Far from DC battles, C-27 gets glowing reviews

Far from DC battles, C-27 gets glowing reviews

The metaphorical C-27J battlefield has been mostly quiet since the skirmishes earlier this year over the Air Force’s plan to mothball its entire fleet. For all intents and purposes, the fight seems to be settled.

Air Force leaders heard the objections of Congress and Guard and Reserve airmen, but they were glancing at their watches and checking their BlackBerries under the table the whole time. Since then, they have apparently gone ahead with the first steps toward icing the C-27Js even without outside buy-in, as Defense News’ Marcus Weisgerber wrote this week.

On the real battlefield, however, far downrange in Afghanistan, the tale is different: An official Army story Monday, cited by Air Force Magazine’s Daily Report, depicts a little twin-engined airlifter that could, winning fans among the grunts who, once upon a time, were to have been its primary users. Here was the word from Richard Barker of the 25th Combat Aviation Brigade:

Since beginning operations in August 2011, two C-27J aircraft have been tactically controlled by the 159th and 25th Combat Aviation Brigades.  They have performed 67 airdrops and delivered more than 277 container delivery systems containing vital supplies such as food, water, blood and ammunition to special operations forces located in the unforgiving terrain of Afghanistan. The 25th CAB makes this support possible as a result of its solid understanding of soldiers’ needs and its tactical control of the C-27J aircraft that are operated by the 702nd Expeditionary Airlift Squadron.

Got the setup? Air Force birds under the tactical command of Army aviation units, resupplying Army troops forward. OK, here we go:

Maj. Craig Jayson, executive officer for 3rd Battalion, 25th Aviation Regiment, 25th CAB, says with the C-27J relieving his unit’s Chinooks, the unit has the opportunity to fly more missions to forward operating bases which the C-27J does not have access to.

“We can focus on picking up personnel and equipment that are lower priority and fulfill requests that are normally canceled due to lack of resources,” said Jayson. “Overall, the C-27J increases our flexibility and ability to support more customers in a single day.”

An increase in C-27J missions also decrease the costs associated with CH-47 missions as well.

“The hourly operational cost of a resupply mission using the Chinook is more than $7,500 an hour for the CH-47D and $9,000 an hour for the CH-47F,” said Jayson.

Based off Landrum’s calculations, the U.S. Army has saved $30 million by conducting missions with the C-27J instead of the CH-47 Chinook. When it comes to relieving the CH-47 Chinook with fixed wing assets, the C-27J seems to be the best choice over other fixed-wing options.

“The C-27J has all of the benefits of a fixed wing aircraft such as speed, altitude, payload capacity and range, yet also possesses the ability to conduct many mission sets similar to rotary winged cargo aircraft,” said Sgt. Maj. Ronald Graves, 25th CAB operations sergeant major.

Adding to the list of the C-27J’s benefits, Graves said the aircraft can operate in adverse weather and with limited visibility. Also the C-27J can land on a 2,400-foot dirt strip as opposed to the 3,000 feet a C-130 Hercules requires. Perhaps the biggest advantage the C-27J currently offers the Army is the fact it is tactically controlled by 25th CAB commander Col. Frank Tate. The tactical control gives him the flexibility to provide immediate support to soldiers on the battlefield.

“This relationship allows for quick and dynamic tasking, when required, which greatly increases our ability to deliver nearly anything, anywhere, in support of the soldier in the fight,” said Graves.

Back to the metaphorical battlefield: These are shots across the Air Force’s bow and it looks like the Army’s gunners have their ranges dialed right in. The “customers” of the 25th CAB are loving their C-27Js, and this story even stacks them against the bird the Air Force says can do the job just as well: Its C-130 Hercules. Meanwhile, the Army saves money and wear by flying its Chinooks strategically, hitting the bases where the Spartans can’t go.

Will this endorsement, from the very “warfighters” in whose name defense leaders always try to act, have any effect on the mothballization of the C-27Js? Probably not — this is a truth vacuum, a reality-distortion zone, and unless the Spartan’s allies in Congress unequivocally put their foot down, it looks like their ultimate departure remains certain.

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Takeaway: Seems like the only service that knows how to acquire within budget and focusing on the warfighter is the Army. Someone on the hill should take notice.

kidding right? FCS, Spin-Outs, Crusader, Comanche, WIN-T, ARH, CH-47, UH-60, Patriot, Abrams, Bradley… .http://www.acq.osd.mil/ara/am/sar/SST-2011–12.pdf let me know if you don’t know how to read it

Army acquiring within budget? I just pi**ed myself! How did you not cus at jakemono? I’m emailing my friends working on *** with the GAO now…they’ll love it!

well — he got what he wanted — someone on the hill will take notice!

Anyone have some more specific information on the landing distances of the two aircraft?
Sources I have found state:

From Lockheed: Landing/takeoff ground roll (typical assault mission) .… .… . 1,500 ft / 460 m http://​www​.lockheedmartin​.com/​c​o​n​t​e​n​t​/​d​a​m​/​l​o​c​k​hee

Air Force guidance: Runway Length for Takeoff and Landing. Minimum runway length for normal takeoff is Critical Field Length or Minimum Field Length for Maximum Effort Take-Off for max effort operations. Minimum runway for normal landing is Landing Distance or Ground Roll plus 500 feet for max efforts.

From http://​www​.uscost​.net/​a​i​r​c​r​a​f​t​c​h​a​r​a​c​t​e​r​i​s​t​i​c​s​/​acc
Min landing distance at min landing weight: 1150 ft
Min landing distance at max landing weight: 2020 ft

From Alenia: http://​www​.c27j​.com/​e​s​s​e​n​t​i​a​l​-​f​a​cts
At its maximum landing weight, the C-27J has a ground roll of less than 1,115 ft.

No Air Force guidance available.

Obviously the only real source is the Dash-1. Anyone have a copy handy for both the C-130J and C-27J?

It really doesn’t matter. The aircraft works and performs the job it was intended for, hence the government will cancel it so we can can have more aircraft like the f-22 and f-35, today version of the a-5 vigilante and the f-111.

“Air Force birds under the tactical command of Army aviation units, resupplying Army troops forward.”

SACRILEGE!!!! (screams the Air Force Uber Alles crowd)

Good article, except the picture if of a C-27A not a C-27J.

Who would have “thunk-it”, an Army platform flying on Army missions, supplying Army troops, and a rousing success! The only contribution the boys in blue made was to “half-asxx” try to kill the program and they even flubbed that. The only way the AF will ever kill the C-27J is by deploying it straight to the shredder at Davis Monthan, which should inspire the taxpayers to turn over at least half of the C-130Js to the Army as compensation. AF, get a life and quit kicking a winner! :)

A C-130 with JATO rocket assist can still beat a C-27J. Doesn’t matter about its field performance the Plane is doomed by politics.

C27 is a lot like the A10, AF brass never wanted it but be dang if they were gonna let the Army get thier own bird and funding. (I really wander how much money over the years has been moved around from these programs to ones the AF wants? We know it happens but just what is the actual ammount I would love to know some day). The 27 is a good bird, all future gunships should be based on the 27 rather than the 130, Would also be good for coastal ASW ops and for surveilance platforms for Coast Guard and Border Patrol. They are already paid for so pass them out amongst ourselves rather than letting them rot sitting or giving them to so called friendly nations.

