Shyu: Army acquisition’s pivot to the Pacific

Shyu: Army acquisition’s pivot to the Pacific

Army leadership has a struggle ahead in explaining how America’s land service fits into the new defense strategy and the Pacific pivot that it outlines. The Army’s acquisitions chief said Monday the pivot will shape the service’s acquisition strategy going forward.

Heidi Shyu explained in an interview with Military​.com that the Army must focus more on technological battlefields where the Army will not enjoy uncontested aerial environments. The Army will face enemies with missile fleets, cyber attack capabilities and the ability to shoot down U.S. drones.

Shyu will join the rest of the Army’s generals at the Association of the U.S. Army’s conference in Washington D.C. this week to lobby for the rapidly shrinking pool of defense dollars focused on building a military to exert influence in the Pacific.


“The pivot tells me the next step the Army needs to go is figuring out how to address an environment that is more contested. That means we have to focus on cyber warfare, we have to focus on working in an electronic warfare environment,” Shyu said. “We have to focus on air and missile defense.”

She knows the Army will not so easily collect intelligence, surveillance and reconnaissance (ISR) data as it did in Iraq and Afghanistan in future wars. Enemies will not allow drones and turbo props to loiter over potential targets.

“We have to focus on our ISR, and not just in clean environments, ISR in a contested environment,” she said.

Missile defense is a topic that has not received the same amount of attention this past decade as the Army has faced few missile threats in Afghanistan and Iraq. Shyu said that will change as the service shifts its focus to emerging threats in the Pacific. North Korea and China both bolster significant missile fleets.

“There’s countries that have a lot of missiles, so our air/missile defense becomes more important,” Shyu said.

One challenge she highlighted was upgrading and replacing the service’s quickly aging vehicle fleet. Shyu explained that the service’s vehicle fleet faces power limitations when keeping up with the technology advances the service hopes to introduce into the Army. She has worked hard to ensure the survival of the Joint Light Tactical Vehicle program — the vehicle the Army hopes to use to replace its Humvee fleet.

“Some of our vehicles are totally maxed out. You can’t add more [communications systems]. You are maxxed out in terms of size, weight and power so we have to have upgrades. We are planning for upgrades now. Then it comes to a point where no matter how much you upgrade, you just need something new,” Shyu said.

Shyu’s 16 month tenure as the acting Army acquisition chief has ended after Sen. John Cornyn, R-Tex., removed the last hold on her nomination. She said she will continue her top down review of the Army’s acquisition strategy with a close eye on the expected cuts to planned defense spending.

The Army must take into account emerging threats as well as national and Defense Department priorities when choosing where it will spend its shrinking budget, Shyu said. She has started a 30-year review of Army acquisition examining each step of the process “from concept development to technology demonstration to EMD [engineering, manufacturing and development] to production to sustainment.”

She explained that the Army must cut out capability gaps faster by working with the Science and Technology (S&T) community and ensuring their work translates into equipment reaching soldiers in combat. At last year’s AUSA, Shyu unveiled the S&T prioritization of seven Big Army problems and 24 specific challenges.

Shyu wants the entire process to work together better. The engineers working on S&T research should have the sustainment strategy in mind and work with those officials, she explained. The Army has no other choice with the budget cuts it expects to sustain, she said.

“We should know it’s coming. If you look all those together you can balance your portfolio, because if I get a budget cut I can look within my portfolio and across the portfolios because across portfolios there are interdependencies,” Shyu said.

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When your boat is sinking it seems like you should bail it out first before figuring out a new direction to sail. I’m just saying…

Unknown to many, the Army has multiple divisions worth of troops in the Pacific. How about some questions on deployment capability? What are we doing to increase deployability besides the dozen or so ships designated for transporting Army units or is that enough? Are there more training opportunities with our allies besides the several yearly exercises we already conduct?

None of this is “new”. We’ve been doing it for decades under the radar. Maybe better publicizing of our current capabilities might diminish this perception that he Army has a problem with the Pacific? Then again, the reporting could use a bit of improvement also.

Mr. Hoffman your wrong one thing JLTV will replace only a portion of HUMVEEs in service it ment to replace unarmored Humvees for combat mission the army send them on,when a APC is the real tool needed.

Overall if the US returns to its natural setting keeping the peace in the Pacific GCV and ICC and AAS programs would be a major waste, less on fighting in desert of flat land is needed and the army needs to work on amphibious capabilities and Army Navy network upgrades. Think the army still has its mindset to fight Iraq all over again.

There are endless reaches of ocean in between the USA and the far shores of the Pacific. The distances are truly daunting.

The Army isn’t going to be doing a single thing in the Pacific unless the Navy and the Air Force get them there safely.

And, given that USN and USAF capital spending plans are both a total trainwreck, you figure that the Army better get used to running around the Yakima ranges for the next 20 years, because that’s as close as they are going to get to any fight that breaks out in the Pacific. The necessary sealift and airlift are simply not going to be there in sufficient numbers.

“The Army isn’t going to be doing a single thing in the Pacific unless the Navy and the Air Force get them there safely.” True!

“given that USN and USAF capital spending plans are both a total trainwreck,” Specifics would help…

To state tge obvious the Navy and the Air Force aren’t going to be change a situation on land without the Army (or the Marines to a lesser extent). AUSA is a prime opportunity to ask the difficult questions that AirSea Battle avoid and maybe even help focus the entire picture so services work together vs. stovepipe approaches.

Operations Allied Force, Deliberate Force, Desert Fox, and Odyssey Dawn are obvious evidence to counter the USN & USAF “aren’t going to be change a situation on land without the Army” claim.

Yea, we’re gonna scare China with 3 divisions and a new vehicle! Maybe the new camo will blind them to our weakness all over our sphere of influence. The Pacific Rim owns more of the US than we do!! China spends little outside China, they have huge armies, resources and are not financially unstable unlike the US!!

Op’s Allied & Deliberate Force, had the Army poised to destroy enemy forces like Desert Storm. It was a use it/lose it or surrender situation. (You’re welcome :) Desert Fox? Wow! That’s where Iraq’s WMDs went three years before OIF! A success? Hardly.

Odyssey Dawn e.g. Libya? Sure if you can count on a nation’s populace to overthrow the gov’t and something tells me that isn’t over because air power didn’t interdict Al Qeada or their franchises there. Were you counting on the Chinese people to revolt or any of the pacific nations to have enough strength to stop the PLA (largest Army in the world)?

No doubt air and sea power are significant but the hubris to think those forces can conduct a military action to a decisive point alone is utter hubris. I shouldn’t have used such a low standard such as “change a situation”. How about decisively defeat?

I don’t believe the Army has any conventional rapid deployment forces positioned in the Pacific like they did in the 1960’s. A few Airborne Infantry BCT’s would be nice but the closest is just the 4th ABCT from the 25th ID located in Alaska. Still there are not enough C-17’s to drop a full ABCT much less multiple ABCT’s should the need arise.

Too bad the Army signed that darn Key West Agreement and lost their aircraft. The Marines have their little air force complete with jet fighters the Army has to go begging to fly its paratroopers.

The Army managed to do a lot of fighting in the Pacific in WWII that affected the outcome of the war in that theater.

What if the army went to congress and basically said.….we no longer wish to abide by the Key-West agreement? That it threatens the ability to do their job and costs American lives?

What if the army went to congress and basically said.….we no longer wish to abide by the Key-West agreement? That it threatens the ability to do their job and costs American lives?

The 4 ops I mentioned all achieved valuable political objectives. The US came out stronger (military, economic, reputation) as a result of each of them. Contrast that to the last 3 protracted ground wars — Vietnam, OIF, and Afghanistan. The cost of these conflicts is staggering, with questionable strategic benefits. Real hubris would be to think that “decisive” victory on the ground is even possible in the 21st century, and here’s why. The enemy knows all they have to do is fade into the civilian population, fight a protracted guerrilla campaign, and then come out after the US land forces inevitably leave. We could manage that better if the Army strategically planned for this sort of conflict, but this is not what the Army does. It repeatedly tries to focus its resources on high tempo 3rd generation warfare enabled by cutting edge technology. This is their strategy to attempt to maintain the same R&D & Procurement budgets as the other services.

Due to its acquisition failures, the Army ends up falling short of this goal, as well as falling short of having the logistics enablers of said technology required for any type of war effort, as evidenced by the insane dependence upon contractors. There are many fantastic org’s & capabilities the Army brings to the fight: Delta, Green Berets, 75th, 160th, 82nd, 101st, 10th Mtn for example. But overall the Army does not need to be as heavy, eg, with pretend HBCT formations in the ARNG. The Army is too slow, too costly, and too heavy. Much of our heavy force should be moved into inviolate storage, much of the Army’s force structure could be moved into reserve status, with the savings being used to make the lighter force more effective, with growing roles in homeland security, peacekeeping, and humanitarian missions. Decisive victory in the long term should mean staying on top economically & militarily and strengthening ties with allies. Trying to organize, train, and equip the Army to defeat the Chinese Army mano a mano with our scarce resources is not the way to go.

