army also is reviewing is “future organizing construct” — how will that play out with Army leaders’ commitment to scale back their stateside “generating force” and make their remaining combat power that much more effective? And we don’t know yet how much officials will delay the F-35 or the Ground Combat Vehicle, and what pushing them to the right will actually mean for the future force. With this budget forecast, is a delay a kiss of death?

Deputy Defense Secretary Ash Carter was asked Thursday about the standard wisdom that delays often mean cost increases, which mean program unit reductions, which mean additional cost increases – the death spiral. Won’t that happen with all these programs pushed down the line?

We’ll just have to make sure it doesn’t, he said, in so many words. And there lies the key to the future of the Defense Department. The coming years and months will put the Building’s sometime commitment to hard-nosed, cost-conscious, disciplined acquisitions to the ultimate test. If it can knuckle down, it may realize Obama and Panetta’s vision of a leaner, meaner and more effective force.

But if it can’t — if GCV, and the new Air Force bomber, and the Navy’s Flight III destroyers, and especially the F-35 — do not perform about exactly in line with expectations, we may well see another judgment day like Thursday’s before very long.

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Sounds like it went something like this, “Hey, you know, we’re broke so I thought it would be a good idea to do whatever we could to make the unit cost of the Virginias and F-35s explode.” “Fantasitc plan, we should announce this immediately to show everyone how smart we are.” “Champange for everyone!”

“In practice, we did not experience the anticipated airfield constraints for C-130 operations in Afghanistan and expect those constraints to be marginal in future scenarios. Since we have ample inventory of C-130s and the current cost to own and operate them is lower, we no longer need – nor can we afford – a niche capability like the C-27J aircraft.”

The question I’ve been asking for the last 30 years has been: why doesn’t the Fraud, Waste, and Abuse policies that those of us in the trenches must abide by apply to those in the Ivory Tower?

Make costs explode on the F35 and VA’s? How do you figure? It makes sense to do LRIPs of an aircraft a decade into development having just discovered the carrier model can’t land on a carrier? They defrayed the construction of one VA boat but also said they want to buy the SSGN idea so more hulls will lead to cost savings in the long run.

Bringing back military jobs should be a high priority. It’d be cool if we cut our dependance on Private Military Contractors, raise the age enlisted limit from 17 to 21, and start a harder crackdown on rape of female personnel by male personnel. Too bad the DoD’s policy makers are too fucktarded to make that happen and to a further extent the financiers are fucktarded in their own right for letting the banks cause this domino effect to happen.

I can’t help but wonder why you bothered to reply. The tailhook issue is already being addressed (surprise, they found a problem in testing. That’s what testing is for.) and reducing the production rate is going to make the unit cost rocket. That’s basic economics. Same for the Virginia’s. They’ve spent years working on getting them affordable enough (and getting the supply chain in place to support it) to build two Virginias per year. And now they want to cut that. Guess what that’s going to do to the cost? And guess how all the costs to get the unit cost down are going to be absorbed. It’s going to cost MORE that if they hadn’t made that effort in the first place. Why? Because now you’ve spent all that money to get you there, and because of the lower production rate, you’re never going to realize the savings. That extra cost has to go somewhere and it will be reflected in higher unit costs.

Errr…. at the risk of stating the obvious…. Because its the high-faluting folks in the Ivory Tower that make the policies and get to punish the mere mortals that are left trying to follow those policies?

1992 all over again. They called it a “Peace Dividend” back then. Now it is just because we are broke. Theme will be dismantle and then rebuid at twice the cost during the next war — “Save Now, Pay Twice As Much Later” Chairman Mao must be laughing at us from ****.

The US Navy’s loss of 7 cruisers sounds bad since they are already looking at a serious gap in Large Surface Combatants down range, but looking at the specific justification on retiring the CGs 1 needed extensive hull work and the other 6 were incapable of being upgraded to perform the BMD mission. Looking at the threat matrix in the western pacific without that capability (and given the large maintenance cost of Tico class cruisers) it was the easy answer.

If I had to place a bet on what ship(s) will survived the announced cuts once Congress has it’s say I think that 1 Virginia Class SSN is better than even money to find it’s way back in the building plan.