And we all know Army FOBs have stockpiles of takeoff rockets, right? Those rockets are rarely used by anyone now unless they’re absolutely needed.

Actually the USAF most certainly wanted the A-10, when its mission was flying around independently and punking unsupported Soviet armor. Once the A-10 stopped being an unattached tank hunter and started being troop support and CAS, they decided that they didn’t like it anymore.

First no active duty strait trash hauling 130 uses JATO assist and hasn’t for a long time. Two, the 130 the Air Force is going to is the stretched J model which requires more space to turn around and a longer runway at max weight. Three, it boils down to two issues. 1– the USAF doesn’t like people moving in on their turf which is what they felt the Army was doing and 2– Lockheed has more lobbiest on capital hill than the company that is selling the plane to the US government. Funny how Lockheed used to be a part of the C-27J program, jumped out and now are pushing to have its 130 replace the vary plane that was brought in to to what they said the 130 couldn’t do.

“1– the USAF doesn’t like people moving in on their turf which is what they felt the Army was doing”

Which is funny seeing how the C-27J was supposed to replace three existing Army aircraft.

I caught this as well. The real story here is Air Force assets being TACON to an Army unit. Why not TACAIR, ISR as well? This story is intended to be about an airplane, but the doctrinal issue here is much more interesting.

From what I heard within USCG circles, their is talk about the US Coast Guard acquiring the C-27J from the US Air force. It would be perfect for the US Coast Guard and they can use them for curtain AOR’s that have adverse weather and long AOR such as Cape Cod, E-City, Point Mugu, Astoria. On the Plus side it would still be in the US inventory, but being used by the US Coast Guard that the US Air force can call on if they need it.

Sure. They are real experts. Future Combat Systems, eh?

If the US Army wanted fix wing, just make it where they are only allowed to fly turboprop such as the Embraer EMB 314 Super Tucano or the Dash 8

I’ve never heard anyone say the C27’s not a good platform, or that it can’t do the mission. What I hear is the AF can’t afford it when the budget is being axed and C130 can do the job almost as well. The TACON stuff is doctrine…that’s an interoperability issue, not a budget issue.

In the future, every USAF major requirement must be evaluated by Congress. USAF stated they wanted this aircraft. Then later, because they can’t make ends meet, stated that the C-130 can do the job just fine in Afghanistan. Problem is we won’t always be fighting in Afghanistan. Consider some of the lousy short airfields in the SW Pacific and other places in the world.
The current USAF leadership just wasted a bunch of our money on a reversal. What else are they telling us they need that wasn’t properly thought out?

All AF major requirements, along with all the other services’ major requirements, are already evaluated by Congress.

Not to rehash the 200+ comments we already made on this subject, but go to the C-27J articles on this site. With very good reasons the Air Force has been accused of lying to Congress on this issue and selling out the Army. The doctrine/interoperability comments made here make me wonder if the Air Force was ever really needed for this aircraft to be fielded.

So, the PDF you directed me to shows the UH-60 w/an increase of 5.6%. Not great, I admit, but there lets’ look at, say, LUH. A contract that was bid, awarded and has a significant number of birds on the flight line on time and on budget. Same w/MRAP and now the C-27. I’m not saying the Army is perfect, but my G-d the Air Force takes twenty years to field a handful of planes, literally, and the Navy can’t even seem to decide which ships it even wants (excepting CVNs) Again, all things being relative (and all history being recent) I’d say the Army wins. I give kudos to the Army for squashing ARH like a bug when it spiraled out of control. The air force would have redrawn the requirement for fewer birds and stretched out the acquisition time so that IOC would be in the next decade. The whole ARH episode happened in the blink of an eye compared to an AF or Navy acquisition. CH-47 was relatively quick and painless as well. Patriot, Abrams, Bradley — and even Comanche– are ancient history.

I’d venture that FCS is the last vestige of the Army’s foray into Capability Based Planning. They seem to be more focused on needs and threat based requirements nowadays.

Well…I think there is little doubt that both the AF and Congress were lukewarm about the C27 even back in 08–09, and I also don’t think there is much debate that the AF muscled in on the JCA program based on “doctrinal” arguments…no argument there. Sec Gates, no friend of the AF, made the call to shift the program to the AF and cut the numbers of airframes, and Congress backed him up. Now, the main guys accusing the AF of “lying” to Congress currently are the Guard TAGs, backed up by the Guard lobby, the Governors, and their respective CODELs, all of whom are trying to save ANG force structure and jobs in their states. Make no mistake about it, up on the Hill the C27 means jobs. One of the main guys currently questioning the AF’s numbers on the C27 is Sen Levin from MI…one of the same guys who was all about giving the JCA to the AF in the first place. Why? I dunno for sure, but I will point out that under the JCA program the Michigan ANG was slated to get C27s…the Michigan Army Guard was not. It’s all politics…

I stand by the TACON/doctrine/interoperability comment…I think the Army/AF could make a lot of improvements in those areas without buying a new airframe.

The problem I (and other Army coworkers) have over this episode is whether the Air Force thinks they can afford the planes or not, they told Congress when they were part of this program that they needed the plane. Now that they’ve bought the planes they want to get rid of them for budget reasons, but GEN Schwartz justified it by saying “we don’t need them, the C-130 can do it.” There’s a big difference between saying they need those planes but can’t afford them, and saying the planes aren’t worth keeping.

I’ll agree that Congress was lukewarm. It was because they had no confidence that the USAF would execute. In the Fiscal 2009 def appropriations bill, Congress cut the USAF’s request for advanced procurement funding, but USAF kept its portion of the program on ice by saving $16 million in research and development funding. Contrast that with lawmakers supported the Army’s request that year to procure seven C-27Js. Congress knew in its heart that the Air force would leave the Army hanging. Prescient!

The Air Force was lukewarm? Gen Schwartz said at a House Armed Services Committee Feb. 23 ’10, “I think the Army was intently interested in this [buying the C-27J] because they weren’t sure their Air Force would be there with them when they needed direct support,” Schwartz said. “That is a change. We have demonstrated to our Army brothers and sisters, as well as others, that we will be there. We can do this.” http://​www​.airforce​-magazine​.com/​M​a​g​a​z​i​n​e​A​r​c​h​i​ve/


Yes, the AF was/is lukewarm to the C27. Read Gen Schwartz’s comment you posted…he said the AF is committed to providing direct support to the Army, not that the AF is committed to the C27 platform. In Jan GEN Odierno signed the MOU with the AF that says the AF will do the mission without the C27. He did that in part because the operational proof of concept was done in Iraq when he was the CG there, and it was done with C130s, not C27s. So…if the AF says they can’t afford the C27 now, and the Army says they can live that, what’s all the crying about? It’s about jobs for the states with ANG C27 units. You can make this an Army-AF fight all you want, but this is politics, plain and simple. Make no mistake…the Guard lobby will come after the Army too if/when the Army tries to cut any Army Guard force structure.