Anyone see something wrong with this sentence from above???? “Shyu said that will change as the service shits its focus to emerging threats in the Pacific. North Korea and China both bolster significant missile fleets.”

Umm, strictly speaking, this is not an Army mission, but if one does not mind the pun, we “missed the boat” with FCS. So it would appear that our brave light infantrymen and cavalrymen will just have to build the capacity to swim longer distances with their horses and bayonets. :)

“We have to focus on air and missile defense.” And “There’s countries that have a lot of missiles, so our air/missile defense becomes more important,” Shyu said.

But wait, the Army has to worry about missiles and aircraft too?

But what would they target? Aircraft? Transports? Bases?

Hmm.

This sounds familiar.

The rubber meets the road in phases 3 (Seize the Initiative) and 4 (Dominate the Enemy) of the JP 5–0 operations cycle. I’m not convinced that the Air Sea Battle people have thought this through completely. This is not to prejudge where your operational center of gravity is — or should be.

Having a “high tempo 3d gen war” capability does not preclude one from desiring to have, or developing a high tempo 4th or 5th generation war capability. Too many people have just given up and thrown out the baby with the bath water. At least the Navy understands its tradition, and embraces that tradition — sometimes to a fault.

Note to Major Rod — this is one of the clearest enunciations of the dangerous light fighter extremist mentality that we have been wrangling about for some time now. Yes, it does exist, right before your very eyes.

Strictly on demographics, economic capacity and technological power — the US far outclasses China and would win a conventional war once fully mobilized. The question becomes — how many years does that take, and what is the risk of escalation ? These are unpleasant and largely unanswerable questions. But one thing I think we do know — the “Assassin’s Mace” happy path where China strikes first and the United States just gives up is, well, sadly wishful thinking. Think again.

Alpha – You blew it. A lot of apples and orange comparisons and double standards.

Why compare short duration air ops to protracted wars? Short military ground ops don’t count? How long did it take to get regime change in Grenada, Panama and Kuwait? Then you fail to realize that in two of the three protracted conflicts you mentioned “valuable political objectives” were also achieved by the ground component (e.g. Taliban fell, AQ ran and regime change in Iraq). Obviously not all of them, but “valuable none-the-less. BTW, the Air Force participated in all those “protracted conflicts” to the best of its ability with no decisive result (less so than the ground element). Then you think the other services don’t have procurement issues?

Planning for guerrilla warfare doesn’t equate to success. I also disagree that this is the look of all future war. OIF & OEF had conventional ground ops and FYI, it’s much easier to transition to counterinsuirgency with a fore trained in high optempo ops than the other way around hence the focus on it. BTE if you really believe assymetric warfare is the way of the future why again are we buying/maintaining so many F22’s and F35’s? Sounds like another double standard you apply to one service but not your own. Why don’t we put all those high speed aircraft in storage and the ANG? Obviously because the enemy gets a vote and we need to be competent with our equipment, not simply have it.

Air Power remains an important part of the nation’s military power and as a former Infantryman I wouldn’t want to have to operate without it (though I could at great cost). Since its inception it has struggled to realize Douhet’s vision as THE decisive force. It’s not there yet (if ever). It always comes down to the man with a rifle to defeat the enemy decisively when it involves a piece of ground of which 99% of mankind tends to occupy.

Majrod…that’s one of the big differences in the Pacific AOR…the rifleman is decisive “when in involves a piece of ground”. That is 100% the name of the game in a fight on the Korean pennisula, and nobody can really do that mission except the US Army (with a little help). But, if you are talking about detering and coercing a near-peer rival in the Pacific, one that is more concerned with exerting influence and controlling the commons than they are about occupying land, then the Navy and Air Force will bear the brunt of that fight. It all just depends.……

I agree that planning for guerilla warfare is not the way to go…those sitauations, I believe, can be adequately addressed as a lesser case. We have to be able to reach out with a joint force, propertly balanced for the scenario, and touch the enemy in an A2AD environment…if not, we risk losing our seat at the table.

VP — Not to worry. Anybody who’s been in the Army more than a week knows the Infantryman can’t do everything alone. I agree though, it’s people outside the Army that think they know how it should work without asking for input (and then not listening) who are dangerous.

It’s maddening to a former light fighter like me hearing that spec ops and drones are the panacea. They don’t know how small, relatively delicate (casualty resilient) and vulnerable when they have to provide their own security special ops is. They are very capable but just one tool in the tool box.

Lets say they did…what do they do when Congress agrees? How many strat lift units do you think the Army can afford to operate, and how long would it take’em to get that whole operation up and running? Seriously.

Granted maintaining assets to deploy an Army isn’t an Army mission (sigh) but it gets addressed when the Army brings it up.

Don’t agree that FCS was “the boat”. It’s unrealistic aspiarations ensured it would never “float”.

You misunderstand my position. I’m not fooling myself and saying the Air Force and Navy aren’t critical to anything that happens in the Pacific but just like in WWII the Army and Marines to a lesser degreee were critical to enforcing the nation’s will.

All the maritime LOCs are either controlled or influenced by land masses and islands.

You also fail to look 5,10 or 20 years in the future which today’s decisions impact. Korea is obvious today. So is Taiwan but there are other nations we need to be concerned about Vietnam, Thailand and japan come to mind. Then there are all the scenarios we aren’t predicting e.g. the islamic radicalization of the most populous Islamic nation on the planet, Indonesia.

AirSea Battle isn’t a comprehensive answer. The Army is not only absent in mention, it’s absent in presence in the office! It’s not a serious solution. It’s an publicity campaign to protect or enlarge two service’s budget.

Thank you for the clearest enunciation of the dangerous zealous commitment to the doctrine of modeling warfare as a linear process. No wonder DoD wastes billions attempting to develop systems to “dominate”, misses countless opportunities to improve our economic, military, and political status as a nation, and cannot decisively win a ground engagement within a schedule and a budget.

Majr0d — I’ll celebrate with you our successes in Grenada, Panama, and Desert Storm. As far as Vietnam, OIF, and Afghanistan, valuable political objectives at unknown costs are not the decisive outcomes the taxpayers deserve. We are going to paying how many billions for how many decades to our casualties? You don’t know, do you? The Army repeatedly wants to be optimally designed for high tempo ops (what the Army wants to justify a perpetually growing budget), and assume counterinsurgency & nation building (what we need the Army to do) will somehow happen on its own or are the responsibility of someone else. Your response shows you’re a pretty conventional Army thinker with a propensity to defend the institution.

Majr0d — I made no claims that the other services don’t have procurement issues and I am a critic of both the F-22 & F-35 status quo. F-35 is an utter disaster — it is not even ready for consideration to move from front to back burner. But, the F-22 in particular has significant value as a strategic deterrent for decades to come. I certainly would be willing to consider an option of moving some F-22s to reserve status, as a budget saving measure, to free up resources for more urgent needs or capitalize on other opportunities. And I certainly did not suggest moving “all” heavy forces to reserve status.

True, the sea lanes are influenced by land masses and islands, but I contend that China (that’s obviously the near-peer we’re talking about) historically has not done much invading of other countries, which they’d need to do control the sea lanes from land. Also, the cyber and space commons are not influenced much by land masses or islands. True, in the future China may pose a land threat to Vietnam and Thailand, and I’m not saying we don’t need Army/Marine forces to deter and respond if necessary. I’m certainly NOT saying the Army has no place in the Pacific, but other than in Korea, a very large portion of the military strength the US flexs in the region for the foreseeable future (out to at least 2030) will be Naval and Air forces. And yes, I agree.…ASB is not a comprehensive answer to this strategic issue.

The whole concept that the Army/Marine forces will deter & respond to China, and therefore need to designed & resourced accordingly, should not be taken seriously, unless we had a much stronger economy, no debt, and trillions to spend on each and every remotely conceivable scenario. Come on guys, a wise Army general once said: “Any future defense secretary who advises the president to again send a big American land army into Asia or into the Middle East or Africa should ‘have his head examined” The Army & Marines have problems aplenty that need to be solved now. Embarking on a new big hairy audacious goal would not be wise. Training Vietnam and Thailand to defend themselves from a land attack would be much more affordable than trying to design the Army/Marines to do that fighting for them.

