GD apologizes to Army over radio testing critique

GD apologizes to Army over radio testing critique

A  spat between the Army and General Dynamics over test results of the Manpack Radio erupted Tuesday at the Association of the U.S. Army’s annual conference when DoDBuzz asked Army Maj. Gen. Genaro Dellarocco, head of U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command, if the Army had taken steps to settle the dispute over the Network Integration Evaluation’s testing conditions.

General Dynamics’ Manpack Radio received negative reviews from soldiers testing them at White Sands Missile Range, N.M. Michael Gilmore, Director of Operational Test & Evaluation, tabbed the radio “not operationally suitable.” The Manpack passed a retest at Fort Huachuca, Ariz., in less challenging conditions. Gilmore said the radio continued to demonstrate “poor reliability,” according to a Bloomberg report.

However, Frank Kendall, the under secretary of defense for acquisition, still approved the awarding of a contract to General Dynamics to build 3,726 of the Manpack Radios. Infantry soldiers will carry the two-channel digital radios in their vehicles and in their packs.


General Dynamics C4 Systems President Christopher Marzilli told AOL Defense the Manpack Radio performed poorly because of unrealistic combat conditions at White Sands. “All radios had problems in that environment” because of the amount of radios emitting signals in the spectrum, Marzilli said in AOL Defense’s report.

The Army took offense. The NIE was stood up precisely to mimic combat conditions. Questioning those conditions was a direct shot at the entire existence of the NIE — a test the Army has held up as a symbol of progress in its improving acquisition arms.

Marzilli wrote a letter to Army officials apologizing for his comments. In fact, Dellarocco scrolled through his Blackberry and read directly from the letter after DoDBuzz asked if the testing conditions at White Sands needed to be changed. It’s rare for an Army official to so publicly call out a defense industry president.

On Monday, the Army opened up the competition for a wider fielding of the Manpack Radio. Defense analysts suspected that Marzilli’s comments could be held against General Dynamics as competitors like Harris and BAE Systems line up to fight for the multi-million dollar contract. Army leaders confirmed that would not be the case.

Bloomberg reporter Tony Cappacio asked Dellarocco if tension exists between Gilmore’s agency and the U.S. Army Test and Evaluation Command following the dispute over the radio testing conditions. Dellarocco said no, although he did say “he sees things in black and white, we see things in shades, well I don’t want to go there.”

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“All radios had problems in that environment” because of the amount of radios emitting signals in the spectrum…

New combat rule—No more than 4 radios turned on at a time.

Any weapon isn’t perfect or radio so some road bumps are expected.

The Army needs a divorce from GD. Army MRAP program office put together a sham procurement for a “digital backbone” based all so that they could use GDs smart display. Oh boy, we can’t justify going sole-source to GD so let’s pick our components and then do a “competitive” procurement for the kitting contract.…all to get GD smart display. There was a protest and the Army had to go through the motions of sending out “sources sought” notices for the digital backbone components just to satisfy the Court of Federal Claims.…..but the MRAP PM had already planned to use this new radio system.
How much money did these defense contractors invest in putting together sales packages for their C4I systems when PM MRAP already knew what they were gonna do.….…
Disgusting.……

It seems to me that both the Army and GD are ignoring a basic issue with man-pack radios and all other gear in the class of so-called “software controlled radios”. Such radios consume about half of the available bandwidth in network management overhead. This happens because radios employing JTRS waveforms and TDM protocols must search for nearest-neighbor ad hoc network nodes while moving over terrain. There isn’t one thing that can be done to change or improve on this performance. Moreover, the signalling demands of Army forces have been allowed to grow without limits, while available bandwidth is limited by unallocated RF spectrum. This is a prescription for network gridlock, and it’s most unlikely to be curable with digital radios.

After the first shot is fired, all battle plans go right out the window.

Many moons ago, the DOT and NHTSA built a “crashproof” car that was designed to to save the occupants from a 60 mph head on crash. After the first crash with the usual test dummies inside, it was revealed through the sensors and like equipment that all the occupants had died.
To put a spin on it, the gov’t announced that the occupants were only “slightly” killed so I guess that made it a safe vehicle. Thankfully, the car was never produced.
This parallels the statement that “All radios had problems in that environment” because of the amount of radios emitting signals in the spectrum.

In analysis that we did for the Army several years ago, we identified numerous COTS MANET suppliers that had network management software that was far more efficient than the JTRS design or the Soldier Radio Waveform. They would not hog the bandwidth like the JTRS waveforms do. However, because these suppliers were not a part of the “organic supply chain”, their offerings received scant attention by the acquisition community. And in a rather pointed exchange between a GDC4 PM and a representative of the Army Science Board a few years ago, the GDC4 PM acknowledged that the performance objectives of their radio were dependent on technology innovations from a COTS supplier that had yet to appear on the horizon. In the private sector, we call that “vaporware.” In defense, it’s a “KPP threshold not yet met.”

Looks like the Army will waste millions on perfecting a system that will barely work when it is fully operational. And we wonder why the DoD consumes so much of our taxpayer money. I mean the Army spent 33 million dollars on deciding on new camouflage and then realized the new design wasn’t that great.

Ask Thales Com for a Bid !

These type lessons need to be remembered in New Procurement Processes, and projected needs. There is no Money to risk or spend on non-producing equipment to do it all over again. The “BDU Development & Pattern Designs” is a good example at frivolousness.

They have to be better than the PRC-10 I carried in Viet Nam.

A couple of years ago, the Army performed a year-long “Army Acquisition Review”, with the help of a large group of experienced senior officials and General Officers. They found about half of the money spent in new systems development and acquisition during the past 20 years was in programs cancelled before they reached large scale production. I haven’t seen comparable numbers for the Air Force and Navy, but similar results wouldn’t surprise me. That’s tens of Billions of dollars thrown down rat holes.