TMB, those thoughts are understandable, but if the DoD wasn’t staring down a $487 billion gun barrel, I’m pretty sure the AF would keep the C27…I think it is that simple.

Well that why the system needs to stock up on them then. I the C-27J stayed army it be just fine but it was doomed when political leaders made this a join USAF/Army program.

No, nice try. The context was referring to the C27.

Odierno signed because what choice does he have. Again. refer to the article above. The C130’s are not going to be opconned to the Army. Did you read this story? http://​www​.dodbuzz​.com/​2​0​1​2​/​0​3​/​0​9​/​c​s​a​-​p​r​a​i​s​e​s​-​doo

I’ll agree. This is about politics though. It’s called interservice rivalry.

I’d also add the Gates decision to cut the Army out of this project is hard to understand. Why? The Army started the program. Congress funded the Army and actually cut the USAF’s early procurement funding. The C27 was supposed to address a specific Army need. Yet Gates came in and not only cut the numbers in half but cut the Army out of the program. Why?

Well, Gates didn’t like the C27. Giving it to the Air Force guaranteed its demise over time and if it was a good thing the Air Force could keep its monopoly. Don’t forget, Gates was an Air Force officer.

Hell the whole Air Force should be back under Army control in the first place.After all if George Washington wanted the U.S. to have an Air Force it would have been written into Article One section Eight , IE Army and Navy (BTW the Marines ARE PART of the U.S. Navy they are the men’s dept!)We could save a whole lot of money if the Air Force did not exist.…Or amend the U.S. Constitution to allow it’s creation in the first place..Damn you Harry S.Truman…Not a pound for air to ground.…Really…

The also includes the fact that Schwartz and Donley have been promoted way beyond their capability.

pg 8 of the SAR the UH-60 APB then year cost overrun is @20%, not the 6% you quote. LUH is not much more than buying a non-developmental off the shelf helicopter — not much chance for cost risk there — which is actually where the Army & the Services need to go more in the direction of. The Army can’t take credit for MRAP — the SecDef had to force it — and again it is based on non-developmental items. You look at development programs like JLTV and GCV and you see more programs struggling in development, with negative press on cost & schedule overruns, and unstable technological baselines. Two more Army disasters: GFEBS & DCGS. The Army’s acquisition system is fundamentally broken, riddled with corruption and waste. Heck, USAF even had to provide the Maj Gen in charge of Iraq contracting and 70% of the contracting personnel for Iraq. All Services have major problems with acquisition. Your initial thesis that the Army is “the only service that knows how to acquire within budget and focusing on the warfighter” does not pass basic sanity check.

Claim Jumper has a point. No Service can make adjustments to POM funding without the approval of OSD, and the Sec Def and President have to approve the budget before it is submitted to Congress, who have the power to debate the issues and appropriate the resources. There are plenty of safeguards in place to manage the alleged inter-Service rivalry issue. While on the surface the USAF decision on C-27 looks suspicious, there may be more than meets the eye here, and we as taxpayers deserve to see the competing analyses before harshly judging the USAF leadership.

Agree. And anyone who says that the Air Force is going to just plug in a frickin C-130 in every instance when a C-27J is currently being used or would be used in the future has their head in the sand (or something else). The Air Force won’t do it and either contracted planes, Chinooks, or frickin convoys will make up the difference. In this age of asymmetric warfare, getting rid fo the C-27J is a crime.

What about putting JATO on C-27?

Gates being an ex-AF officer had nothing to do with it…as I said before, he was not a strong AF advocate (he fired the SecAF & the CSAF…remember?) I could be wrong (and I’m sure you’ll let me know if I am), but I haven’t noticed the Army making a big push to have the C27 transfered to them. The AF & Army have made substantial improvements in direct support procedures, and I think that has gone a long way towards GEN O’s confidence in signing the MOU…the services just need to make sure they don’t lose the bubble on those improvements once we’re done with OEF. I’ll repeat myself and say, again, that the real stink over the C27 these days is coming from the ANG. They wanted the C27 all along to replace aircraft lost in the 2005 BRAC. If someone waved a magic wand and told the ANG they’d get C130s to replace their C27s, you wouldn’t hear another word.

SecAF and CSAF were fired. Hard to cover up losing nuke accountability, huh? Army pushing for C27s? Heard of a Chain of Command? The SECDEEF’s and was “NO”. It’s not up for discussion. Of all the services the Army respects civil control and doesn’t do end runs. Miss that block of instruction?

Gen O was confident signing the MOU? Did you read that article? Here’s the Money quote by Gen O… “The Air Force made the decision; they think they can do this with C-130s. If we get that same support — that is what we need. I would say that this has been supplied very successfully by the C-27.” So you think the word “if” means “confidence”? Oh and yeah, it’s the “services” that have to worry about losing the bubble. Whose responsible for aerial resupply? I do have to agree though, this is politics. Interservice rivalry politics and the FAILURE to hold up one’s end.

The Army’ll get the job done even as it’s denied replacements for its fixed wing aircraft. It’ll use Chinooks which are four times more expensive. Why would the Air Force care? Doesn’t come out of their budget and it isn’t “their” supply problem.

Oh and sure Gates being an Air Force officer had nothing to do with it. What’s your explanation for cutting the requirement in half and giving the whole project to the Air Force to fix an Army intratheatre supply problem especially in light of Congress’ action to defund the Air Force part of the program but fund the Army’s?

Yep, politics. Interservice rivalry politics.

So.…why the personal attacks? I’m pretty sure I know as much as you about chain of command, or civil-military relations. It’s obvious you are an AF-hater…no doubt about that. Quit being so reactive and try to have a intelligent discussion.

…and who’s got any JATO bottles left? Blue Angels’ “Fat Albert” used to do JATO takeoff at airshows by drawing from the existing stockpile of surplus bottles that were no longer used by almost anyone else. Now, they’ve had to stop because they can no longer find any bottles that haven’t already reached EOL and are considered unsafe.

What was also interesting was that this was originally an Army led joint program. As the program progressed, questions were raised regarding a curious situation: Somehow USAF had managed to negotiate for itself a price that was twice what the Army was paying. for essentially identical aircraft. the solution was clear: Put USAF in charge of the entire program.

As the saying goes, “…and the rest is history”.

Now there’s some sharp thinking there… do you know when planes were invented?

Dave — That’s a bit extreme.

Personal attacks? You are way too sensitive. Sorry I hurt your feelings. You know as much as I ref civil-mil relations? Maybe, but I’m not the guy suggesting the Army ignore a SECDEF decision.

I don’t hate the Air Force. They do a marvelous job at the strategic level and the air to air mission. On the other hand they don’t play well with others. They tried to ditch the navy’s air wing. They tried to bogart the whole UAV fleet. CAS has been a constant sore point and consistently under resourced. They tried to keep the Army from getting helicopters. Tactical airlift is just more of the same.

I’m not an Air Force hater. You are an Air Force apologist/propagandist. BTW, I feel personally attacked :(

Ok, so I’m gonna stick to the facts. There are new SecDef and Army Chief sheriffs in town…there would be no chain-of-command issue when it comes to the Army readdressing the C27 issue, and they could certainly do it if they wanted to spend the green stamps. They have thier own fish to fry, like trying to talk Congress out of shoving a bunch of unwanted M1s down thier throats. Like I said before…the main advocate for the C27 these days is the ANG.