We’ve paid billions to casualties of war since before the VA was founded. It’s only mentioned now as the left tries to measure our wars as they’ve never been measured before. Reminds me of the new metric “created and SAVED jobs” (like that could be measured). What’s your point? Air Power is cheaper? Maybe, planes are INCREDIBLY expensive and incredibly limited when it comes to creating decisive outcomes on a national level (again, see the historic record)

Your propensity to ding the Army for perping for high OPTEMPO conflict while ignoring the Air Force does the SAME EXACT THING demonstrates your bias better than I ever could. Same goes for understanding the deterrent value of the F22 but not the Army’s mechanized capability. You’ve shown yourself to be ignorant of military power outside of the air component and with a propensity to defend the air power uber alles canard.

BTW, moving “some” F22s to the guard vs “much” of the mechanized force only further proves my point.

Do you not realize that the conduct of war is always a gamble? The enemy always gets a vote.

And again with the double standard? When has any air campaign decisively won “within a schedule and a budget”.

I agree that we should have SOF and conventtional forces in those countries doing SFA. The National Guard State Partnership Program is pretty darn weak in PACOM…it could be beefed up. We need the Navy in Viet ports, and the Air Force conducting excericses in Thailand (India??) as well. But in the end, China ain’t stupid, and neither are the Viets or the Thais. I think we have to have a land component that can react rapidly and reassure our friends and allies that we will be there if the hypothetical ever occurs. I’m not talking about a big land army or invading China, but a properly scoped land component that puts some US skin in the game. I think we have to maintain a minimal capabilty, or we lose credibility.

Think beyond war. I’m much more interested than just winning “wars”. War is a continuation of politics by other means. Winning of war through indirect means and avoidance of direct conflict is highly advisable. More important than war is national survival, prosperity, and freedom to live the way you want. I’ll agree with you that as with any military endeavor, the cost/schedule of an air campaign is uncertain and risky. But the overwhelming evidence is that protracted ground warfare is far more costly and painful, and all the enemy has to do to protract the ground conflict is to conceal themselves within the civilian population, who hates having US ground forces on their homeland. Let’s try to get past the enemy always gets a vote cliche. The enemy has far more options at its disposal, including waiting out the US Army that requires $100B+ annually to maintain an inadequately sized force in a foreign country.

In today’s 24/7 internet enabled news world there’s lots of cans of worms being opened up. That’s progress. Just because in the past we may have been ignorant of the questionable benefits vs real, staggering costs of protracted wars does not excuse us to continue living in ignorance. Information warfare is just another mission the armed forces needs to win in. The tools & capabilities are there, waiting to be acquired. But the scarce dollars are going to other priorities, like the Army’s crusade to develop a “dominant” high intensity operations force, embarrassing strategic & logistics vulnerabilities be damned.

Also you are talking about somewhat measurable billions of dollars for casualties of past wars with the immeasurable future billion dollar liabilities for the care of Soldiers with lost limbs and chronic psychological, brain trauma, and other disabling conditions. That’s billions of dollars that could be invested in all kinds of future defense programs to address the multitude of problems we face and threats to our homeland security.

That general was Dwight D. Eisenhower, whose massive retaliation policy brought the United States to the brink of nuclear war over two small islands, Quemoy and Matsu, located in the South China Sea. That fabled “land war in Asia” crippled US policy in Vietnam, preventing us from doing what it actually took to win that conflict. There are real questions as to how far and how much land power China is capable of projecting beyond its borders — what we can say is that it is definitely moving towards a “close-in” projection capability out to the first island chain in the Western Pacific. Southeast Asia is in many respects the least of our worries. China is deeply entangled with its alliance with Pakistan, which makes it a long-term adversary to India. Even if you let events take their course in South-Central Asia, it is horrid strategy to start by stating who you will never want, to, have to, need to do. I’m all for policies that afford this nation strategic depth and flexibility. The pathetic lack of even the hint of a national security debate last night underscores the need for professionals to force reality on the policymaking community and get them to face up to unpleasant and inconvenient facts.

Frankly, the Army has no choice in the matter. We are constrained by long-standing policies that make us accept risk as an everyday way of doing business. We have done so since the end of the Second World War. All in all, we’ve been pretty lucky. But there is a day coming, mark my words, when you won’t be able to limit the Army’s commitment to fight and win. You won’t need just five divisions, ten divisions, sixteen divisions — you’ll have to mobilize the entire National Guard and it still won’t be enough. You won’t be able to replace the equipment quickly enough, or develop new equipment fast enough to keep pace with the need. All the things we’re not supposed to need because the politicians say so — we’ll need them. You don’t want to be the guy responsible for that situation.

it is just the words they use. If you study JP5-0, you can find all the firebreaks and points where escalation dominance kicks in, just like we used to talk about during the Cold War –and probably should talk about more today. You will also find the phases where we won the war and lost the reason for which the war was fought, a problem for any democracy that looks for the barn door when the shooting dies down. Frankly, I’ve never quite “got” the people who talked about non-linear thinking, since an historical cycle can be transposed into a linear process model, just like an ellipsoid model of the earth can be projected on a flat surface (with some distortion). Can we fight, like the Romans, on a steady state basis, where the doors of Janus are never closed ? Yes, up to a certain level, we can — certainly at the level of the past 10–20 years. Would we want to ? Of course not. But when we ask the politicians for nothing more than a floor, we get all kinds of excuses and mumbo-jumbo. They really like the nonsense, because superstition absolves them from hard choices.

Well, the answer to this is obvious. Don’t withdraw, and starve the enemy out. As an Army, we actually know how to do this. Personally, as a devotee of Liddell Hart, John Boyd, and Heinz Guderian, I don’t aspire to brute force methods like these, but at bottom, victory only goes to the side that is committed to win. Andy Bacevich and I parted company a long time ago, but I think one thing we may still agree upon is the notion that war is a serious and deadly endeavor, not to be glorified or entered into for triffles. There is no silver bullet. And most people don’t even know where the silver bullet meme comes from.

The US Army started out as a coastal defense force with a very minimal ability to conduct even small land operations in our own continent. We built dozens of forts up and down the Atlantic coast, many of which were never used, some of which were only used in our civil war. Talk about “wasted assets” !! At the time, the Commandant of West Point doubled as the Chief of Engineers. Whether it comes to homeland security or ballistic missile defense, the FAIL of America First is strong in our body politic. And yet, for rather scurrilous reasons, we keep trying this approach, again and again and again, no matter how times we get burned. Last night, President Obama used the phrase “nation building at home” no less than six times — with a very strong suggestion that taking money out of defense to do this worthy task was wise and strong policy. So much for smart power, or even soft power. So much for paying prices and bearing burdens. Its all about me, right now, to the devil with the future. So much for “adaptive” organizations, too. As long as America keeps up this kind of nonsense, we will always be held hostage to the next crisis that come our way, unprepared and playing catchup.

Let me get this straight: the pivot results in increased Cyber and missile threats to the Army, para 4. So Secretary Shyu’s ‘challenge’ is to upgrade the Army’s fighting vehicle fleet, para 9! This makes no sense. What am I missing?

your listening to the dying throws of a hugh critter, THE US ARMY. they have pissed the money away instead of looking to the future they are looking at ways to keep what they have and that needs to change. installations in europe take large amounts of money to operate with no return on the investment. shut down europe and move the men and equipment to the USA. rapid deployment is a oximoron. army’s do not “code 3 to the scene” they move responsibly, rationable, sure footed and prepared. troops located in the USA can be moved anywhere just as fast as army units normally deploy and they can do it with more equipment and a more cohesive group from the USA soil without costly interference from some foreign politics and opinions.

GH – Not understanding what China’s lack of recent historical conquest has pertinence. Prior to WWII, Japan had not invaded a lot of countries. I doubt you are proposing that should China desire to project power they are going to ignore controlling land masses especially if it isn’t a peer in naval and air power.

I don’t think our positions are that far apart except that Air Sea battle is foolish in ignoring land power and the ability to dominate decisively on land. It would be like creating a naval strategy but ignoring submarine warfare.

Alpha – “Think beyond war”? Sure. Agree on Claus’ quote. Agree avoiding direct conflict and achieving goals is preferable to a fight. (Do you not think competent, capable and versatile forces achieve that?) Agree ground warfare is always more costly. A lot of people die.

“But the overwhelming evidence is that protracted ground warfare is far more costly and painful, and all the enemy has to do to protract the ground conflict is to conceal themselves within the civilian population, who hates having US ground forces on their homeland.” Uh, no (e.g. Desert Storm) and the last ten years doesn’t dictate the encyclopedia of war. You are making a gross miscalculation that all future wars will devolve to a low intensity conflict.

Finally, you may not like “the enemy get’s a vote” cliché or want to “get past it”. It doesn’t make it less true or unavoidable…

Alph – There’s plenty of waste across all the services. You considering the Army’s desire to prepare for high intensity ground ops a waste flies in the face of history unless you are preparing to “fight the next war like we fought the last one”. That’s the ultimate shortsightedness.