I believe a single factor is the unambiguous cause of most of this waste: the JROC process in military requirements is broken. Military careerists are permitted to submit their “dream sheets” of unrealistic requirements, which are validated by a technically weak “Oversight Council” and then move through Milestone A (program validation) unchecked by reality. That flawed process continues until Industry runs into the inevitable brick walls during systems development or test, and the program fails.

What’s needed instead is re-balancing DoD procurement dollars to bring technology to maturity BEFORE large scale programs are permitted to write their CONOPs and begin systems development. If the requirement isn’t right — and technically feasible — then the acquisition never will be.

“to bring technology to maturity BEFORE large scale programs are permitted”

But then you won’t get those generational-leap technologies that make for such great Powerpoint theater. On occasion I’ll go back and look at the FCS briefings for a good laugh and ponder “what were they thinking?”

I’ve thought often about the view graph engineering and emotional denials that characterized FCS. I led research and writing for several of the releases of the FCS Technology Development Strategy during the seven years I was with the program in one of its LSI contractor groups. There ARE no intentional generational leaps. Paradigm change (now a maligned phrase) almost always happens by accident not by design. And my professional advice to young program managers is “unproven high technology and complexity are NOT your friends!”

What the heck is General Dynamics complaining about the testing requirements for? A serviceman or woman’s life could depend on how well this works.

kind of contrary to “Victory at the speed of light” and “the best way to predict the future is to create it” marketing slogans perpetuated by FCS powerpoints & youtube videos eh?

listen to this man, people. But LTC USAF what you describe is really what the DoD 5000 acquisition process status quo is. the problem is that the best processes can get defeated by a service’s senior leadership that promotes a corrupt agenda through bureaucratic force and “irreversible momentum”

Army decision making on technology is about as stupid and corrupt as it gets. we need a stronger OSD that can slam the door on foolishness so we don’t have zombie doomed to fail programs that last 10+ years & billions of dollars while overpromising and underdelivering, constantly holding a carrot in front of our noses and holding us hostage to sunk costs.

We can solve these problems by creating a group of signal corps NCOs (SGT/SSG) with combat experience to make the decisions on what works on the battlefield and what doesn’t. Radios designed by “organic” contractors have historically carried unsuspected problems. For example, every wonder why th.e RT 1523C/D models were never issued Army wide? NOT for the official reason given. In 1998 the 101st ABN DIV discovered during the EPLRS field test that the RT 1523C/D would not OTAR with the previous versions and the engineers/designers could not figure out why. The personnel who discovered and reported the problem were 2 SPC and one SGT.
These personnel are also less likely to play nice with the contractors in the hopes of getting employment in the future.

The power points and videos were certainly large parts of the problems FCS had. But a more fundamental issue still needs to be addressed: the FCS Operational Requirements Document developed by the Army specialty schools and approved by the Army bureaucracy contained over 550 numbered requirements, many of which were outright vaporware. And it was APPARENT to many working engineers from the start of Concept Development and Test (CDT), that about half of the 550+ were infeasible due to either inadequate technology or violating laws of physics. With that large a credibility gap, the FCS CONOP was impracticable from day one — but nobody in real authority would stand up and say so. Careers had become identified with the success of the program, and emotional denial kicked in.

FCS’ problems dated from before the issuance or update of DoD 5000 regs. In the late 1990s, a General named Shinseki read the imaginings of Alvin and Heidi Toffler –popular futurists who had never fought a war — and decided that the way out of the Army’s acute problems with recruiting enlisted people was to replace fighting troops on the ground with stand-off precision weapons and network technology. Careerism again kicked in, as dissenting staff were told they wouldn’t have one unless they got with the General’s program.

For all its failings in application, I believe the principles behind DoD 5000 regs are sound. Expensive and slow when applied to highly complex systems, but sound. The bureaucrats and the generals mis-perceived the problem when they worked around the regs, instead of simplifying their requirements enough for the regs to work.

When a combat capability is thinly supported by technology, it cannot be a “requirement”. It’s a “desirement”. And it should drive long range R&D in the lab, not short-range systems development for field troops. Shinseki and ASA(ALT) never seemed to understand that.

Amen. It seems if a product doesn’t work its guaranteed to be procured. It would be nice if defense contracting worked like contracting in the civilian sector. If it has problems, it gets fixed before it is purchased.

Groan, I just had flashbacks to the ‘90s and the procurement of the Stryker.

Though amusingly, when told the US would occupy and hold Iraq, he seemed to have little faith in technology to be able to do it with less than half a million troops. It reveals some slanted mental development which focused on using technology to bring down the manpower cost of invasion, but not on how to deal with the flip side of the coin, occupation after the end of major hostilities.

And now Shinseki is at the VA…

…If you are a field grade or general officer and are assigned to a contractor’s project, your career may well be on the line. The survival rate of officers who call their projects “turkeys” is depressing. I suppose that it is human nature that if you can’t get out in time to save your career… that you sell your soul so that either the military will buy it… or at least you will have a good job to help you put your kids through college.

…The military has many, many fine officers… It also has a history of paying money for garbage and otherwise getting rubbish into the hands of our men.. Hats, shoes and tunics that dissolved in the rain in the Civil War… Brass for Cavalry carbines that broke extractors at the Little Bighorn… Rancid canned meat that poisoned our men in the Spanish American War…

…In WWII the Reising gun… the Brewster Buffalo… and two years of denying that American torpedoes absolute crap…

…Vietnam, LAWs absorbed moisture… soon useless. Military refused to deal with problem… Most LAWs at Lang Vei (near Khe Sahn) SF base would not fire when enemy tanks in the wire…

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