What no apology for hurting my feelings? I’m doubly hurt. (sniff, sniff)

Sticking to facts? What about Odierno’s quote and your “confidence” comment? What, no explanation for Gates reasoning? No. You’re going to hang your hat on the army hasn’t asked the “new” SECDEF to overturn the PREVIOUS SECDEF’s decision? How much precedent is there for that? Uh, ZERO! It was an order. I was giving you the benefit of the doubt before about knowing as much as I about COC issues.

You wonder why USAF advocates might be a little sensitive to the generalized hatred tossed their way. Mr Ball is no lone ranger in his thinking. I’ve been through Army Force Management School and encountered much of the same sentiment.

This is a good example of interservice rivalry beating out common-sense. It would have been better if the Army bought the planes for there missions but have Air Force pilots flying them. The pilots in my opinion should be assigned permanently to the Army units they support. Kind off like how Navy corpsmen are assigned to Marine units.

Dude…you are spewing it today! Here’s a fact I’d like to see if you know; what type of future wars is the DoD sizing the force against? Do you know? If you know (which I don’t think you do), it will go a long way to explaining why nobody in the Pentagon is lying down and dying to save the C27 (except the ANG). BTW…Panetta approved the AF’s proposal to get rid of the platform. What service was he in??? I’m sure you know. Be forewarned, this is my last exchange with you on this subject, so don’t waste you time googling articles and cherry-picking quotes, or dredging up AF budget history from the 1950s. If you do, it will be minutes of your life you’ll never get back…

Considering the way the USAF has tried to monopolize air over the decades (e.g. naval air, army helos, CAS, any armed fixed wing, UAVs, tactical air) sometimes you reap what you sow.

Uh still no comment about Ordierno’s “confidence”?

Future war? From low to high intensity there’s a need for intratheatre lift.

You’re an Air Force apologist who can see no wrong with the Air Force’s acquisition and subsequent canning of the C27. The veil of fiscal responsibility only applies to the “furture” vs. holding anyone responsible for the past. How convenient. Don’t go away mad, just go away…

Mothball????? Can these critters drop slurry? You can “mothball” a half dozen of them on the front range of Colorado this summer.

Don’t blame the a5 vigilante & F111 buyers and designers, their long range missions were merely taken over by the ICBM,etc. production should have been stopped and a5’s mothballed, but hard heads in Navy Aviation wanted a fast plane.
An old Viggie b/n

How much of this problem is caused by the fact that Alenia can’t produce a quality product and can’t support what they do deliver?

Think you’re confused with the C27A. The C27J seems to be pretty solid maintenance wise.

As I mentioned in the past; the Army should be allowed to operate C27’s for their obvious real world combat needs, they should also be equipped with Super Tacano’s for their light CAS needs as well, it’s a no brainer.

It’s irresponsible for anyone in uniform and out to make attempts to justify canning operational use of the C27 program when you have war fighters on the ground making it clear how much of an asset the Spartans operating as they are in the AOR.

The C27 is a great aircraft, but it only has two engines to wear out and (shutter) only uses half the fuel, and can still fly most of the flights that WASTE the A/C and everything else on missions like dropping troops on traing missions instead of C-17s and C-130s which use twice the gas. The Army had some great tactical a/c to drop into those hilltop firebases in Viet Nam. The C-130 is just to damb big a target sometimes. The main reson to pickle them is, wait for it, ta da, they just aren’t glamerous enough !!! It screams of using a semi to deliver a ream of paper. The C-27 is like a pickup not a semi..

Considering there are multiple fixed wing air forces in DoD outside USAF I guess their efforts to “monpolize” have not been very successful. The Army has been more successful in monopolizing the CJCS position, who I am sure has influence over platform resourcing considerations. Your potshot at the SecUSAF and CSAF getting fired over nuclear accountability was cheap. Those senior leaders had as much control over nukes being loaded on B-52s as the SecArmy and CSA had control over Abu Gharib, Pat Tillman friendly fire cover up, slaughter of 17 civilians, or promotions of psychotic psychatrists that shoot up soldiers for a hobby. There are plenty of mistakes and reaping and sowing to go around.

The USAF cannot change the programmed funding without the approval of the SecDef, and probably multiple boards of general officers prior to that. Maybe they know something you do not. I agree with you, on the surface USAF senior leadership’s position does appear to stink. That is why I think we should have an independent audit/assessment of the entire decision, so we can all learn & benefit and improve decisions for the greater national good in the future. An independent assessment might even support the USAF senior leadership position.

However, given the changed fiscal position, and ability to satisfy the mission by other means, this is not something to browbeat the USAF over. As far as CH-47 vs C-27 costs go, under wartime conditions, supplemental funding is provided to unified combatant commands, which can pay for all the last mile required tactical airlift. I understand your perspective that this may be sub-optimal but look at it this way. It would be nice to have the unique niche tool for each and every situation. However at some point you have to draw the line and you have to stop spreading your resources so thinly among multiple niche platforms. I’m sure there are even shorter and more austere runways and smaller platform loads that would require an even smaller aircraft than the C-27. But when taking an overall mission theater into account, you may not have the luxury of having the perfect tool for each situation,

I disagree. This is not the first incident that the USAF’s quest for hemegony of the sky impacts the Army’s ability to fight. This is a systemic problem.

Niche aircraft? The F22 is a “niche” aircraft. So is the A10. Guess what? The Air Force is mothballing 30% of the A10 fleet. It’s canning the C27 completely. This isn’t a coincidence. CAS and Tac Airlift have always been of little importance of the mission to the Air Force.

The C27 wasn’t the Army’s first choice. Air Force meddling drove selection of a larger plane. The greater question is the short shrift given intratheatre transport and the Army’s lack of confidence in the Air Force’s ability to support that drives the use of CH47s that impacts other areas.

Eventually a US patrol has to traverse a route under an IED threat because CH47s are not available because they are doing a mission the C27 could/should. How many GI’s should we have to risk or lose because the aircraft isn’t “optimal”. Bigger ques, when does the BS stop? I’d readily admit that CAS and tac Airlift are secondary priorities in comparison to the USAF’s larger mission. They are critical Army multipliers. Give those roles to the Army and the Air Force will never have to fund them and weigh F35’s to C27’s.

Nearly the same argument can be made for cases of almost any services acquisition of new equipment and technology. It could have been decided that the Air Force would be the proponent for all UAVs. Clearly there are costs to every decision and services will make do with “sub-optimal solutions” Tell you what. Never mention the way the Army screwed up FCS to anyone on the forum and I won’t mention the C27J fiasco?

That’s a great idea! It’ll never happen. In the meantime I’ll continue to toot my little horn.

My comment about the relief of of the SecUSAF CSAF was in another discussion and an apropriate response to USAF apologists trying to cover up the irrational decisions made in procuring the C27 by a SecDef who happene to be a former USAF officer.