Sorry but that’s F35 fanboy BS. 10 years into design and they just discover the tailhook doesn’t work at all? Pathetic. That’s like saying we didn’t know it could fly before we built it, sorry but design systems, software and knowledge are a wee bit more advanced than that. This is just a sloppy slip shod piece of junk waiting to suck the US dry.

Your argument on the VAs is false isn’t going to pan out either for the a reason touted by your F35 program. If they sell more 35s internationally prices come down. Buying the SSGN version of the VA class will mean more hulls, so maybe you can explain why your 35 program can say it will save $ by selling more models but in your world the same does not apply to the VA class.

You act like RDT&E of the SSGN version will be free. No doubt this will come as a shocker but it won’t be free.

You act like pouring billions into an aircraft and a decade of work to discover in LRIP it can’t land on a carrier is anything other than a colossal inexcusable F up.

Probably a good bet to make. Even if it doesn’t, the work required to develop the extended hull plug, and integrate it into the Flight V design, should keep the program healthy enough that the 1 boat slide to the right won’t have too much of a negative effect.

Holy c r a p Navy, we’re losing cruisers and replacing them with LCS!!!

Let’s put in in another way
Tico cruisers are are best platforms by far, even better then the Burkes in some ways
–Top of the line AsuW (with Harpoons, and Tomahawks, only flight I Burkes have Harpoons)
–better ASW than the Burkes with AN/SQR-19 TACTAS (only flight I Burkes have a tail) and 2 helo (only flght II have helos, but no tails)
-(2) 5 in guns (Burkes have 1)
-(2) Plalanx (flight 1 Burkes have 2 and only some flight II have 1, flight IIA have none)
–122 VLS tubes for a large mix of missiles
–SLQ-32 v3, most Burke only have v1
-(4) directors (Burkes only have 3)
–ABM capability

and now we are replacing them with LCS
(1) 57mm gun (mostly for defense)
(1) seaRam (for self defense only)

so, the LCS has NO offensive weapons, no sensors, to means to do ASW, AsuW, AAW, AMW, and it
can barely defend itself again LOW level threats

STOP the LCS madness and save the warships (Ticos)

BigRick,

The Ticos they are planning to retire aren’t capable of BMD making them significantly less valuable than they appear — certainly against Iranian or Chinese ASBM which are quickly becoming the 2nd most dangerous threat to CSGs (SSN/SSKs being #1).

Also, to argue that LCS are replacing or are intended to replace CGs is ridiculous, LCS are replacing FFGs (though they no longer have guided missles so they are really nothing more than newer Knox class FFs now) and MCM ships.

Apples to Apples please. There is still a HUGE cap looming in Large Surface Ships vs the intended/needed needs outlined most recently in the QDR. We may eventually find our CSGs and ARGs without the escort ships needed to fulfill their intended deployments.

LCS is “nothing more than newer Knox class” now who’s not comparing apples to apples

the Knox class was a real warship, it was very good at ASW, it could also take out other ships with it’s Harpoons, and it could do good gun fire support with it’s 5in gun, and it was fast-over 30kts on a single boiler, they had:
–5 in gun
–Harpoon
–Asroc
–torpedoes
–Phalanx
–helo
–SLQ-32
–powerful radars
–it had a great sonar and a tail

the Perry’s where decent warships until they defang-ed them and they were very tough (USS Stark, etc). They were able to take a lot of punishment, something the aluminum foil LCS can’t.

Overall, the LCS can’t do anything, to say it’s a replacement for anything (FFG, FF, MCM) is ridiculous

It happens. Real life isn’t a Hollywood movie. (See F-15 longeron f–kup discovered after 30+ years of service.)

I say it again, fan boy. We aren’t talking about a structural support buried inside the fuselage not living up to lifetime flight hours. We are talking about the naval variant being unable to land on a carrier. Stop making excuses, I’m pretty sure in 7 decades of carrier aviation someone jotted down on a sticky note how long tailhooks need to be compared to measurements on aircraft. The thing is a bad joke, period.