I’ve told you once and I’ll tell you again in the hope that it takes. A ground force trained to conduct high optempo ops can transition to low intensity than vice versa.

“somewhat measurable billions of dollars for casualties”? OK what did WWII cost us including casualty cost care? What’s your point? Are you saying we shouldn’t fight wars? No kidding? We shouldn’t fight long wars? Again, no kidding! Problem is you don’t know until you start if it’s going to be a long war. Do you think investing less in an army is going to make ground combat less likely? You might be right. Our enemy will for sure win quicker. The same logic can be applied to naval and air power. Being frugal sourcing a force that LOSES the next fight isn’t what we want!

There are many political & economic constraints to why we can’t build & sustain 16+ heavy divisions. In this constrained reality there are much wiser ways to configure the armed forces than your vision. No one “guy”, except possibly the President, is going to be responsible for whatever happens in the future. Acceptance of residual risk is in fact inevitable and wise practice.

are you sure it was Eisenhower and not Macarthur??

What is shortsighted would be to ignore the glaring, embarassing problems in our force structure & readiness now, and embark on a major new “doctrinal concepts” guaranteed to cost gargantun sums of money and create a host of new problems. The reasonwhy military leadership resorts to cliches like don’t “fight the next war like we fought the last one” is because they are too proud and embarassed to admit to and fix past mistakes, and probably incapable of as well. They’d rather create the new big hairy audacious goals like “pivot to the Pacific” and ” air sea battle” than actually face reality. Then they’ll stretch the new concepts to justify whatever desired programs are in the pipeline, no matter how bad those programs are screwed up. WW2 was different in that we had to commit large #‘s of ground forces to protracted war because our homeland had been attacked by an enemy nation and the freedom of the entire world was at peril.

Of course there are situations where you have to fight on the ground regardless of cost. This was not the case with either Iraq nor 10+ years of Afghanistan. Another difference is the exponential cost increase of health care for things like brain trauma treatment and exotic prosthetics, and the shocking debt problem & future trillions of dollars of unfunded liabilities problems we face. If we didn’t have the debt problem, I’d be all for setting DoD build & sustain a force structure without resource constraints. But we do, so all the forces need to figure out how to be more economical, and stop wasting so much $. I’ve put some ideas on the table, including cuts to F-22 & F-35. You’ve offered nothing, but the defense of the status quo. Your self assured & self serving certainty of what would happen in the future with a reformed Army ignores so many variables (all the services plus the allies, eg) it is a joke.

Desert Storm was not a protracted ground war. Saddam was an idiot and thought he coud take us on. America’s enemies learned from Desert Storm not to take America on in the open. Anyway, face it, the US Army is not going to get the budget to build a mechanized armored force designed for a conventional conflict with China. In the meantime, there are MANY missions for the Army that would be of great service to the nation if the Army would really put their heart into preparing for them. History tells us the Army will want to go back to prepping for large scale high tech conventional ground war (the most expensive strategy possible) and remain unprepared for missions that the American people ask of it.

well, maybe the army should use all of those thousands of helicopters to ferry their stuff over the Pacific… They could water taxi all of their stuff.… guys leaning out paddling with the butts of their M4 weapons… oh wait… the M4 is a pretty useless paddle.… darn it… The Navy has Aircraft because they are useful first to the Fleet, and more importantly, to the NCA.… 90 Aircraft just over the horizon are a pretty good deterrent even to regimes or wannabe regimes staffed by fanatics.… The USMC has aircraft because they fly CAS and support for their ground units… Nobody else flys CAS like the USMC air flies CAS… they practice it every mission when you can get them out of the oclub bar.….… Its same service on the deck and in the air talking the same language… it works.… and they make sure it works… God Bless our Sailors and Marines…

“glaring, embarassing problems in our force structure & readiness now” Specifics? With our withdrawal from Iraq the Army is returning at rebuilding its competencies in high optempo combat. Again, are you saying the days of high optempo war are over?

You might not like the cliché, “fight the next war like we fought the last one”. That doesn’t mean it’s any less true. Your thoughts are based on the last ten years. The next ten years will likely not be the same both because of what we have learned and the enemies may be different.

“Desert Storm was not a protracted ground war.” EXACTLY!

“Saddam was an idiot and thought he coud take us on.” TRUE! He did it again in ’03 and lost. What we didn’t do was resource enough forces to secure Iraq before an insurgency took hold and stand up a gov’t not under internal attack to stabilize. It took us four years on our own with no organized internal threat to adopt our current form of gov’t.

“the US Army is not going to get the budget to build a mechanized armored force designed for a conventional conflict with China.” We aren’t asking for one.

“there are MANY missions for the Army that would be of great service to the nation if the Army would really put their heart into preparing for them.” Specifics?

“Army will want to go back to prepping for large scale high tech conventional ground war (the most expensive strategy possible) and remain unprepared for missions that the American people ask of it.” Do you believe conventional ops are no longer a threat? What missions will America ask for? Why are you not getting a force trained for high Optemp can do low optempo better than the other way around. Virtually every other nation on the planet gets it.

Really, now. So how is it that the United States, with 50 million more people with an economy to match that added population cannot do what it was doing in peacetime in 1988 — to say nothing of what it did in 1917 and 1942 ? In the world of risk management, just accepting the risk is generally the worst of all possible options — it is what you do when you have already made a mistake and cannot correct it.

It is simply wild rhetoric to refer to WWII as a “protracted war”. The smartest Army thought leaders have gotten serious about force generation and mobilization. Why ? Well, we are in fact at a tipping point, where you simply can’t draw down the active force structure any further without real consequences. Accept the risk ? A silly proposition. Avoid the risk ? Well, you can get away with that for awhile, but as Pearl Harbor and 9/11 demonstrate, one can’t get away with sticking one’s head in the sand forever. Mitigate the risk ? Show me the plan, and I’ll tell you where the holes are. Ultimately, you must decide what it is the Army is supposed to do, and give it the resources it needs. Pretty basic.

I suppose there will always be Armchair Generals who know better and who would have done it better. Kid stuff.

I presume those missions are all those world policing missions that our political leaders have sworn we will not indulge in again. Really, to criticize Iraq and Afghanistan, and in the same breath, demand that the Army focus mainly on missions where victory is not only fleeting, but success is intractable — that is committing the Army to a life of frustration and failure. Perhaps high tech can in fact add capability to make such missions less onerous. It does not solve the conceptual challenge posed by low intensity conflict to democratic societies. Read “Alternative to Armaggeddon” and get a clue.

Hindsight is always 20/20, isn’t it ? We really did not know that Desert Storm would be a walkover. Yes, there were some indications, but nothing anyone would have staked their reputation on before the fact. Iraq had a large army. They had months to prepare their defenses. They did have a good bit of combat experience. Who knew ? Nobody.

Thanks for playing. But that is not how it works. Forward basing gives us faster response time and improved options. Most places in which we are likely to find ourselves fighting on the ground are hard to reach and difficult to sustain ourselves in. Lightening the force only makes us more vulnerable unless we develop a technological offset in protection, mobility and/or lethality. No matter how hard we wish, we can’t defy the laws of physics or the facts of geography. And all those pesky partners — we need to stay on good terms with, because we need their help and will continue to do so.

Darn it! There you go cherrypicking pertinent facts that blow the “theory” out of the water.

Alpha — I challenge you to document where the Army is requesting 16+ heavy divisions?

Now you are just making stuff up in a desparate attempt to cobble together an argument built on sifting sand.

You don’t want God to bless our Soldiers and Airmen?

You’re creating a strawman. There are many more missions than just strategic airlift and strategic airlift is something EVERY service uses. Doesn’t make sense to build that capability in every branch when the Air Force has done a bang up job for ALL the services. No one complains they can’t get a big airframe to move a bunch of stuff.

What about intratheatre lift? Congress gave the Army the C27. DoD (Gates) took it and gave it to the Air Force who recently cancelled it. That was an end run around Congress who allowed it because the Air Force promised to operate the system and the Army believed them. (That won’t happen again)

The Army could use its own fixed wing assets to execute very specific “niche” missions that specifically support Army missions like Intratheatre lift and CAS. The Air Force maintains a small number of armored vehicles to provide airbase security. The Army doesn’t interfere. That’s a common sense “one team” approach.

Context helps… “ the Army must focus more on technological battlefields where the Army will not enjoy uncontested aerial environments. The Army will face enemies with missile fleets, cyber attack capabilities and the ability to shoot down U.S. drones.” We have not faced an enemy that can shoot our drones down, has an air force or is armed with intratheatre missiles.

She also said “The pivot tells me the next step the Army needs to go is figuring out how to address an environment that is more contested.” That implies we have to get away from operating from large bases like both the Army and Marines have had the luxury of having in Iraq and Afghanistan. The Army is changing the scenarios at the training centers to a mixture of high and low tempo threats and operating from austere bases (e.g. no showers, fixed dining facilities, dorm rooms etc).