The Army has held the CJCS nine times, over twice as much as the Air Force and almost twice as much as the Navy if one doesn’t count WWII and an acting chief (which would bring the total to 6 Navy CJCS). Double is HARDLY a “monopoly”. mo·nop·o·ly/məˈnäpəlē/ Noun: 1.The exclusive possession or control of the supply or trade in a commodity or service.

I trust I don’t have to look up “exclusive” for you. You may not like my style. The truth hurts and not strange you never confront the USAF Uber Alles crowd for their out of this world excuses.

Respectfully, no deal Major. There is too much too be learned from both of these case studies that should be discussed in the open. We are talking resource allocation & strategic decision making in a time of scarce resources — this is bigger than protection of reputations. I disagree with you the F-22 is a niche aircraft, since it does have air to ground capability. Point taken, though, an AC-27 variant might very well be a valuable addition to the force structure. Also note F-22 is central to USAF air superiority doctrine, C-27 is not central to Army doctrine, so the comparison weakens. A-10s mothballing? Sure the A-10 is an awesome weapon system, and it is a shame to not have a better replacement. However, given the age of the aircraft, retiring a percentage of the fleet is alone not evidence to support your theory that USAF places little importance on the mission. We retired a third of the B-1 fleet, resulting in improved spares & logistics support for the remaining aircraft. This was not a move to demonstrate the USAF does not place importance on the “strategic bombing” mission.

Your argument seems compelling, but I think you are overly focused on the C-27. What matters is the tactical airlift mission, whether or not USAF has been deficient in the past at this, and whether or not it will be again in the future. If it has been deficient in the past, I’d like to see what were the problems in the chain of command that resulted in the mission not being accomplished, for example, why weren’t more C-130s deployed to theater. Overall I think your Army soldier’s blood is on the USAF’s hands is uncalled for, or to be fair, it needs to be balanced out with how many soldiers lives have been saved thanks to USAF. Like say, the population of the world — thanks to the nuclear deterrent mission, for one. Best regards to you sir.

what would never happen, the independent assessment, or an independent assessment that would support the USAF leadership position? you don’t have to answer. Now there are a lot of things that people thought would “never happen”, but they do anway. I was trying to be constructive, but if you’re here to just toot your horn, I guess I won’t get far with that.

Why not just have Army aviation units own them and have Army aviators fly them? Why introduce unneeded complexiity?

Snapple Fact of the Day #1: The SecDef who currently supports canning the C27 is a former Army officer.

Snapple Fact of the Day #2: The JCS and office of the CJCS were established by the National Security Act of 1947.

I think the Gates USAF officer argument is rather silly. Gates was on active duty for 3 years from 1967–1969 and he was really CIA the whole time. Claim Jumper effectively refuted the argument with the revelation that Panetta was an Army officer. Using your logic, we can presume that every resourcing decision in the future where USAF gets a shorter straw over Army is a result of the current SecDef’s bias. Me, personally — I wouldn’t make such an argument.

Your dig at SecUSAF & CSAF firings and slights at USAF advocates belie your assertion that you do not hate the USAF. I don’t think the USAF could ever provide enough “service” to you, as you would not even give an inch that the C-27 resourcing decision (ultimately to be made with much more than USAF’s vote) could be a justifiable one, however painful it may be. The reality of fiscal constraints hurts much more than your version of the truth. Your argument is internally inconsistent, anyway, as exempllified by your use of the definition of “monopoly” and assertion that USAF’s desire to monopolize air power, when the reality of our 4 air forces proves otherwise. USAF will let the Army have all the flying beer kegs & ravens they want, for example. They’d just like the air space above x K feet managed better to reduce risk to our forces.

careful now, truth might hurt the good Major.

Budwieser Fact of the Day #1: who is the SecDef today doesn’t have an impact on a previous decision unless he chooses to make it so. Once told “no” professional soldiers execute.

Budwieser Fact of the Day #2: I qualified my info clearly not to take more credit than was due. Did you miss the definition of Monopoly or do I have to follow up with my Bud fact #3 the definition of “exclusive”?

What you “think” is worth less than condom with holes in it.

Your example doesn’t follow logically. When a former Army secdef makes a decision diametrically opposed to congress’ view and cuts the Air Force out of a program it started to support its need you’ll have a leg to stand on.

Backdooring the previous secdef’s decision is not something professionals do. Using that as a defense smacks of the political maneuvering the vilest backdoor bureaucrats of the beltway are so adept at. You’ve learned well.

Defending the previous secdefs clearly irrational decision speaks more of your bias and values than mine.

Well you already know what your “thinking” is worth.

I’ve got no problem with the servicemen of the USAF. They are patriots. That said I can disagree wehemntly with the decisions of a bureaucratic organization and the decisions it makes especially when they are made to increase their power vs. what is better for the larger organization.

BTW, ref monopoly. You have a point. the Air Force hasn’t monopolized airpower (not to say that it hasn’t tried) but it always has had a desire to exercise its hegemony over its utilization. Hegemony is a better word anyway. It has a certain evil backdoor appeal to it.

I also guarantee that the fiscal truth you speak of its much less painful than the price the Army pays in “blood and treasure” for the Air Force to have its way. Numbers have always been a “safe” place.

I didn’t think you’d put your money where your mouth is. The C27 is an excellent “case study” of how the interservice rivalry of the USAF costs the Army money (and subsequently the taxpayer) but more importantly the most efficient means to conduct combat operations. How’s that, intellectual enough for you?

You’re a bit focused on FCS. Take that out of the equation and half your posts would be gone. The C27 is just one issue I engage on. The C27 is what’s the article is about. I could go far afield in fixing the system. Something I’m sure those in uniform are working on. Less are concerned with highlighting how vile, meanspirited, costly and unprofessional insterservice rivalry is.

If the subject bothers you, don’t engage. If you want to turn it into some systemic or quantitative analysis of the problems of the system be my guest. That seems to be your forte. In the meantime I intend to make the costs as high as possible when any branch buddyf–ks the other.

How dare you bring up real world considerations of the warfighter. Be prepared for the dressing down by Chaos for not looking at the “bigger” economic realities.

(That was sarcasm Gman. You nailedf it. The geeks don’t get it and they are getting angry because we won’t see it their way.)

thank you revealing the truth that you are an arrogant hypocrite. You calling the USAF elitist is like the pot calling the kettle black. you could not comprehend what I do. let’s just say in order for me to do my job first I have to do the job of officers much higher in rank then you. any time you want to get back to constructive dialog let me know.….

“What you “think” is worth less than condom with holes in it.” my daily duties & responsibilities to officres senior in rank to you evidence to the contrary. Now if you were so thirsty for truth why would you repeatedly make unsupported, unprofessional, un-officer-like cheap shots one would expect to hear from.…juvenile delinquent high school dropouts??

you are off the deep end. You blaming the USAF for the Army’s blood is insane. The USAF has no authority to send the Army in harm’s way in the first place. The USAF did not have the authority to limit the resources sent to OIF & OEF. The SecDef, POTUS, and Combatant Commander had the authority to have adequate platforms & capabilities for the tac air mission to be performed. In your blind hatred of the USAF you have lost sight on how operations go down and you also lack the creativity to see how that mission can be provided for by multiple means. Why don’t you give credit for Army lives that have been saved due to USAF resources? You know all those contractors providing all those services that enabled the OIF mission, ie. saving lives? 70% of the contracting personnel were from the USAF, including the Maj Gen in charge of contracting.