Navy’s off to a good start on LCS. They just fired the program manager. Now they need to fire the ship. There is no comparison for LCS with real combat ships. I guess the Navy decided it wants to be a Coast Guard.

LCS is “transformational”, Aegis is “old and busted”. (That’s how much “thought” your average politician puts into these decisions.)

The new tail hook is the same length as the old one. No doubt you glommed onto the most obvious difference between the F-35C’s tailhook and “those that worked” and concluded that tailhook length is all that matters but it isn’t. Hope that didn’t kill that poor little hamster on a wheel you use for a brain. God knows he’s giving it all he’s got.

It seems rather pathetic to be calling everybody who disagrees with you a fanboy. The problem with the tailhook isn’t the length, it’s the positioning. The tailhook is closer to the rear landing gear than on most designs due to stealth concerns. As a result there is some trouble with the timing between the wire being depressed by the landing gear, and when the tailhook is supposed to grab it.

But I know it’s far easier to shout “those idiots at Lockheed didn’t make it long enough.”

It’s not so much the ‘stealth concerns’ that are responsible for the hook position as it is the ridiculous prioritization for STOVL. Take away the requirement for having the engine nozzle as close to the CG as possible, and the necessary room for the 3-bearing nozzle-swiveling mechanism , and this is the kind of cluster —- you quite PREDICTABLY can end up facing.

It may be that a simple change in the hook shape and an improved damping mechanism will make it efficient and reliable , but that won’t really be known until rough weather shipboard trials are completed.

BTW, it may indeed be somewhat ‘pathetic’ to refer to some JSF advocates as ‘fanboys’, but in sferrin’s case, his past record shows it to be undeniably a concise and entirely accurate label.

EDIT: Should say “Mandate the requirement” instead of “Take away”.

Interruptions and all that…

Well said Mr Taxpayer, now they need to start firing some admirals.

Have you notice that admirals NEVER get fired, it’s always the O-6s and 0-5s. I guess life is good when you a “made” man or woman.

The program is a joke and being a zealot fan boy doesn’t change it. Same goes for you William, precisely how many glaring F ups does this program get for free in your and the rest of the groupies opinions before people are allowed to desecrate the temple of F35? How many tens of billions should be allowed to prop this pig up? There’s nothing pathetic about referring to the rabid defenders of this money hole as fan boys because only a mindless groupie would continue to give this flying tub of crap a pass when all the goofs ups and cost overruns are added up.

Let me say it again for the hard of hearing and the brainwashed masses. It is over ten years into development and in LRIP and we just found out the carrier version can’t land on a carrier. Pathetic.

Mindless groupie? Mindless critics like you have no perspective and claim every problem encountered is a reason to kill the program. What do you want to do, operate the F-15, F-16, and F/A-18 for another 30 years? Or do you honestly believe two or three new programs would cost less than going forward with the F-35? Make no mistake, people like you would have been shouting to kill the previous generation of fighters when they encountered problems in development. Do you forget the problems these programs had to overcome, the F-14 even had a prototype crash IIRC.

Congress and the DoD put us in the situation in the first place by betting everything on one program, but the F-35 is far from doomed. The tailhook issue can and will be fixed as other problems have been.

You assume that you can cherry pick problems. The totality of problems is ridiculous and the fact that we are ten plus years into development and encounter something as basic as one variant being completely unable to perform its mission is acceptable and just a whoopsie. Frankly what I would personally like is to see the whole program canned and new plane started, not because it would be cheaper but because I would like something that works. Is better suited to the theater of operations where it will be needed. Has specs more suited to the threat environment.

Frankly for the record anyone who thinks it is acceptable to be ten plus years into development of a carrier aircraft and in low rate initial production only to discover it can’t land on a carrier is a mindless groupie.

We can argue till everyone is breathless about the merits of the LCS as a replacement for the USN’s MCMs and FF(G)s, but the upcoming budget is a whole different subject, by eliminating 7 CGs they are taking an already dangerous Large Surface Combatant shortage and making it into a huge capability gap.