What “familiar” situation were you referring to?

read vp above

“We aren’t asking for one”. See VP’s comments for what the force structure reqts for the Army ought to be. The “pivot to the Pacific” implies a transfer in strategy requiring an obvious commitment of investment in new systems — no cost estimate provided and no commitment to fiscal prudence in the leadership statements either. “Do you believe conventional ops are no longer a threat?” Ans — no. What missions will America ask for? the full spectrum of ops you can look up in strategy & doctrinal documentation. “Why are you not getting a force trained for high optempo can do low optempo”? History.

You don’t need to be in the Army for a week to know that the Infantryman can’t do everything alone, or believe that “special ops & drones are a panacea”. The only people that would suggest as such are the imaginary ones in your head that you believe hold to such foolish positions that you can destroy so easily, so you can enjoy the comfort of your intellectual superiority. One of Petraeus’ most admirable qualities I find is his intellectual curiousity, as evidenced by his Princeton PhD where he learned a lot from a much different peer group than your typical officer.

VP — Eisenhower or Macarthur?

In a word — $. Your last statement on risk management reflects a complete misunderstanding of risk. Acceptance of risk is inevitable at some point, the specific term is residual risk, and it is in fact VERY WISE practice. Your analysis of the required Army force structure is dangerously myopoic. You are missing critical variables of the other Services as well as Allies, as well as other instruments of power besides the military one. If the requirement was 16 divisions, or 160-380K soldiers, we could help our allies develop such a force far more cheaply than developing the organic US equivalent, if such a force doesn’t already even exist in the first place.

atleast some “Armchair Generals” understand the difference between myopic and more comprehensive analysis, as well as risk management. it’s pretty telling that someone has run out of intellectual ammunition when they resort to namecalling & belittling an adversaries’ career path choice. thank God the ultimata decision making on resourcing the Armed Forces likes with the Congress, President, and taxpayers that vote them there.

You’re both right. Mac’s quote. Ike’s massive retaliation nuclear doctrine.

I don’t think I’m superior to anyone. Just citing some historical facts and time immemorial truths of warfare.

I sense a tone of superiority creeping into your posts. Sounds earilk like a similar poster who called himself “Peritus” (expert in Latin). He was wrong also and tended to talk when he should be listening.

Petraeus never said conventional ops were dead.

You stated it first and he responded with 1988 (and even then we didn’t have 16 heavy divisions).

Again, who’s asking for 16+ heavy divisions since YOU cited that number first?

Still waiting for some comprehensive analysis that justifies not focusing the Army on training on high optempo ops because they won’t happen in the future…

Many have said conventional war is dead after the introduction of a new weapon. Machine gun, airplane and nuclear weapon enthusiasts have all said hign intensity conflict is dead to only be proved wrong again, again and again…

There was a school of thought before Vietnam that felt we needed to develop our ability to conduct low intensity warfare because of nukes and the use of proxy wars by cold war antagonists. Special Forces & SEALs can trace their birth back to that moment. Good move. They were not silly enough to think high intensity warfare was gone.

After Nam the zealots of the group preached that large scale conventional warfare was dead. They were proved wrong in ’73 and scattered to dark deep corners at the obvious threat in ’80’s Germany. I thought they were extinct after Desert Storm and growing mold when we conducted conventional ops early in OEF and OIF to defeat the enemy. Like vampires, they seem to come back after being nourished by the blood of a decade of unconventional ops but they continue to ignore the lessons of history.

Conventional ops WILL be waged in the future. Conducting nonconventional ops in homeland America against the enemy is as much an answer as having an Army incapable of waging conventional warfare.

VP isn’t asking for one. He didn’t state a need for 16 heavy divisions. YOU did.

“pivot to the Pacific” implies a transfer in strategy requiring an obvious commitment of investment in new systems” No, it also includes a movement of forces.

Google “full spectrum ops”. It includes high intensity warfare.

High intensity trained forces are capable of low intensity ops. E.G. Indian wars, Phillipine Insurrection, Mexico Punative expedition, Dominican Republic, Nam, OIF & OEF. (Don’t confuse national will wanning with military success) International examples…

The opposite is obviously untrue. China vs. Japan, Tibet vs. China, Chechnya vs. Russia

That’s history…

not just world policing. training allies, disaster response, homeland border security, fighting forest fires, providing extra security where needed. The Army has great potential to be an even more valuable resource to train Americans, instill patriotic values, and make an impact in many different ways, including maintaining high optempo conventional operations.

Movement of forces involves a tremendous upfront investment cost as well. Housing & environmental remediation come to mind. How much is that going to cost? I don’t expect YOU (since you’re fond of shouting) or the Army to provide an answer to that any time soon. Your low intensity vs high intensity examples neither appy. Neither China, Tibet, nor Chechnya have all the military resources we have. The example of Soldiers in HBCTs& SBCTs abandoning their heavy gear and becoming door kickers is much more relevant. It does wonders for their morale, which drives retention, which drives readiness. Heard that story yet?? Google it.

The post by “Carl”, just before “John” was obviously referring to strat lift and and that was the context of my reply. The problem with the intratheatr niche missions is that when the budget crunch hit, those requirements didn’t make the cut, in either the Army or the AF. The C130 can get into about 98% of the airfields the C27 can get into. But again, that’s not what those two were talking about…

On yeah…isolationism…that works (not).

I never said conventional war nor high intensity conflict is or will be dead. “Conventional ops WILL be waged in the future.” Get some help for your God complex. You don’t know the future. “Like vampires, they seem to come back after being nourished by the blood” Nice drama. When you are ready to get back to rational discusion let me know. The ironic thing is that the shed “blood” was due to the Army’s lack of preparedness for counterinsurgency than it was due to these “vampires” trying to reach out to the Army to throttle back on the “dominant high intensity” paradigm and take a more balanced approach to how the Army can better serve the Nation.

Maj…the Japanese were rattling sabers all over the place for several decades before WWII. They fought China over Korea in the late 1800s, then they pulled the ole sneak attack (sounds familiar) on the Russians at Port Arthur in the early 1900s. Throughout the 1920s the Japanese Army was basically a state sponsor of terrorism in China. In the early 30s they invaded Manchuria and then China proper in the late 30s, and had another border tussle with the USSR in there somewhere. Of course, the Chinese take the long view, and they saw what happened to Japan in the end. Their history doesn’t indicate they will try to annex other countries…of course, if they felt they had an overwhelming chance of success, that might change thier calculus.

YOU! he said “You won’t need just five divisions, ten divisions, sixteen divisions” YOU! Are we to assume that light ARNG divisions & BCTs w/o Bradleys & Abrams are expected to perform these “dominant high intensity full spectrum operations”! YOU!! i’m writing YOU a prescription for a chill pill.

Just for clarification, I wasn’t asking if that was Eisenhower’s doctrine, I was asking if that Eisenhower said that original quote, as VP’s post pretty much implies. One thing I will give him credit for is taking us on another interesting tangent.

neither did anyone here besides you.

But Carl wasn’t saying strat air. I didn’t take it that way.

“The problem with the intratheatr niche missions is that when the budget crunch hit, those requirements didn’t make the cut, in either the Army or the AF.” Uh no, They didn’t make the cut among the Air Force priorities. The Army didn’t get a vote on the C27J.

The Air Force is concerned with economy of scale and not responsiveness. The C130 is too large and because it is not an Army asset and the Air Force LOATHES assigning assets to a ground commander, is not as responsive to high priority intratheatre lift requirements. The Army has used Chinooks which cost almost five times as much, detract from other missions or contracted out. We’ve had these discussions before. Spare me having to post the numerous DoDBuzz articles that prove my point, again.

Did you notice the Army is trying again to secure a common airframe? http://​www​.dodbuzz​.com/​2​0​1​2​/​1​0​/​0​2​/​a​r​m​y​-​s​e​e​k​s​-​c​omm

I do not support the Army acquiring an air superiority or strategic logistic capability totally independent of Air Force assets. I do support the same level of fixed wing freedom our sister services have. Again, the Army doesn’t have a problem with the Air Force establishing a ground element with enough capability to protect an airfield. It’s not a threat. A handful of airplanes with Army colors doesn’t threaten the Air Force.

Gave up the 16+ heavy Div talking point huh? (About time…)

What movement of forces are you talking about? The units exist and are resourced.

I just cited where non high optempo forces were CRUSHED by armies focused on high optempo and your answer is the vanquished didn’t have the resources? Uh, there’s a lesson there! Thanks for making my point.

Then you take the versatility of SBCT/HBCT units shedding their heavy capabilities to conduct low intensity ops as proof we don’t need high intensity forces? Uh, you just made my point again!