Oh…you’re using Budweiser facts! That explains a lot, an awful lot.

you are factually incorrect Major. I’ve posted quite regularly on F-35, V-22, C-27, and pretty much any failed acquisition program involving too risky technology and the inevitable performance shortfalls, cost, and schedule overruns. Since you didn’t really engage in what I previously posted, I guess this horse has been beat for now.

the bigger picture is that there are multiple platforms & solutions that provide both CAS and tactical air lift. what matters is whether or not there have been deficiencies in the accomplishment of these missions in the past, and in the future. and if there are/will be deficiencies, we should also consider if there were/are non-material solutions (DOTMLPF or failure to employ existing assets, for example, the OOB for OIF & OEF was too far constrained by size as the wars were fought “on the cheap”. so a deficiency in accomplishment of the tacairlift mission may have been due to a failure to employ existing assets (more C-130s, for example)) prior to acquiring more systems and adding more complexity & risk to the defense portfolio.

At the same time, I agree with you that on the surface it seems like C-27 and Super Tucano’s make sense. If I were God I would be all for acquiring those and providing more support to troops on the ground. However, the geopolitical (wars are winding down) and fiscal situations have changed from when these systems were approved & advocated for years ago. That’s reality, and it has nothing to do with the USAF being sinister and having bloods of soliders on their hands, per your hyperbolic arguments.

and I’m trying hard not to go low road and “dress down” or resort to namecalling for anyone with different points of view. I’m trying hard to understand others and build consensus and constructive ideas for making things better in the future. When people are factually and/or logically incorrect, I’ll engage so we as a community can seek out the truth by weighing all the evidents and arguments.

you are factually incorrect. I post regularly on F-35, V-22, GCV.. pretty much any acquisition effort that involves too risky technology, and the inevitable performance shortfalls and cost & schedule overruns. I link that to the moral damage caused by the bad practices in the status quo, and have developed original concepts & practices for the development of technology & system acquisition using better risk management methods, which I assure you, DoD has a loooong way to go in.

Heck yeah…let’s give every company four Tacanos and a C27 (that was sarcasm). Wait…what does the Budweiser fact say about a “hollow force”?

That truth hurt huh?

No I don’t hate the Air Force. I hate the interservice rivalry that hurts any service. You’ve lost the argument and resort to demonizing me and putting words in my mouth.

What the Air Force has done in general support to the Army is of no consequence to the discussion. Just like when Army troops pull security at Bagram or a myriad other bases that airmen are at. Want a group hug? Go back to kindergarden.

The C27 fiasco is no reflection on the individual airmen but a classic case of waste, inefficiency and poor support for a brother branch by the bureaucrats in D.C. Your crowd.

Yeah, I was thinking the same about your snapple. Bet they go well with your fruit wraps.

Chaos — I’m impressed. Seems you have a lot of time during the duty day to post on DoD Buzz. Critical job!

I give what I get. Consider the increasingly condescending tone and personal attacks in your posts. Can’t handle the heat? Duck under your desk.

As long as the acquisitions are off-the-shelf. If the Army is developing it, it’s a whole other story.

Not intellectual at all. But intellectual discourse is not your goal so why does it matter to you? You assert that CAS is of little importance to USAF. your evidence is a decision to mothball 30% of a fleet of aircraft that has been flying since the 70s with way too many K hours on them. my counter argument 1) retiring a portion of the fleet actually makes the rest of the fleet healthier and 2) there are many ways to perform CAS including A-10, AH-64, AC-130, F-16, even heavy bombers. the same logic flows for a counter argument that the tacairlift mission can be done with C-130s, helicopters, and contracted aircraft. I also contend that if this mission is not getting done adequately the problem may be due to operational breakdowns such as failure to employ existing assets due to political or resource constraints, which may even be made worse by acquiring more disparate systems rather than seeking to make better use of what we already have.

and if you wanted to be intellectual you could study math a bit and learn that given dynamic conditions of different types of war, uncertainty, and unknown unknowns, there is no such thing as “the most efficient means to conduct combat operations.”

you don’t hate the Air Force? your rhetoric towards senior leadership and potshots with USAF representatives here evidence to the contrary. “the fiscal truth you speak of its much less painful than the price the Army pays in “blood and treasure” for the Air Force to have its way.” your words major. hate interservice rivalry? you are doing more than anyone here to stoke that fire as hot as possible. “want a group hug?” where did I suggest that? And you want to use the put words in my mouth argument on me?? hypocrisy. the USAF’s spectrum of services is relevant. You are cherrypicking the C-27 argument, milking it for all its worth, and browbeating the USAF over it. and this is nothing “like” Army troops pulling security at Bagram. I’m not the one attacking the Army for lack of support to the USAF.

condescending personal attacks in my posts?? maybe you’ve got me confused with yourself now.

on a personal level it would not be possible for me to care less. i’ve engaged with plenty of condescending and factually incorrect people (many of them officers). my concern is the breakdown in constructiveness, and its consequences for DoD and the country.

Army already flies tons of turboprop..whats the issue?

Curious.. you ever served in the Pentagon: HQDA, G-8, ASA(ALT), or even better yet OSD? If not, it would explain much of your myopic hatred against the fiscal & politically constrained world that isn’t responsive to your every whim. Real professionals find ways to succeed even with these difficult constraints, would take accountability for accomplishing their missions through the judicious use of their own resources (all the Army’s tac air lift & CAS requirements could be fulfilled and then some with the $15B the Army stuffed into Boeing’s pockets on FCS — and the Army STILL has not given up on FCS’s MGV concept), and would not try to pin the blame for its own failings on another service.

I think it comes down to relative importance. There are no tactical cargo fixed wing in Army active forces..only in the reserve components. Of that, there are only three companies of that type in the Army. That is not very many to get in a food fight over, and an easy target for ‘efficiencies’ with C130, especially given that the article states that the Army has worked out a way to get great support from USAF cargo aircraft…they just happen to be C27.

A couple of years ago the Army/AF ran a test of the direct mission support/TACON concept in Iraq…I think it was the same OH ANG unit that is now flying the C27 in Afghanistan. At that time they used C130s cause the C27 wasn’t on-line yet. The current Army CSA was running MNF-I at the time and he felt the test was successful. So, it certainly appears there is precedent for doing the mission with the C130 vice the C27.

The USCG already operates the HC-144 (Ocean Sentry) derivative of the CN 235, precursor to the C 295.
Why would they show interest in a totally new airframe design and all its components, when they already have, and continue to receive (and would certainly prefer more), Persuader aircraft?

They’d be better served with an additional mix of Sentries/Persuaders and Guardians (HU-25, French Dassault Falcon…how’d that not-made-here aircraft slip thru the system, huh?),
rather than bring in an entirely new airframe and its logistics footprint.

Any citations to back up your assertion the USCG wants/needs C-27Js?