I get that 1 is in need of major hull work and the other 6 were not (could not?) be upgraded for BMD, but even if everything goes great with the DDG-51 flight IIb restart with the new IAMD capability built in, you still have a issue with having sufficient ships available for escort depolyments and a capability gap from replacing CGs with flight 1 & flight 2 DDG-51s.

After GAO evicerated the USN Flight III plan I bet big money we’ll see a new AoA and a rebirth of the CG(X) program, if anything replacing the Tico class CGs 1 for 1 while (perhaps) continuing to build DDG-51s.

The six cruisers are not incapable of being upgraded to BMD, they have not yet gotten the cruiser mid-life upgrade. If they had gotten the MLU, they would also be capable of being made BMD ships. Identical cruisers that are actually older are in or througn MLU already as these could have been.

The six cruisers are not incapable of being upgraded to BMD, they have not yet gotten the cruiser mid-life upgrade. If they had gotten the MLU, they would also be capable of being made BMD ships. Identical cruisers that are actually older are in or througn MLU already as these could have been.

The totality of problems is reasonable if you understand all the specifics involved. It is an ambitious program and even components like the electrical system are far different from preceding aircraft. The greatest mistake was the high degree of concurrency expected.

The JSF has been in development for more than ten years? So what? The Eurofighter, Rafale and F-22 were in development for even longer.

Now, the first F-35A did not fly until late 2006, while the F-35C did not fly until 2010. The X-35 (and Boeing’s X-32) were quite different machines and were built as a proof of concept and to test and compare the two configurations.

By nature of being for three services, everybody had to make some compromises. I’m guessing the USN would have preferred a larger (and costlier) twin-engine stealth strike fighter that would be more capable in the air-superiority mission than the F-35C. The USAF would probably want something similar to the F-35A, but with somewhat lower weight and greater performance. The USMC would still want there next-gen STOVL aircraft, and the F-35B is just that.

Yet would Congress go for that? Of course not. So over the years a variety programs that began in the ‘80s and ‘90s morphed into the JSF.

I’m sputtering with confusion here. By what measure is raising the minimum enlistment age a good idea ? Typically, kids who are considering enlistment do so as they graduate from high school, and that’s where the recruiters hunt. If you are targeting college dropouts, that would be 19 or 20 years of age. Doesn’t make any sense at all.

Why not cadre these cruisers and use them as training ships for the Naval Reserve ? We need to start thinking out of the box this way, and the old Blue and Gold rotation scheme is getting pretty frayed, no ?

“In practice, we did not experience the anticipated airfield constraints for C-130 operations in Afghanistan and expect those constraints to be marginal in future scenarios. Since we have ample inventory of C-130s and the current cost to own and operate them is lower, we no longer need – nor can we afford – a niche capability like the C-27J aircraft.”

Summarizing:

a) They bough a shit of an A/C with the C-27J, which though smaller and less capable than the C-130 is MORE expensive to operate (in that case, why did they not buy the A/C of the other competitor, which was much cheaper to maintain?). Why did nobody check the record of the old C-27A, from the same manufacturer, that lasted only 8 years in service because it had horrible problems and was horribly expensive to maintain? This one has lasted only 3 years… when any decent A/C (like the C-130) should last a minimum of 30!

b) The old C-130s are used to haul small cargo around, (i.e., flying almost empty), thus burning fuel and requiring maintenance of an expensive (big) aircraft that a much smaller A/C could do as well at a much lower cost. Again they’re wasting taxpayer´s money, in this case because a small A/C is not “sexy”. At least the coastguard has been much smarter with the HC-144A, a much smaller A/C which is used not only for maritime patrol, but also to transport cargo around.

I agree with your premise! Unless or until the head honchos put the “oomph” back in to the Arleigh Burkes
they will be hard pressed to cover a carrier strike group, even if the Aegis cruisers are not replaced in kind.
We go through this drill every decade or so, but you’d think that someone would realize that we can’t put all our eggs into one basket — we need more of a forward deployed and combat-capable warship than we need LCSes. Whatever happened to the PGM-style gunboats from the Nam time periods? A very proven gunboat — with modernization and upgrades, they would make a great in-shore weapon for less than the LCS. My opinion, but why not look at it or study it?

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