BTW, you continue to use the last ten years to define all future warfare. Perfect example of proving the cliche “preparing to fight the next war like we fought the last one”. Brilliant!

Oh, i’ve served in both light and heavy infantry units. How you get to the fight doesn’t impact retention. What are you basing your “observation” on?

You’re the fella making the case to not resource high intensity forces.

Yeah, sure you were…

You missed the sentence preceding that, “But there is a day coming, mark my words, when you won’t be able to limit the Army’s commitment to fight and win.”

Context is important. He’s not proposing 16+ heavy divisions today. He is talking about a day we’ll need a massive Army and I doubt our allies are going to create a bigger Army than we have just based on population.

You’re dreaming that we will get our allies to resource significant forces and dreaming it will be in time. The Poles, French, Belgians, Dutch etc. didn’t realize they needed a bigger Army until a month later when they surrendered.

“Their history doesn’t indicate they will try to annex other countries…” Heard of Tibet? Then don’t forget the Chinese and Indians have their issues.

Before that, China had a history of annexing its neighbors. The Land of Chin and the People of Han are full of annexing land and peoples. Vietnamese and Thailand have historic antithapy aimed at the Chinese that the savagery of Imperial Japan put on the back burner.

The lesson is don’t underestimate Chinese ambitions. (Since 2002 they have increased their defense budget six times)
http://​www​.washingtonpost​.com/​w​o​r​l​d​/​a​s​i​a​_​p​a​c​i​f​ic/

Here’s an article

Relax Francis. Not God talking. (I would have struck you with a lightning bolt by now to jolt some sense in you :) Just sharing a whole bunch of truth. Be happy! Free education!

Your words… “Much of our heavy force should be moved into inviolate storage, much of the Army’s force structure could be moved into reserve status, with the savings being used to make the lighter force more effective, with growing roles in homeland security, peacekeeping, and humanitarian missions.”

Key points, “Much of our heavy force, much of the Army’s force structure could be moved into reserve status,”

Not a recipe for dealing with a conventional situation until it’s over. As for the balanced approach, the Army is doing that. Creating forces that can fight and win on high intensity conventional battlefields and devolve into low intensity warfare. http://​www​.dodbuzz​.com/​2​0​1​2​/​1​0​/​2​3​/​a​r​m​y​-​a​d​o​p​t​s​-​new

The Army has been serving the nation just fine for 237 years. It’s pretty arrogant to think you just broke the code.

That boat mentioned that is probably sinking, thanks to ALL of the technical material advancements we have allowed our enemies to get free, or steal from underneath our noses…We may even say thanks to ALL those American patriots that sold them the technology, or stole it for them.…to those immigrants that were thankful to get in our country, under false pretenses, but fooled the hell out of our government, with the Liberals making their cases for free entry.… Open borders, non-existing immigration laws, liberal lawyers, courts, judges.….Oh we many folks to thanks for that boat sinking weaponhead.….

WTF is Ms. Heidi Shyu talking about? She is talking about spending, spending, spending tax payer money. She does not give a shit about the military, just about her share holders. The Taliban is doing a fine job without spending, spending, spending. They get plenty of protection money from the convoys that depart Pakistan, drugs, etc.

Yes…1800 years ago the Han Dynasty did some expanding.

I’m not underestimating Chinese ambitions, I’m talking about they way they plan to go about achieving those ambitions. A good case study is Taiwan. China would have long ago cowed Taiwan into coming back into the Chinese fold were it not for Taiwan being backed by the US. The Chinese learned from the 1995–96 Taiwan crisis. We sailed a couple of carriers down the Taiwan Strait and dared’em to do anything about it. It worked cause China could not deny us that access–they knew it, we knew it, and Taiwan knew it. China has been working to correct that deficiency ever since (see your article link), and they’re making progress. We have to match it. IMHO, they care about expanding Chinese borders, they want to expand Chinese influence while diminishing US influence–from my point of view those two things are not one in the same.

You have no US forces examples in modern history that were crushed by a better equipped high optempo army. This would be the only acceptable reference points because they would come closest to taking into account many other variables such as the impact of other services, allies, or other dynamic conditions, such as whether to even employ a light unit against a heavy unit, which would be silly. In the unlikely event that we would find ourselves against a superior ground force, we could employ a variety of TTP’s to not get “CRUSHED” by an enemy.
So much for your theory on the versatility of high ops tempo BCTs facility with converting to counterinsurgency: http://​archive​.truthout​.org/​a​r​t​i​c​l​e​/​f​o​r​-​u​s​-​t​r​o​ops

This is how you get to retention, since you need everything including the ABC’s explained to you. The Army continually wants to focus on high intensity ops. Our politicians are sane enough to avoid these confrontations. The Nation needs the Army to conduct counterinsurgency, which it has neglected because of its culture and your dogged defese of it. Your heavy troopers have to do the door kicking, which isn’t what they are trained for and expect. Morale plummets, spouses are pissed off. Soldier leaves the force that has not prepared them properly, because it would rather spend decades pursuing Comanche, Crusader, FCS, and GCV. Oh yes, the taxpayer gets to pay for all those unexpected retention bonuses to required to keep Soldiers in uniform, which of course the Army or you would never include in your calculus of how best to structure the Armed forces and what it costs. Your mockery of me using the last ten years of conflict as models with which to guide decision making forward while you then yourself go all in on hypocrisy and depend on China/Japan (40s?), and China Tibet — this is the real laugher. US counterinsurgency forces have so much in common with Tibetan monks.

If the units exist and are resorced, then what is the need for a “pivot”? Where did I say “don’t need high intensity force”? What’s that you jerk you can’t find it? Got a dictionary where you can look up the difference between “cut back” and “don’t need”? Did I say anything like “we don’t need high intensity Air/Navy/Marine forces”? NO?! It’s obvious you’re resorting to straw man argumentation because you cannot debate in a rational manner.

Not to put too fine a point on it, but MacArthur was a rather strong practitioner of the indirect approach, who, faced with a real land war against China, could think of nothing else but to utilize nuclear weapons on the battlefield to make up the force balance. He also seems to have gained the view, after the surrender of Japan, that nuclear weapons had changed the nature of war forever. Bacevich’s “The Pentomic Era” documents the strategic and intellectual rut the Army got into after WWII and Korea, including the controversies over limited war and irregular warfare that bedevil us today — or at least they should. My own view is that we will need to be prepared to deal with the inevitable results of nuclear proliferation and will see a nuclear war, probably somewhere in Asia, sometime in this century,

I do curse the day someone thought it was a good idea to take business management practices and apply them as a core principle of national strategy. Every time some K Street pundit engages in this kind of language, I’d like to wash their mouth out with soap. In point of fact, it becomes nothing more than a policy excuse for neglecting the US military and beggaring its readiness in the tradional and time-honored American way. I’m happy to debate burden sharing, but too much of that conversation has the flavor of “if wishes were horses, beggars would ride”. Time and experience has proven that the USA cannot beat its allies in a negative arms race.

16 divisions is just an arbitrary number based on our last Cold War force structure. Bush took it to 12 divisions, right after Desert Storm, and Clinton earned his peace dividend bones by taking it down to 10, then hollowing out those 10 a little bit more with Division XXI (even while the Army quadrupled the division area of operations). One can only live in fantasy land so long, so the broken Army of 2004, with massive reserve callups, and an eventual very modest and temporary increase in active Army forces structure of 10% under Robert Gates proves how unsustainable the 1990s level force structure was. And we will be fortunate if we can even keep that baseline once the post GWOT cuts really take hold.

projob66, I’m getting tired of some Marines denigrating other services, especially the Army. ____The Marines have been making up stuff to try to put themselves above the other services since at least WWI. ____The Germans never called Marines “Devil Dogs” in WWI, a US reporter with the Marines made that up. ____At the “frozen Chosin” in Korea, an Army unit (Regimental Combat Team 31) on one side of the reservoir was 1/10 the size of a Marine unit on the other, and faced a larger Chinese attack than the Marines did. Yet all you hear from Marines was that the Marines held the line and the Army didn’t — of course the Army didn’t, because the unit was completely destroyed with massive casualties, but it inflicted enormous losses on the Chinese. To hear the Marines talk about it, they won Fallujah all by themselves, forgetting about the Army units involved. finally, the Army has always had a massive presence in the Pacific, even in WWII (about 20 US Army divisions compared to about 6 Marine divisions). –end part 1

–start part 2 — You just don’t hear as much about the Army in the Pacific in WWII for two major reasons: the Marines suffered a higher casualty rate in the Pacific than the Army did in the Pacific theater, and because the land battles in the European theater were of a much more massive scale (the US Army had about 80 divisions in Europe, and there were many hundreds of divisions when all combatants were totaled). There are dozens of other examples of things that you just wouldn’t know if you only listed to some Marines denigrate the other services.