And Army leadership would probably recognize commonality issues with the PT-6 powered Texan turboprop and all those C-12s that will have to soldier on…(plus again, the fact that USAF operates them as JPATS trainers).

I still think a fair and balanced fly-off is paramount, with as many commonality pluses as each side can demonstrate (Super Tuc and Texan II).
And I still think a beefier variant of either winner should be powered by the T700-based turbines as powers Army Blackhawks and Apaches, to further commonality concerns (called a CT-7 in turboprop form…I’ll still argue to tomorrow that the best C-12 replacement would be CT-7 powered Beech 1900D variants).
Either or, the latest UAS-datalink features the Longbow Apaches can utilize should be incorporated from the start in the winning aircraft.
Since they will probably operate in close proximity (even if primarily only in training), minimally they should be able to work together without excess commo and datalinking conflicts.

Actually, my last assignment was in a battle lab working heavily on FCS (which we thought was pretty bogus). The majority of my other assignments was with troops in some capacity.

Since we are sharing. How much time do you have with troops or in combat? You know, where the rubber meets the road and one has to live with the decisions from “the puzzle palace”?

I’d bet a big fat ZERO based on your characterization of my perspective as myopic or being a whim. Classic elitist HQ pogue talk because they knoiw better how to fight the war they’ve never seen.

If there was precedent for doing it with C130s WHY DID THE AIR FORCE BUY C27s?

–Maybe because the C130s were more capable and not as efficient for smaller loads?
–Maybe because the C130s do MUCH more than intratheatre lift and the Air Force would prioritize higher level support because “lower level” is less important (you see this same approach in USAF CAS doctrine where deep attack is deemed more efficient than CAS or F16s are preferred over A10s because they can do other more important missions)?
–Maybe because C130s are not opconned to Army BDE’s like the C27 was?
–Maybe because the C27 was going to be procured by the Army come heck or high water so the Air Force wanted them so the Army wouldn’t have them?

BTW, the test was a proof of concept for the C27. They worked for the Army. The supplied got delivered. CH47s were allowed to do other things like move troops/supplies so there was less road movement/exposure to EIDs The #1 troop killer in Iraq/Afghanistan. The C27s were working fine. Now the USAF apolofists want to cover up the “bait and switch”. Gen O and the troops also praised the C27 (note the above article and http://​www​.dodbuzz​.com/​2​0​1​2​/​0​3​/​0​9​/​c​s​a​-​p​r​a​i​s​e​s​-​doo… )

battle lab don’t count. I want to know how much you understand about HQDA and resource integration across DoD. we are drowning in unfunded requirements across DoD (and the fed govt for that matter). You may be surprised to find out that resourcing & accomplishment for the tactical airlift mission may be in a lot better shape than many other requirements…each one meaning lives on the line from some perspective or another. I have great respect for all danger you and our troops face, of course I have not faced nowhere near that kind of danger. I will tell you that I am an enlisted man’s son, grew up in s*ty housing, was almost killed by a s*ty DoD doc, spent years without my dad, and worked on flightline.

I have firsthand experience with pain in the O&M world, which is why I get so irate when service leadership pushes for too risky, too expensive, and operationally unsuitable technologies that arrives too late to the battlefield. I’m plenty critical of USAF obsession with F-22 & F-35, like I was with FCS and now with GCV. that’s why i’m not afraid to engage with you on GCV. you lack the acquisition experience to understand that APS is not ready for prime time integration in an ACAT 1 MDAP, and that the wishy washy approach the Army is taking with GCV, is not going to work, unless you intentionally want a repeat of FCS. That’s not being elitist — you are the one actually being elitist when you disregard my knowledge, expertise, and experience in my domain.

We (the US military) have been “renting” airlfit for years and years, just like we “rent” base operting support and long-haul convoy assets. We also incentivize civil carriers to keep airlift ready and on-call.

The Air Force and L-3 put a team into Alenia to ensure build quality on the US production line was assured. The original build quality was somewhat “Italian”. The fact the US has control has improved the delivered product tremendously. Feel sorry for the other countries. I have seen images of Greek C27Js minus engines and leaking cockpits — and it has nothing to do with the recent economic woes.

The Blue Angels “Fat Albert” broke last week and could not transport the Blue Angels support team to Robins AFB, GA for the airshow they were performing at. Guess who saved the day by travelling to FL to pick up the team? A C-27J!!!!

“WHY DID THE AIR FORCE BUY C27s?” because when the decision to buy the C27s
was made DoD was flush with GWOT/OCO cash and had more money than they knew
what to do with, and now the fiscal situation has changed and DoD is in
fiscal dire straits. Kind of like how if you just get a promotion you may
think that buying a second home for vacation or investment might make a lot
of sense, and then when you are faced with prospect of getting laid off you
might start to decide liquidating assets even for a loss. But I suppose you
are too cool to appreciate and would rather be snarky towards anyone who
does appreciate “behavioral economics”.

Your remaining arguments are
interesting and compelling, however you still have not addressed that the
mission is one that can be satisfied through better operational employment
of existing assets, and not one that absolutely can only be done with C-27
vs some other platform or means. Your F-16 prioritization of assets
argument is interesting as well — however that prioritization is made by a
JFC, with a JFACC working for them. Guess what service gets the lion share
of JFC assignments?? Heaven forbid a USAF officer have tacon over infantry

So surplus cash is the reason the Air Force intervened in the Army effort, moved money from other accounts when Congress wouldn’t fund early Air Force procurement and eventually took overthe whole program.

Brilliant! I guess buying more C130s that “can do the job” didn’t enter your mind?

HILARIOUS! Only second to the supreme arrogance to turn around and insult my logic!

C-7 Caribous flew in Viet Nam, tree top level, stol on 600′ strips, and freed up the Chinooks for FB supply. AF had no use for the plane, so it didn’t last long in the inventory. Looks like C27 fulfills a similiar role, but AF can’t see a long range need. If the need ever arises, they will design and build a C-393 much to Lockheeds delight.

Let me make this simple for you. B2’s can do CAS. Just because they can it doesn’t mean they are the best system for the job unless you wait for the situation to become so bad that one needs 20 or so applications of 2000 pounders.

Stick with numbers PLEASE! You’re clearly out of your element when discussing operational and tactical issues.

Do us both a favor and ignore my posts since “they lack logic” like you’ve previously stated. You obviously aren’t busy enough behind that desk in the Pentagon to have time to post here.

no arrogance. was just trying to get across that tactical mission needs and economic situations change, sometimes resulting in guess what, changing a previous decisions. since your omniscient i’m sure you’ve never had to make a call like this. and again, it is not a lack of # of C-130s that is the problem — it is the failure to employ the assets more optimally. Chain of command is POTUS — SECDEF — Combatant Command Commander — JFC — JFACC. USAF provides what is ordered, and the air assets are under control of the JFC. and again, the investment decision making authority is above the USAF as well. the USAF (like each of the Services) can propose what they think is best given fiscal reality, but the power of appropriation and law is with the politicians.

If I can’t discuss operational & tactical issues, why is that I can explain to you how the chain of command works both in operational issues and in strategic budget decisions, and you keep resorting to the “stick with numbers”? Why don’t you stick with infantry discussions, and don’t engage on whether or not APS is ready for prime time in the GCV (a system engineering / acquisition /risk management problem)? shove it, you hypocritical jerk. you are not God and you do not know everything.

