Influential Australian counterinsurgency adviser, David Kilcullen, says the Obama administration risks a Suez style disaster if it fails to deploy the troop numbers requested by Afghan commander Gen. Stanley McChrystal. The deep divisions within the administration and the long delay in answering McChrystal’s plea for more troops has created deep concerns among NATO allies and has presented an exploitable opportunity for the Taliban, Kilcullen tells Britain’s Guardian newspaper.

The American battle for Sadr City in 2008 and the Israeli war in Gaza later that year are being held up as models for future fights against irregular opponents. We take a look at some of the key lessons learned from both operations as well as an important factor that may limit where they can be replicated.

Updated: New “Gates Option” said to be Pentagon’s preferred choice.

Conflicting reports continue to come from the Pentagon and the White House as to whether Obama will give McChrystal his requested reinforcemnts. We take a look at where things stand nearly two months after McChrystal requested more troops.

The man at the pointy end of the spear of missile defense and of nuclear weapons warned today that the US must carefully weigh any increase in missile defense — particularly on the West Coast — to avoid triggering a “destabilizing” reaction by the Peoples Republic of China. “We have to be cautious about missile defense…[which] can be destabilizing if you are not careful,” said Air Force Gen. Kevin Chilton, commander of Strategic Command and one of the military’s brightest brains. When the US places anti-ballistic missile assets on the West Coast, “What does it make the Chinese think…?” he asked.

A report by GAO cites enemy initiated attacks in Afghanistan as a useful metric showing a deterioriating security situation there. Yet, increased contact with the Taliban results from more troops moving into more areas and aggressively patrolling. It raises the question of what metrics should be used to measure progress in guerrilla wars.

Supporters of an escalation in Afghanistan argue that only a troop intensive counterinsurgency there can prevent a spillover of the fighting into neighboring Pakistan, a much more strategically vital country. CSIS’s Rick Nelson warns that an expanded offensive in Afghanistan risks pushing more militants into Pakistan, worsening stability there and ultimately hindering efforts to eliminate Al Qaeda.

Frustration over the Obama administration’s delay in sending more troops to Afghanistan is mounting among the hawkish set inside Washington. At an AEI conference yesterday, some of the same folks who had a hand in promoting the Iraq surge back in 2006 called for an even bigger troop surge in Afghanistan, warning that any delays risks certain defeat.

“I believe that the US at the moment does not have the political will, nor the public understanding and commitment to do what is necessary in Afghanistan.” Those are the words of Muqtedar Khan, director of the University of Delaware’s Islamic studies program, testifying Monday morning before the House Armed Services subcommittee on oversight and investigations.

In what appears to mark a major shift in Chinese military and arms control strategy, the head of the PRC’s air force has said in an official interview that military operations in space are an “historical inevitability.” General Xu Qiliang said that, “As far as the revolution in military affairs is concerned, the competition between military forces is moving towards outer space… this is a historical inevitability and a development that cannot be turned back.”

Two Australian military thinkers take a crack at the tough nut that is Hezbollah like hybrid enemies and come up with a manuever concept that seeks to restore striking power to the offensive. They envision swarms of small teams to probe and infiltrate a defender coupled to precision strike and superfast kill chains.

Reports indicate that the Obama administration will adopt a “hybrid” strategy in Afghanistan, with the vast majority of troops providing security in urban centers while drone strikes and raids would be used to check the Taliban in remote areas. The danger of such an approach is that once rural villages are ceded to insurgent control, they may never be recaptured as the Taliban expands its shadow government.

A number of experts now say the U.S. should abandon its “top down” strategy of building an Afghan national army. Better is a “bottom up” approach that arms and pays local tribes to fight the Taliban alongside U.S. special forces.