Steve, WTF are YOU talking about? Ms. Shyu is the ACQUISITION executive. Her job is the ACQUIRE things. Perhaps you would like to trade your place and go fight with the resources and equipment that the Taliban has? Where do you come off saying she “doesn’t care about the military, just her share holders”?

doningram, your post makes absolutely no sense. You make a couple stupid assertions without any facts or references to back them up.

Yeah, sure I was. My initial post was directly quoted an Army general. VP’s next post was “That general was Dwight Eisenhower”. Then went off on his tangent of Eisenhower’s doctrine & Presidency. You think I would rather wrestle with him on his tangent, then clarify if he was inaccurate on who he said the quote came from? It’s obvious who is trying to obfuscate the issues, change subjects, and cannot even provide a simple yes/no response to who made what quote. Short, sarcastic answers are indicative of people who are out of intellectual ammo.

For this post, I’ll concede to you all points regarding Eisenhower’s doctrines. Thank you for the history lesson.

Working wih allies to build interational capabilities is more a geopolitical issue than a business management one. International legitimacy & reputation is equally if not more important than military strength. Why do you think the Soviet Union lost the Cold War?

Maj R0d — I challenge you to documente where I said the “Army is requesting 16+ heavy divisions?” It’s clear who is desperately making stuff up.

That’ s more indicative of waste & poor business practice than a lack of the taxpayer supporting the Army with financial resources.

Nonsense. There is only a small community in the Army that wants to maintain counterinsurgency capability. As evidenced by how long it took for the Army to get around to having someone like Petraeus revise the conterinsurgency manual. There’s a great book about the history of the 160th, and how one year one of their commanders spent their entire training budget on a realistic, complicated exercise that exposed all their flaws. The conventional thinking Army general said, “this is not our core competency”. The Army 0–5 said, “this is exactly what our core competency should be.” The Army is hardly “balanced”. Look at its embarassing dependence on contractors, slowness to adapt to the IED threat, and multiple embarassing scandals it has treated the nation to: Abu Gharib, Pat Tillman, Walter Reed, Maj Hasan, PFC Manning, recruiters having sex w/ recruits, Ft Braggs barracks debacle (youtube video), sending letters to families of deceased soldiers encouraging them to “rejoin the Army.:” The Army is far from balaced. Weaponhead said it well above, if your ship is sinking you should fix it before setting on a new course.

You’re wasting my time now. It’s clear you have a hard on for the Army while knowing nothing about how it operates or how to fight a war. It isn’t perfect but it’s far from the CF you’ve tried to portray it.

You think it took a long time to write the latest COIN manual? Do you know when it was started, how it differes from the previous one and how long it takes to rewrite a manual? Do you know what techniques tactics and procedures were in effect before the manual was published? You’ll find we were applying COIN and even after applying the manual in full it took four years to settle things to the point we could leave using a mixture of COIN and counter Guerrilla approaches. Do the research. You’ll be surprised. (Though I doubt you’ll spend the time to educate yourself)

Your Reference to TF 160 has no context and knowing your propensity to make things up I doubt it’s true..

Listing a myriad of problems with your own weak analysis hardly proves anything. Slow to address IEDs? In what way? Tactics, strategy or equipment and by what measure? We suffer casualties to direct fire. Is our “failure to not wrap the soldier in body armor a slowness to fix the problem? Are we supposed to have zero casualties in war?

The list of scandals is a ridiculous litany with no relationship. I could list the same number of well known controversies in any other branch. (E.G. Air Force losing nukes, Dover remains mishandling/punish whistleblowers, Lakeland training sexual abuse controversy relieving over 30 instructors,the C27j Fiasco and cutting ARNG disproportionately, two gay officers in Florida panhandle having sex with kids, etc.) It hardly equates to a broken ship.

(Airmen, not making the case the Air Force is broken. It’s not. Just showing a list of blemishes (we all have them) doesn’t mean a ssrvice is broken)

Anyway Peritus, stick to your day job. Analyzing what’s wrong with the Army and how it should become a primarily COIN focused force isn’t your forte.

“There are many political & economic constraints to why we can’t build & sustain 16+ heavy divisions”

No, it’s how you answer a verbose individual who doesn’t know what he’s talking about.

The readers will decide who is has a handle on things.

Some of this is legitimately in the Army’s lane, some of it not. Do we train allies ? You bet, and that has been a high demand thrust in this administration — but there have been times and places where it was considered too sensitive to put green suits with boots on the ground — and the State Department dispatched MPRI instead. Disaster response — well, show me where that is laid out in the Army Universal Task List. Oh, you couldn’t find it, could you ? Problem. There is a DHS organization that is responsible for “homeland border security” — not the US Army. The bottom line is the Army is not just a job shop that you can plug into to fill out any government organization that wears a uniform. We train to the mission so that we can do it one time, the first time, and do it right.

VP — You might want to clarify you are talking about ALL divisions not just heavy.

This reminds me of a conversation I had with John Feffer back in the 90s. Now you don’t get much farther left than Feffer, but at the time he was goading the Army to reform itself and to take on a constabulary role. Of course that was before we really did have to take on a constabulary role in Iraq — which of course Feffer opposed vigorously and viciously. But some of that did apparently motivate General Shinseki to go for a “new look”, with berets and wheeled personnel carriers, and large HUMINT cells in the SBCT headquarters staff and — of course, Future Combat Systems (which in turn was used to terminate Comanche and Crusader). Back in those days I was writing Hackworth and explaining how the Army could restructure by going to separate brigades, one patch per cadre, and eliminating divisions in peacetime. MacGregor had his own brain cramp, and so we did the UE/UA thing, then BCTs. The point is that there are those people out there, like Feffer, who would like to “reform” the Army out of existence. Such people will get no love from this corner.

You’re a dingbat. Since I don’t have an example of US forces being crushed I haven’t made my point? Ridiculous.

Yes, explain retention to me. Uh, how many reenlistment counseling sessions have you done? I can’t even remember how many I’ve done over 20+ years.

At this point constructive convo has ended. You’ve wasted my time. If you want to continue, I’m going to waste yours…

You’re the LAST guy to call any debate rational.

Like I said I think we agree more than we disagree but I tend to believe they aren’t willing to wait a century. Their timeline is more like 20–30 years barring national disasters.

The Soviet Union imploded from within. To this day, I can’t say that we completely understand why. Its economy was broke, and that certainly contributed to the collapse. But that does not explain what happened, for example why the Communist party bosses for each of the Soviet Republics just went on, shucked off the Communist mantle, and set up little satrapies on their own. In a sense, this was the moral collapse of Russian imperialism as much as the death of an ideology.

I suppose it would make us all feel better if an Army Chief of Staff went to work one day, laid his stars on the Service Secretary’s desk and said, “I quit. I can’t do this any more and I’m going public in opposition to the government’s policy.” Although general officers are excellent men, they do tend to breed out that kind of independent moral toughness. Those of us who have served understand the pressures to “do more with less”. It is really a hollow slogan, and I do not believe there is much left to give. If it makes you feel better, the trend is to put heavy forces in the reserve, but the question I have is, well — where do you expect the next generation to learn its business ?

Perhaps this is an issue worth discussion, but I think this concern would be better directed at the Air Force and the Navy rather than the Army. Current doctrine says do both combined arms maneuver and wide area security it roughly equal proportions. I have seen nothing to indicate a shift in that doctrine, or the policy underlying it. Personally, I would like to see a thorough debate on the lessons of Iraq and Afghanistan, not just a history lesson but something more like an extended after action review up and down the force, that seeks thorough change and deep reform. We did something like that after Vietnam, and the results speak for themselves. But this is something that has to come from within the Army, not imposed from outside.

Currantly Defense is around 4% of GDP…and bullets are flying.

Cold War Deterrance in Reagan and previous administrations regularly reached 6% of GDP.

I’m not saying that throwing money, in itself, is the answer.

I am saying we have previous precedence to commit the resources for coordinated strategies and capabilities developed to over-match known threats — to over the horizon and a few “Mentalists” to anticipate future challenges/ contingencies that will turn up.

Civil Operations: ART 7.4.1 Provide Support in Response to Disaster or Terrorist Attack

Your inability to find where I said “don’t need a high intensity force”, “don’t need a high intensity Air/Navy/Marine force”? (since Air/Navy/Marines are “forces”) is noted. For the record this is what you said I said: “Then you take the versatility of SBCT/HBCT units shedding their heavy capabilities to conduct low intensity ops as proof we don’t need high intensity forces?”