Ooooooh testy also?

That’s hilarious!

Your inability to respond is noted.

I saw no coment on operational issues. I saw beltway tapdancing with the buzzwords “strategic budget” and “behavioral economics” used to cover up an interservice rivalry incident that has cost the taxpayer hundreds of millions and the Army an equivalent amount.

Just because you can look at a pay chart foesn’t mean you understand how a chain of command works. You want to take a track through the budgetary weeds ignoring the fact that the Army asked for a plane. The Air Force inserted itself into the discussion and puched for a larger pain. Congress funded the Army but not the Air force to research and procure. A former USAF SecDef stripped the program from the Army and gave it to the Air Force. The Air Force said it needed the plane and would operate the plane and now is saying woops we can’t afford it and don’t need it. We can do the job w/C130s.

You couldn’t understand the operational level of war if it came and shook you from behind your desk. I responded. The software deleted what i had to say about your politicing and Air Force excusitus.

you must be blind then, because you didn’t see how the operational chain of command flows from the POTUS to the SecDef to the Combatant Commander to the JTF Commander to the JFACC. The USAF does not have the final investment decision making nor the operational employment authority. What this means is that the need and strategic environment have changed. So what made sense before does not make sense given the new situation. And Behavioral economics is not a buzzword — it is an entire field of economic thought that you must not know much about if you will dismiss it as a tapdancing & a buzzword. Accuracy, openmindedness, and fairness are not your strengths.

Against my better judgement I’m going to respond. The proof of concept was for the direct support mission, with Army TACON over AF assets. It was not “for” the C27..C27s weren’t operational yet. I know, I was there. For the first three days the C130s moved almost zilch cause the Army personnel acting as the local air clearance authority coudn’t figure out what to put on the planes. Eventually it got sorted out. That, the interoperabiltiy of the AF and the Army within the direct support mission CONOPs, is much more of an issue than what type of airframe the crap goes on. If agreed to/directd by the JFC and JFACC, C130s can be TACON’ed to a CAB CC just like C27s. (OPCON is different…that ain’t happening) And yes, you are right…based on the various strategic scenarios the DoD is telling the services (Army AND AF) to plan for, and witin the current budget constraints, C130s are preferred over C27s because the C130 is more multi-role…same reason F16s are preferred over A10s. For some reason you seem to treat the tactical/operational levels of war as completely seperate from the strategic level. In layman’s terms that’s called wining the battles and losing the war.

A lot of what you say is factually correct but not the whole story. C130s OPCON’d to the Army was a DIRECTED test for obtaining the C27. Wouldn’t have happened otherwise. The whole raison d etre for the C27 was that the ARMY needed a fixed wing to do intratheatre supply something the Hurons , Sherpas and unfortunately CH47s are doing.

Your explanation doesn’t acknowledge/explain the C27s is more efficient with smaller loads (like the Hurons/Sherpas). You fail to recognize the JFC & JFACC are too high a level to coordinate most low level supply missions to free up Chinooks to do other tasks. The Army runs a decentralized operation as it must in the ground arena and especially during COIN. Finally you fail to address the systemic pressures on the Air Force to use C130s for operational and higher tasks robbing the Army even temporarily (though I believe much longer) of C130 support. All we have is an Air Force promise that it will support the mission. Considering how the C27 was “acquired” by the USAF, how the USAF promised to use it to support the Army and now its attempting to mothball the fleet incredulity is appropriate.

I’ve read about no instances that C130s are opconned to Army aviation BDE’s since the test do you? YET you buy hook line and sinker that the problem is solved because the USAF says it is. Well the USAF also said it needed the C27. In fact it shoehorned its way into getting it but to USAF apologists that’s water under the bridge. PUHLEASE!

Thanks for responding.

Thanks for making my point.

There is difference between OPCON and TACON. I know the JFC and JFACC don’t schedule missions, but they, along with the COCOM, determine the command relationships in a given AOR. I believe the C27s in the AOR now are TACON to the CAB, OPCON/ADCON to the AF…the same setup used in the Iraq test praised by the current CSA. Same thing could be done with C130s. Nobody said the C27 can’t do the job, and do it well. But, in today’s fiscal environment something has to go, and keeping duplicate capability doesn’t make sense (unless you are a Congressman from one of the states with a C27 unit). In these discussions, you can’t forget about the $400B axe that fell on the DoD budget. IMHO, the real answer is better TTPs.

You’re still failing to get it. By the time th JFC/JFACC become aware of a logistical need it’s too late. The Army will have committed CH47s to execute the mission and exposed troops to IED attacks because their routine patrols were less priority than getting fuel somewhere among other 2nd and 3rd order effects (increased cost, absolute critical supply needs executed and others not filled, operations adjusted because logistics not in place etc.) You aren’t getting it.

C27s are working for aviation brigades. C130s are not. You hope the Air Force will continue that relationship with C130s. Hope is not a method.

What better TTPs do you suggest be enacted to keep the Air Force from interfering in future Army attempts to replace the Sherpas and Hurons?

Look guy…you obviously have no idea how the intratheater airlift system works, and based on your comments about the JFC/JFACC/COCOM, I don’t think you understand command relationships either. Being obstinate and refusing to get to the root of the problem is also not a “method”. And the worst part is I may have killed a brain cell trying to explain the issue, but I guess that is my own fault. I’m done…

No I understand. You’re being obstinate and refusing to understand the effects at the root of the problem. The C27 was supposed to be a replacement for the Sherpa/Huron. What happened was it got sucked up into interservice politics and given to the USAF which NO MATTER WHAT is applying Air Force logistic methodology to an intratheatre Army specific supply problem.

You’re consistent attempts to return to BIG Air Force and THEATRE level supply demands/air allocation doesn’t fix the problem. It’s like expecting the federal gov’t to fix the local school districts truancy problem.

You are avoiding the point. The Army is a negligent, incompetent planner of acquisitions. The execution is nearly as bad. They waste billions that the troops could really use.

It’s an a Air Force platform, being flown by Air Force crews. Read the article.

C-130s don’t even have attachment points for JATO bottles anymore. Haven’t for decades.

From a chinook guy who was over there…the C-27 was carrying less than we were, and taking longer to fly from point A to B based off of routing requirements. Saved $30 million? Couldn’t be further from the truth. We still flew the same amount. The money was still spent…regardless of whether or not the Spartans were in theater.

That being said, I will say it did allow us to support some of the smaller bases more effectively. But to suggest the Army saved a bunch of money…lets just same I’m chuckling. Those crews and aircraft never sit around over there.

The USCG Commandant TOLD ME that he would like the C-27Js to supplement the a/c he has and to let some older C-130s go away. He also said it was up to the USAF future plans to determine IF the birds would be transferred.

As someone who used to work in Army Acquisition corps (used to), I can assure you that is not the case. I saw more then one program changed on a General’s whim despite the millions of dollars already spent to meet the original requirements. I say used to because I couldn’t stand the waste. Even worse than Navy acquisition.

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