Yes your examples do not make your point. We have historical examples of how US Army forces trained for high intensity ops had to trade in their heavy gear and relearn new competencies such as door kicking and nation building on the fly. We have $1T+ in cost & 10+ years of a US Army focused on high intensity ops that has given us no decisive outcomes in either Iraq nor Afghanistan. Instead we are stuck with reversible gains. Your service of reenlistment counseling sessions is admirable, but besides the point. Realiy/experience have been when you take Soldiers oriented towards “core competencies”, make them trade in their Abrams/Bradleys/Strykers for kicking in doors, drinking chai, and building nations, they don’t like that. General Sullivan pretty much summarizes the debate between us now: http://​www​.foxnews​.com/​o​p​i​n​i​o​n​/​2​0​1​1​/​1​2​/​2​2​/​w​h​y​-​are

There is a great difference in cost between the USAF scandals you cited & the Army ones. nukes/Dover/sex/C-27/ARNG/gays — no noe died. Abu Gharib — one of the biggest blows to US credibility that will have consequences for decades to come. Sgt Bales — serious blow to success in Afghanistan, contributing to the continued state of decline — Koran burnings, Afghan forces shooting US soldiers. Ft Hood Shooting — worst shooting on US miltiary base ever.

Brings major doubts to US military leadership credibility that ignored warning signs, promoted him, and gave him a TS clearance. Pat Tillman — outright lying to our fallen veteran’s families. Walter Reed & Ft Braggs– horrendous treatment of our wounded & returning Soldiers (not a priority in the hgh ops tempo crusade or Pacific pivot), PFC Manning — what do you think this has done to interservice & international cooperation? Let’s add brazen insubordination to the President by a 4 Star General to the list, and you can see the overwhelming evidence that the Army is a cf, but you don’t have to take my word for it, you could read McMaster’s Dereliction of Duty or Nagl’s Failure of Generalship essay or the Gansler commission on failures of Army contracting and come to the same conclusions. Thank God for some Army leaders that will face facts and get past the party talking points that keep us from making things better. THere was a survey that found a quarter of Army officers believe the service is on the right track. Guess we know where you match up. http://​www​.boston​.com/​n​e​w​s​/​n​a​t​i​o​n​/​a​r​t​i​c​l​e​s​/​2​0​1​2/0

No not “wasted assets”. they served a valuable purpose in past conflict, and now times have changed and we have smarter ways to apply resources. they could still theoretically provide military utility, but we have “accepted the risk” not to man forts such as Ft Miles near Rehoboth Beach. Now it is better served as a wonderful place to visit on holiday and reflect on our country’s great history & military tradition.

“Army is requesting 16+ heavy divisions” does not equal “There are many political & economic constraints to why we can’t build & sustain 16+ heavy divisions.” no more than 2 + 2 does not equal 5.

i suffer from and hate ‘do more with less’ as much as anyone. but there is no good reason why we should not be able to do better with what we have, given the shocking amounts of mismanagement & waste.

right and there’s many parallels between the Soviet Union’s implosion and our possible fate. the protracted costly ground war in Afghanistan was one of the nails in the USSR’s coffin. And the USSR was noted for its commitment to high optempo ground conflict as well, and demonstrated they weren’t very effective at countering insurgents. Maybe if the USSR had reallocated its resources as it did, and developed and sustained a more economy vs its resource consuming ground war machine, things could have turned out better for them.

got evidence?

no, it’s how you obfuscate when you are afraid of what will happen when the simplest of clarifications is intended.

Where did I “make the case to not resource high intensity forces.” You do realize that I suggested a reservation of the heavy force, which would require resourcing, just not as much as maintaining the current force structure? You do realize that Army/Navy/Marines are “forces”, that I have not suggested to “not resource”, even though I am open to options for greater efficiency?

“Anybody who’s been in the Army more than a week knows the Infantryman can’t do everything alone” is neither a historical fact nor a time immemorial truth of warfare. It’s a stupid statement intended to discredit anyone that hasn’t served in Army as not having valid ideas in the national security strategy resourcing discussion.

“There is now almost unstoppable momentum from sources to significantly reduce Army and Marine Corps force structure and to refocus the force on “core competencies,” which is code for “conventional warfare.” This thinking will eliminate many of the programs that emerged as essential to success in irregular warfare. It is based in the misguided notion that we simply won’t “do” large scale, irregular warfare any more.”

No, it’s pretty much a fact. If you feel discredited it’s only because what you say flies in the face of common sense.

Anyway the comment was directed at VP.

Where? Right here…

Your words… “Much of our heavy force should be moved into inviolate storage, much of the Army’s force structure could be moved into reserve status, with the savings being used to make the lighter force more effective, with growing roles in homeland security, peacekeeping, and humanitarian missions.”

Only in your mind is that “resourcing”. Putting equipment in a warehouse where we aren’t raining with it or the majority of our capability in a force that takes months to get ready to deploy isn’t “resourcing”.

Desperate for an intelligent conversation huh? So needy…

God you’re such an idiot… I am no longer writing substantial paragraphs to educate you. I’m leaving you to wallow in your ignorance and occasionally point it out.

BTW, I served with McMaster when we were instructors at the Academy. His book was on Vietnam and the decision making that continued it not on contractors. Another EXCELLENT example at trying to look like you’re presenting an intelligent argument but you’re just making stuff up.

You’ve destroyed your credibility better than I ever could.. Keep talking.

I’m not even sure what this is referring to — does mean anything other than the number of ranger battalions, A teams, Civil Affairs detachments and linguistically qualified foreign area officers we can put in the field ? Hint: “large scale irregular warfare” is an oxymoron.

Thanks for playing. The decomposition of this task leaves a lot to be desired. Do terrorist attacks and natural disasters require the same set of responses ? If not, why do I lump them together ? You will notice that there are no standards/metrics for the task you cite. And their are only two subtasks –both of which reference the stability ops manual for the task you cite.

so you first allege that disaster response can’t even be found in the UTL list. I show you that it is (you’re wrong) and now you change the goal line to it’s not decomposed well enough, which proves my point, the Army says they are focused on a full spectrum of missions, but their heart is in conventional ops.

Dereliction of Duty probably not the best example, since it is more about dysfunction even above the Army level. Doesn’t take away from all the screw ups mentioned. Your non-response to the cost comparison of the USAF screw ups vs the Army’s is telling.

nah. just asking of you what you ask of many posters here to back up their claims. The difference is most of them do without the snarkiness. You have another chance to share with us your inside intel on China’s grand strategy for the next 20–30 years, the threat that makes to the US, and how that should drive US defense strategy. Love to see the data & methodology on that one.

I didn’t feel discredited because your statement was too stupidly obvious. and since you chimed on my discussion with VP over Mac/Eisenhower you’ll fairly be held accountable for anything you post to anyone.

you must use a different dictionary than the rest of the world. First off inviolate storage means maintaining gear to its performance specification, not “warehousing”. Resource means provide the funds to make a requirement happen, which I said I would do. USAF/Navy/Marines are have “high intensity forces”, and I made no indications that I would not “resource” them, although I am open to options for greater efficiency.

FCS is a clear example of the consequences of the Army’s misguided prioritization of conventional ops above other missions. While sodliers were getting blown up by IED’s, costing us in K’s of casualties and unestimatable $B’s of dollars in the future to care for the wounded, the Army chose its resource priority as FCS, sinking over $15B in an effort that was doomed from the beginning, had its origins in an “Other Transactional Agreement” vs a FAR based contract, so the Army could create “irreversible momentum”. They intentionally created a “too big to fail” program, this is standard Army M.O..

The Army expended it’s leadership political capital, rather than resourcing MRAPs and other technology enablers of the counterinsurgency & counterterrorist fight. It took bold and unprecedented SecDef leadership to push MRAPs to their rightful prioritization, as well as courageous and painful decision to terminate FCS MGVs because the Army would not self correct. The SecDef had to do the “organize, train, and equip” mission the Army failed to do, under the most difficult of conditions in the middle of a shooting war, that the Army could and should have done during peace time prior to war.

The Army hasn’t ‘fixed’ their deployment leadership that delayed getting a supposedly moble, rapid deployment division off base for several months at the beginning of Desert Storm. National Guard and Reserves were there more quickly than the Army’s touted professional soldiers. There is a definite leadership issue that can cost lives and wars. What good will new teck stuff do if the generals can’t get off the golf course?

“They intentionally created a “too big to fail” program, this is standard Army M.O.”

Uh yeah, the other services aren’t guilty of that and BTW, the program failed…

“and other technology enablers” Examples?

And again, you make it sound like the Army has been the only one. No doubt FCS wasted resources but EVERY service is guilty of this. FCS consisted of over TWENTY weapon systems Several of these programs actually made it into service (e.g. various UGV & UAVs, Precision munitions like Excalibur &,PGMM, sensor fusion of those systems to the warfighter.). FCS has a lot of blemishes but only the most ignorant talk about it as if it was one system that resulted in no benefit.

Congrats Peritus you win the kewpie doll.

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